Senators upset US firms can invest in Myanmar's MOGE

Senators upset US firms can invest in Myanmar's MOGE

Senators John McCain (L) and Joe Lieberman (R) (AFP/Getty Images/File, Mark Wilson)

(AFP)–22 hours ago
WASHINGTON — Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman welcomed Thursday the easing of US sanctions on Myanmar but warned that doing business with the state oil and gas giant could put democratic reforms at risk.

President Barack Obama gave the green light Wednesday to companies to invest in Myanmar, in the United States' broadest and most controversial easing yet of sanctions on the former pariah nation.

Under the new rules, unveiled in recognition of reforms in the Southeast Asian nation dominated by the military since 1962, US companies will be able to enter into business with state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), but must notify the State Department within 60 days.

"We are pleased that US companies will now be able to invest in Burma, a step we have advocated," said Republican McCain and Independent Lieberman, a former Democrat, referring to the country by its former name.

"We are concerned, however, that the Obama administration has chosen to permit US firms to do business with MOGE at this time."

They said the firm's operations "remain non-transparent, and the billions of dollars in foreign investment that it receives remain unaccountable to the people and parliament of Burma, even though this money is state and national revenue.

"Under these conditions, we are concerned that doing business with MOGE runs the risk of setting back Burma's democratic reforms, rather than reinforcing them, as is our common goal."

US companies have been pressing for an end to restrictions on investment, fearing they will lose out to European and Asian competitors that already enjoy access to the potentially lucrative economy.

But Obama's move marks a rare divergence from Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar's Nobel Peace Prize-winning opposition leader, who has warned foreign firms not to partner with MOGE.

Suu Kyi, who spent years under house arrest but won a seat in parliament since the reforms, said on a recent tour of Europe that MOGE needed first to sign up to international standards such as the IMF code on transparency.

A new investment law is currently under consideration by Myanmar's parliament.

McCain and Lieberman said they had hoped Obama would have given Suu Kyi and other legislators more time to produce a new law enabling investment in Myanmar's energy sector "with a more transparent, accountable and reformed business partner than MOGE is at present."

The senators' statement comes hours before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Myanmar President Thein Sein hold landmark talks Friday in Cambodia on the sidelines of a business conference.

Clinton has welcomed reforms by Myanmar's government over the past year, such as welcoming Suu Kyi back into mainstream politics, but the top US diplomat acknowledged that concerns remained.

The death of intellectual sympathy

Dr Zarni: the death of intellectual sympathy

By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 30 August 2011

Dr Maung Zarni is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE)
He is also an activist, commentator and writer, having founded the Free Burma Coalition in the United States in 1995. He now lives and works in the United Kingdom.
He talks to DVB about the west’s relationship to Burma, delusional international relations, the state of political transition and anger.

Francis Wade: You’re known to be one of the most outspoken critics of the Burmese government and its allies, and have accused others of tiptoeing around the condemnation it warrants. Why do you feel a need to be somewhat vitriolic?

Dr Maung Zarni: I love your characterisation of my blistering criticisms as “somewhat vitriolic” against those whose views I consider “parasitically expert” or “expertly parasitical”.

To belabour the obvious, I am incredibly angry about what has been happening to my country over the past 50-years: Burma is dying a slow-death, by all indications. The more you know the angrier you get. Alas, Western minds are typically incapable of either appreciating this rage over a country’s tragedy but also comprehending any scathing criticism against the “parasitical expert” and other creatures, that make light of our Burmese hell-on-earth.

But this isn’t new. A century ago Rabindranath Tagore obviously had to deal with the same issue, “All the great nations of Europe have their victims in other parts of the world. This not only deadens their moral sympathy but also their intellectual sympathy, which is so necessary for the understanding of races which are not one’s own.”

Here I would simply add that it’s not just Europeans and other westerners who are incapable of understanding this profound rage among the Burmese but the colonised minds among us can’t appreciate it either.

FW: You have been critical of the EU, and what you see as it’s warming ties with Naypyidaw. Can you provide some context to the EU’s apparent shift?

MZ: The most helpful way to understand the EU is to disaggregate this entity. Instead of thinking of the EU as an enlightened multi-state organisation with humanity’s interests at its organisational heart, each time I hear the word “EU” what springs to mind is not the European peoples, millions of whom are themselves working poor or un- or under-employed, but rather, the word EU conjures up sinister images of Brussels’ Eurocrats in the pockets of European or EU-based corporations and national diplomats. Whose primary job description is to promote their home countries’ commercial, financial, industrial and security interests in their assigned outposts.

Then there are a myriad of banks, technology exporters, energy firms, insurance companies, large consultancies, development agencies, credit raters, gas and oil extractors, per-diem and commission-hunting experts and so on, who swarm the corridors of the EU’s national capitals, such as London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Stockholm, Rome, etc.

The EU shift on Burma is first and foremost commercially driven, and against the fact that Burma’s neighbours – such as the Koreans, the Thais, the Chinese, the Indian, the Singaporeans and so on are raking it in, in resource-rich Burma. Greed-driven, the EU feels no longer justified in pretending to live its official “liberal” humanist values.

Now the European interests are in ready-set-go mode, simply waiting for the whistle. I love Susan George, the head of the Transnational National Institute (TNI) when she bluntly and truthfully said, that EU is nothing more than a mechanism for different European commercial interests, devoid of any redeeming humanistic vision.

FW: Do you feel EU policy is intended to benefit Burmese, or is there an element of self-centredness in it?

MZ: You must be kidding! There are no free lunches in international relations. The EU isn’t staffed with our parents, not even stepfathers! According to a recent BBC documentary, the EU is pushing for relaxing restrictions on blood diamond imports from places like Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Find some of the most horrendous corners of the world, and you will find EU entities cuddling up to tin-point dictators.
So, the EU policy shift and policies are about EU interests, not about my people. Of course, there might be crumbs for the locals as “donors” bring in millions in so-called humanitarian aid to lay the ground work for their Burma and Southeast Asia-wide commercial and strategic agendas.

To be sure, there are a lot of well-meaning, in-country foreign diplomats; EU officials, development experts, etc. who would like the Burmese people to have a future. Many of them genuinely believe they are promoting public welfare. But ultimately, it is not their good-intentions and self-justifications for their own policies and initiatives that count, but the overall outcome of the concrete and impersonal policies and their impact on the historical developments of Burma as a whole.

It is a cliché to repeat here but; “The road to hell is paved with good intentions,” it is so true when it comes to international operations in Burma. Even Asian diplomats and ASEAN entities that openly coddle the Burmese generals delude themselves into thinking what they are doing is going to help the Burmese in the long run.

FW: Which country has taken this to the farthest extent, and why?

MZ: Obviously, France (with TOTAL Oil) must top the list here, followed by Germany. One of the major pillars of the German economy is Berlin’s ability to create ‘niche markets’ around the world for German industries. Burma with its estimated 50-million potential consumers is no small market. For capitalists, no amount of profit is small. The Brits are not so far behind either. More than 40% of Britain’s GDP is in the financial sector. British financial firms have never really ceased to operate in Burma, in one disguise or another.

Even the Norwegians and Scandinavians – with an eye on energy and agricultural sectors — are not as innocent as they would like to project themselves in the popular media. As a key consulting agency which drew up the operational plan for the Asian Development Bank-funded GMS energy market creation, the NorConsult, for instance, is deeply implicated in the creation of the integrated energy market within the six-country Greater Mekong Sub-Region.

The energy sector’s projected investment/capital needs for 25 years are about US$ 550billion. Imagine what the volume of capital (and its return) for two dozen different sectors – from government reforms, infrastructure construction, transport sector, agri-business, tourism, education upgrade, capacity building, etc. – would be.

FW: Among the calls coming from Germany is a softening of sanctions. How would this affect the government and in turn Burmese people?

MZ: At the profoundly psychological level, the immediate impact of EU’s softening of its stance towards the Burmese government would be de-legitimising and marginalising, in effect, the resistance movements, both armed and non-violent. Whilst strengthening the regime’s resolve to crush any type of serious resistance, especially from the non-Bama ethnic communities such as the Kachin, the Karen, the Karenni, and the Shan.

At a more material level, the policy softening comes with gradual shifting of support priorities away from the war-torn communities in Eastern Burma and the exile organisations which have played a vital role in keeping the flames of resistance alive, with many forms of interaction and support to their comrades inside the country, to the creation of local EU-proxies in the name of capacity building and community development.

This is resulting in the NGO-isation of politics in Burma, sucking local human resources into the NGO sector and away from popular resistance. Already we are seeing EU-funded entities such as Myanmar Egress that have become rather influential in promoting an intellectually dishonest and empirically false view – that development in a dictatorial political economy in particular and development in general can be, and is, a-political.

Incidentally, EU officials and national diplomats from European governments know damn well that the military government allows Egress to act as its public relations proxy. But what the public doesn’t know is that precisely because Egress is linked to the regime in power, the EU entities rush to work with it. There also appears to be greater interest in Burma from the likes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

FW: What lies behind this?

MZ: The IMF is a banker through and through. It is also the monitor of global financial structures. Save co-operative banks and building societies, I know of no banker or financial organisation in the entire history of finance whose mission it is to promote the interests of the clients.

Out of the ashes of the World War II, the IMF was created by the United States with the purpose of building a global financial system of which the American commercial and financial interests would be the greatest beneficiaries. During the Cold War, Western powers used the IMF and the World Bank as powerful instruments in the fight against the USSR and for building ‘Pax Americana’.

The IMF’s main role in transitional economies or economies on the verge of transition (usually from variously failed leftist political economies) is, in effect, to transform these old systems into new, smoothly functioning building blocks of the global capitalist economy where local assets can be siphoned off into foreign hands. Now in the post-Cold War era, the IMF as the international lender of last resort and “development” banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been used to promote the ideology of market fundamentalism, that is; that it is the market, not public institutions, which best promote human welfare.
The ADB, for instance, in a politically unstable place like Burma, play the role of a de-facto business guarantor for venture capitalists and other foreign firms, and in many cases serve as a multilateral interlocutor or go-between, between dodgy national governments such as Burma’s and western investors.

I would highly recommend John Perkin’s Confessions of an Economic Hitman for anyone interested in how this sinister world of international finance works.

FW: The government appears to have gone on something of a PR offensive since it came to power, enacting reforms to the media and ostensibly opening up dialogue with the opposition. What do you make of this?

MZ: The regime is definitely benefiting from the advice it has received from Burmese technocrats and politicos, as well as foreign experts and officials, and are doing an incredibly clever job of couching their political patrons and clients.

The power of the West is decidedly on the wane; Western interests, both commercial/financial and national security, are getting desperate to maintain and/or rebuild their foothold in places such as Burma where they made the mistake of privileging liberal humanism over their core economic and geostrategic interests.
This is a bad combination for the Burmese communities because outside interests, such as EU’s, know that the nature of the beast in Naypyidaw remains the same, but they will pretend things are changing for the better as a way of assuaging their own liberal guilt – assuming they feel the guilt at the subliminal level, or not.
The human mind is capable of acting in a twisted fashion. I am sure EU policy makers and strategists will find a moral discourse to justify the fact that they are embracing an essentially neo-totalitarian regime. Burma’s democratic opposition under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi seems to have lost the plot as the freshly minted regime has discovered a winning formula for itself. The real losers are the Bama public and, most especially, the non-Bama communities who live in the resource-rich, war zones of Burma.

FW: Taken in isolation, are there areas of governance that have seen legitimate improvement since last November?

MZ: I cannot think of a single where there has been a legitimate improvement since the election charade last autumn. The whole governance structure is dysfunctional, pathological, and incapable of improving in a piece-meal fashion. Virtually all important domains of governance are in the hands of military officers or ex-military officers.

These guys are products of the military – a totalitarian institution. Let me put it in the most brutally honest fashion. The military in Burma, both as an institution and as individual officers, are an irredeemable failure. They are ideologically and intellectually un-equipped –not just insufficiently equipped – to build the country as a multiethnic nation.

FW: Fighting continues to rage in the border regions. Does the government have a ‘Final Solution’ for the ethnic minorities?

MZ: You mean as a ‘Final Solution as in Himler’s? I don’t think so. The generals who hold the real levers of power – whatever the outward form of their government – definitely display neo-fascist qualities: racist, militaristic, sexist, megalomaniac, myopically patriotic, and so on.

Naypyidaw is a tin pot dictatorship, unlike Hitler and ‘Tojo’s’ (Japanese imperial government in the 1930′s and 40′s) technologically advanced fascist regimes. Even if it wishes to implement a ‘Final Solution’ in Burma, it lacks the military capabilities to wipe out ethnic minorities. The extremely low quality and morale of the Burmese troops was one of the major factors which forced the Burmese regime to sue for a one-year temporary ceasefire with the Kachin.

The Naypyidaw government will likely seek ways to profit from the conflict politically – if not economically – especially if these smouldering conflicts can be used as a key justification for the military’s lion share of political power and financial resources. That said, I must say the Burmese generals are adept at playing the minorities off against the Bama majority, and vice versa. Even as we speak they are playing Aung San Suu Kyi and her Bama supporters off against the non-Bama resistance groups.

FW: Is the quest for autonomy still at the heart of the ethnic armies’ struggles, or has that changed over the decades?

MZ: I think the desire for ethnic equality and a life free from Bama imperialism is what has underpinned these ethnic resistance groups. Bama imperialism, both the official strain and the societal ‘disease’ is not just a perception by the minorities.

Look, I am a Bama from the heartland of Burma, and I know how ingrained this cultural imperialism is among the Bama, especially among the non-self-reflective and among the so-called educated class. The problem is real.The only non-imperialist among the Bama leaders I know who ever lived was General Aung San.

FW: Taking into account all that’s happening since last November, where do you see Burma in 10 years time?

MZ: I don’t have a Crystal Ball. Anything is possible. If I were a non-Bama individual I would be preparing my own communities for a time when this imperialist political economy collapsed, either as a result of accelerated implosion, or of a serious external shock like regional wars over resources and proxy wars between Great Powers.

Mind you, Burma as we know it didn’t exist before 1948. It isn’t a ready-made product that was handed down through generations and centuries since Bagan. Nation-states and political systems are like organisms. The new ones are born, the old and the sick die out or splinter into smaller new ones. Burma could disappear in 2048. Even if the disintegration of Burma happens in my life time, I won’t be shedding any tears.

I would consider patriotism and nationalism pathological if it compels otherwise intelligent and decent human beings to emotionally hold on to a place which is nothing more than an open air prison, which keeps 50 million unhappy campers inside.

Author: FRANCIS WADE Category: Interview

http://www.dvb.no/interview/dr-zarni-the-road-to-hell-is-paved-with-good-intentions/17304

BURMA: Comprehensive peace deal possible through tripartite dialogue

BURMA: Comprehensive peace deal possible through tripartite dialogue

WEDNESDAY, 17 AUGUST 2011 13:09 SAI WANSAI
By: Sai Wansai
Wednesday, 17 August 2011

Fresh after the second meeting with minister Aung Kyi, the Pegu or Bago day trip visit of Aung San Suu Kyi have been a success, both in terms of large public turnout and the eager cooperation of the police, which indicates an about turn from harsh, confrontational stance of the Than Shwe, SPDC regime.

Indeed, the warming up of the situation even lead to 4 point statement between Aung San Suu Kyi and minister Aung Kyi, which states:
1. Will cooperate with government for stability and development
2. Will cooperate for the flourishing of democracy and economic / social development
3. Will avoid conflicting views and focus on mutual cooperation
4. Will continue the meetings (Source: Mizzima)

So far so good. But both Aung Kyi and Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, also leader of the new unit, called the Spokespersons and Information Team, insist that it is illegal for NLD to function as a political party, due to its dissolution for failing to register during the run up of the last election, and urge to register so that it could politically be involved.

From the view point of the NLD, while the outsiders could imagine or understand the regime's offer of urging NLD to register as a party as being reconciliatory, the NLD is in an awkward position to follow suit, for this would mean the acceptance of the government’s legitimacy in exchange for permission to take part in politics. This, in turn, would weaken the political position of the NLD party, which overwhelmingly have won the 1990 nation-wide election and is entitled to form the government, on behalf of the people.

The NLD leader, Aung San Suu Kyi has made it known, time and again, that she didn't endorse the 2008 Constitution. On 8 August 2011 - Aung San Suu Kyi, marking the 23rd anniversary of the 8888 uprising, says, “We still do not accept the 2008 constitution.” (Source:DPA)

For now, the military-backed government seems to put the NLD registration issue on a back burner and prioritising “national unity”. Signs that the government is reaching out to Aung San Suu Kyi could be seen by the invitation to meet with officials of the government-backed political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); and to the National Level Workshop on Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation in Naypyidaw this month

While reconciliatory gestures are abundant for Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD, just the opposite is true with the SSPP/SSA and KIO/KIA.

The ceasefire armies, including the KIO/KIA and SSPP/SSA, don't agree with the 2008 Constitution, even though the regime used to point it out that the ceasefire armies also participated in the drafting of the constitution, during the national convention. The point is that the ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties' suggestion of forming a federal union to satisfy their rights of self-determination was bluntly rejected by the then SPDC's dominated national convention. And as such, the ceasefire armies were of the opinion that they owe no legal obligation to the 2008 Constitution and also to the government, especially where the Border Guard Force (BGF) program is concerned.

According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”, Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.

Since Naypyitaw launched offensive against the SSPP/SSA on 13 March, more than 31,700people have been displaced and 24 had died in July alone, according to Shan Women’s Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation. (Source:AP)

Amid deliberation of ceasefire talks by the military-backed government, the armed conflict is still going on in Kachin State. Also there were reports that the regime has sent out feelers to SSPP/SSA and New Mon State Party (NMSP) for ceasefire talks.
So far as the non-Burman ethnic nationalities are concerned, the military-backed government is sending out mixed signals, without much political will or sincerity to resolve the core of the problem: rights of self-determination.

It also looks like that the regime is deliberately trying to side-line the non-Burman ethnic nationalities as a third force, in Burma political arena.
To sum up, the issue of urging NLD registration as a political party and the forced assimilation of the armed ethnic groups within the mould of BGF by the military-backed regime are due to the non-recognition of the 2008 Constitution.

While it might seem that the Thein Sein government is becoming reasonable, the fact remains that all have to honour the 2008 Constitution and any give-and-take will only happen within this mould. And it is here where the most crucial problem is embedded.

The military-back regime could not dictate its self-drawn game plan on all its adversaries and postures itself immaturely by sticking to its "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" rhetoric.

Instead, a more pragmatic and logical approach would be to call for a 'Tripartite Dialogue', between the NLD, non-Burman ethnic nationalities and itself, to resolve all the problems encompassing ethnic conflict and democratization process.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.

Letter from members of the Senate Women's Caucus on Burma to Hillary Clinton

Ethnic militia challenges Burma's army, new government

Ethnic militia challenges Burma's army, new government

August 11, Voice of America
– Danielle Bernstein

Laiza, Burma – Clashes in Burma between an ethnic-based army and government forces are presenting a challenge to the country’s new government, the regime's relationship with its biggest ally, China, and also in its ability to maintain control of resource-rich and strategically important border areas. Although the conflict remains limited to a small region along the Chinese border, it has drawn international attention and public appeals from Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

In Laiza, a sleepy border town nestled in lush jungles and hills, children are coming home from school, soldiers with rifles on motorbikes are preparing to return to the frontlines, and a Catholic priest is leading a service for internally displaced persons in an IDP camp.

The latter group kneels on the floor, surrounded by children playing, sick people sleeping and families eating in the dusty, smoky hall. The Kachin are devoutly Christian and priests in Laiza have been working overtime to minister to some 7,000 newly arrived refugees in town who have fled nearby fighting.

One refugee described being forced to act as a porter for Burmese troops before the latest violence flared.

Increasing number of displaced persons

He said that in the past, Burmese troops forced him for months to carry heavy loads and ammunition for them. He said he was beaten with a rifle butt for being slow. He said that when the recent tensions started, he just ran away.

Local aid workers say that in all, about 16,000 people have been displaced by the fighting on the Taping River, where a Chinese corporation is building two hydroelectric dams.

Many of those fleeing want to cross into China. However, Chinese officials have refused entry, saying the fighting is not close enough to the border to grant asylum.

La Rip, who founded a refugee association to help people displaced by the conflict, said Burmese troops have emptied villages by threatening violence against locals if they are attacked by the ethnic militia known as the Kachin Independence Army.

“The Burmese army already came in the village and dug a bunker in front of houses, and threatened them," said Rip. "If the KIA shoots us, we’ll burn down the whole village. That village is very close to Laiza.”


KIA, Burmese troops clash

The Burmese government accuses the KIA of starting the conflict in June by attacking the Chinese-built dam. The KIA insists government forces started hostilities as early as May, when they fired mortars at their bases, and says its troops have responded only defensively.

Kachin commanders say the fighting has meant an end to a 17-year-old ceasefire intended to prevent large-scale clashes between Burmese forces and the ethnic militia.

Kachin militia commander Chyana Zaw Awn said the Burmese officials are using the construction of the dams as an excuse to go after his forces, because they refused to become border guards, working under the military.

“The source of the conflict is the refusal of the border guard force proposal," he said. "Since we reject that proposal, they have been looking for a way to ignite the conflict. So they have used the security of the Chinese investments as an excuse. We believe that they have planned from the beginning to eliminate the ethnic troops. It is the Burmese government’s strategic plan to eliminate the ethnic armies."

Pleas for peace

U.S. and Chinese officials have urged all parties to settle the conflict peacefully. The conflict also has drawn in Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Last month, the Nobel laureate wrote an open letter to Burma’s President Thein Sein appealing for peace talks.

The KIA’s vice chief of staff, General Gun Maw, has been pushing for a new ceasefire agreement to bring an end to the conflict. But he is seeking discussions covering much more than the conflict in Laiza.

“We want a nationwide ceasefire in all conflict areas, and then we’d like to move toward political dialogue," said Maw. "They seem to be happy to discuss peace, but don’t mention politics. They want a ceasefire, but are not willing to engage in political dialogue. What we want is real, genuine federalism. This word scares the Burmese.”

It is unclear how much leverage the KIA has to force the government to the negotiating table. Despite calls from Aung San Suu Kyi and others inside Burma for the government to discuss the standoff, officials have been unwilling to directly talk to the group. The government has appointed two envoys to talk to the militias, but they do not have the authority to negotiate.

Maw warns that his forces will escalate fighting if the standoff continues. “We are ready to go back to guerilla warfare, if it comes to that, we are ready to carry on the revolution. I believe the biggest battle has not yet been fought. The main thing is, they want to eliminate the ethnic groups,” he said.

Kachin state is not a densely populated area. Laiza has a population of about 10,000 people. The state is slightly larger than 89,000 square kilometers, a fraction of which is KIA-controlled territory. All urban areas are controlled by the Burmese government, as well as key mining areas and rivers, which the KIA was required to hand over as part of the 1994 ceasefire.

Sixty-three year-old Burma-analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw was once a soldier and a member of the Burma Communist Party. He stresses the importance of Kachin state’s location between India and China, and points up that it is where headwaters of the country’s vital Irawaddy river flow south.

“KIA is the very clever insurgent in the northeast," he said. "They know international politics and the Burmese politics and Chinese politics. It is not easy to face Kachin leaders.”

Strategic resources in play

Resource-rich Kachin state, littered with gold and jade mines, teakwood, rubber and banana plantations, is small but potentially profitable. Htoo Trading, a conglomerate owned by one of Burma’s richest business men, U Tayza, has a joint venture with a Russian mining company searching for uranium near local jade mines.

Outside analysts say they are watching to see if the militias will be able to broaden their struggle against Burma’s military to involve other ethnic groups. Ahnan is a spokesperson from the environmental watchdog group, Burma Rivers Network, who said other ethnic groups feel the Burmese government is cutting them out of lucrative projects, such as the hydroelectric dams.

“A lot of anger [is] happening around the country, and also some of the development projects in ethnic areas, so it’s really possible civil conflict happens inside the country,” said Ahnan.

KIA commanders in Laiza expect the fighting to increase when the rainy season ends in September. Maw said he believes much of the fighting is still ahead.

BURMA: Conceptual difference of “Peace” and “Ceasefire” hamper negotiation process

BURMA: Conceptual difference of “Peace” and “Ceasefire” hamper negotiation process

Tuesday, 09 August 2011 11:49 Sai Wansai
By: Sai Wansai
Tuesday, 9 August 2011

Last week, KIO/KIA prepared a set of questions for Col Than Aung, the Kachin State minister for border affairs and head of the government emissary, who was sent to negotiate about possible ceasefire conditions.
The questions among others include:
• Who has given order to the team to negotiate?
• How “peace” should be defined by both parties?
• How should the term “ceasefire” be interpreted or understood?
• How much negotiation power is vested in the negotiation team?
• In case, if one party breaks the ceasefire agreement, who will be responsible to take action?
• What is the government opinion on “Panglong Agreement”?
• How would the government consider KIO/KIA as an organisation?

(Source: RFA - 2011-08-05)

Of all the questions posed, defining “peace” and “ceasefire” are two most crucial terms, which the contending parties must agree upon, if ever the ongoing ethnic conflict is to be resolved.

Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “True peace is not merely the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice.” And Eleanor Roosevelt emphasized, “It isn’t enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn’t enough to believe in it. One must work at it.”

Peace is a state of harmony characterized by the lack of violent conflict. Commonly understood as the absence of hostility, peace also suggests the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all. In international relations, peacetime is not only the absence of war or conflict, but also the presence of cultural and economic understanding and unity.
(Source: Wikipedia)

The online free dictionary states two points; one is the absence of war or other hostilities; and the other, an agreement or a treaty to end hostilities.
Generally, ceasefire could include an order to stop firing and suspension of active hostilities; a truce.

A ceasefire (or truce) is a temporary stoppage of a war in which each side agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions. Ceasefires may be declared as part of a formal treaty, but they have also been called as part of an informal understanding between opposing forces. An armistice is a formal agreement to end fighting.
Israeli–Palestinian conflict

An example of a ceasefire in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was announced between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority on February 8, 2005. When announced, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat publicly defined the ceasefire as follows: "We have agreed that today President Mahmoud Abbas will declare a full cessation of violence against Israelis anywhere and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will declare a full cessation of violence and military activities against Palestinians anywhere."
(Source:Wikipedia)

As far as peace is concerned, the successive military regimes and the recent, military-backed government have never spelled out their position clearly, on how they would like to achieve.

What the ethnic armed resistance forces have experienced by now is either to surrender, become government militia or ceasefire arrangement, which the Burmese government misleadingly called “Peace groups”. In short, there is no “give-and-take” negotiation process, but just being asked to follow the prescribed regime’s plan and become part and parcel of its administrative apparatus, one way or the other.
The coercive planned integration of the ceasefire ethnic armed ceasefire armies into its Border Guard Force (BGF) under the Burma Army is the case in point, which went terribly wrong, when it has been rejected and resisted aggressively to the dismay of the Burmese government.

Former ceasefire armies like KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, and the large portion of DKBA resisted Burma Army furiously, while the UWSA rejected the BGF plan, although not yet in open armed conflict with the Burma Army.

As a result, Burma is now on the brink of a full blown civil war, just because the regime likes to have its radical, racial and military supremacy way without compromising or accommodating the aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ rights of self-determination.

The Panglong Agreement of 12th February 1947, to join with U Aung San and the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) and leaders of Shan, Kachin and Chin nationalities, to live together under one flag as co-independent and equal nations, marks the birth of a nation-state now known as "Union of Burma".

It is not an exaggeration to state that without Panglong Agreement or Accord, signifying the intent and willingness of the free peoples and nations of what could be termed British Indochina, there would have not been born the Union of Burma in 1948.

This Panglong Agreement, which emphasizes the rights of self-determination, democracy and equality have been denied by successive military regimes and this has been the roots of the conflict, encompassing all non-Burman nationalities.
As such, while the ceasefire agreement is seen as a kind of partial surrender, eventually leading to total integration into Burma Army or dissolving the ceasefire armies, it was understood as a temporary cessation of war on the way to iron out a settlement through political, negotiation process, by the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

A Kachin leader recently pointed out that the Burmese military, during SLORC regime had maintained that political settlement should be carried out only with the future elected government, for it was only a military caretaker government. And after almost five decades, the negotiation process has not started. Perhaps, the military-backed government likes all to believe that its 2008 Constitution is carved into stone and that everyone has to abide by it. Ironically, the people of Burma knows that the constitutional drafting, constitutional referendum to nation-wide elections were all flawed, rigged and manipulated to suit the military leadership, from the beginning to the end.

For now, no one is quite sure, whether the military, status quo faction of Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo, Gen Than Shwe’s protégé, or President Thein Sein, who is backed by Thura Shwe Mann, the parliament house speaker, is calling the shots, where offensive against the ceasefire armies is concerned.

Just as the KIO/KIA pointed out clearly, so long as the definition of “peace” and “ceasefire” terms are not understood on the same wave length and the power vested to the ceasefire negotiation team not crystal clear, meaningless ceasefire talks will lead us nowhere and the armed conflict between the KIO/KIA and the Burma Army will continue unabated. Consequently, the war in Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states will likely go on, at the expense of the people.

The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.

ABSDF(NB)

ABSDF - NB

Uncertain Futures

Uncertain Futures

New-generation war in Myanmar

The Folly of More Burma Sanctions

Chronology of Burma’s Constitutional Process

Burma’s ethnic conflict product of flawed constitution - Unity in diversity the sole way out

Burma’s ethnic conflict product of flawed constitution - Unity in diversity the sole way out

Friday, 29 July 2011 18:31 Sai Wansai
By: Sai Wansai
Friday, 29 July 2011

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter to President Thein Sein, together with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA), is a move which must be welcomed.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has pinpointed the importance of peaceful co-existence among co-inhabitants of the Union of Burma and that it is a paramount task for every party concerned to make it a reality.

The letter added that armed conflicts within the non-Burman ethnic areas have created human tragedy, suffering, loss of lives, economic deterioration and destruction of costly physical infrastructures.

The use of force wouldn’t bring the warring parties nearer and that only negotiation and political dialogue could deliver the desired genuine peace and reconciliation.

She added that only within the atmosphere of peace would a genuine nation-building process be successfully implemented.

In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.

While this is, undoubtedly, a sincere and noble act from the part of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it is also essential to look deeply into the underlying core conflict issues and Burmese military leadership mindset, as to why it is so uncompromising and unyielding, when it comes to facilitating genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.

First, successive military dominated regimes, including the present military-backed Thein Sein government, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans - Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.

On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.

Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting "national sovereignty" and "national unity" at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to "racial supremacy" and political domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD, SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set. And as such, the non-Burman ethnic groups aspiration of “unity in diversity” or “genuine federalism” is viewed by successive military regimes, including the present Thein Sein government, as a “disintegration ploy “, which will break up the country, if ever allowed to be implemented.

Secondly, the woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognised as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.

Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of Burma.

Again, instead of reforming and addressing the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, the junta’s orchestrated the present 2008 constitution - dubbed Nargis constitution, due to the rigging of referendum vote by the junta shortly after Cyclone Nargis - is just doing the opposite, which is designed to give the military a clear political monopoly and military supremacy in all aspects of governing the country.

As a result, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ aspiration of “federalism, proportional share of power, in a true sense, in at least one major decision-making body in the central government so that they can protect themselves, and plausible guarantees that the military will not resume attacks on them” were not mentioned or provided in the 2008 constitution.( Source: Analysis of the 2008-SPDC Constitution for Burma - David C. Williams, Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy)

Thirdly, rightly or wrongly, the Burmese military has appointed itself to be the sole saviour of the country and the believe that the army under its command is the only institution that is capable of governing the country. In other words, the junta is entitled to rule over the civilian, with the help of the army.

Fourthly, Burmese military leadership urge for assimilation of non-Burman ethnic nationalities is closely intertwined with its version of forging national identity.

The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present, military-backed Thein Sein regime, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words, national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar", "Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they also belong.

For about a little more than a decade ago, the then Burmese military regime changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals is doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.

The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.

Finally, the misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so entrenched; at least in media and academic studies, it needs some clarification.
The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become a minority in the Shan, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within their own territories.

Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial, current Burma.

Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are neither minorities nor majorities, but equal partners or co-inhabitants in a union of territories, the Union of Burma.

Fundamentally, the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities stem from the inadequate drafting of constitutions, whether they are 1947, 1974 or the recent one in 2008. The flare up of the recent armed conflict in Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states has its root in the flawed constitutional drafting.

On 9 June 2004, during the SPDC's held national convention to draw up the 2008 constitution, 13 ethnic ceasefire armies put forward a joint proposal for the formation of a federal union. But no action or follow up action was taken on this advice till the end of national convention. This has been taken as a real drawback and disappointment for the ethnic ceasefire armies.

Thereafter, many instances of the non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal within the national convention and outside of it were only met with deafening silence from the part of the then ruling junta, the SPDC. (Please see appendix for more information on ethnic initiatives and statements)

According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”,

Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.

This paragraph has been quoted, time and again, as an argument that the ceasefire armies must come under the Burma Army. But the point is that the suggestion and proposal of a federal set up as a political system, during the drafting of 2008 constitution, by the attending ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties were rejected. And the aftermath half-hearted participation of the ceasefire armies, due to the heavy handedness of the junta could not be viewed as a whole-hearted acceptance of this particular paragraph, which in effect would mean the end of their self-determination struggle.

The junta was pressuring the ceasefire armies, even before the change of military-back, Thein Sein government. It even was able to overrun the Kokang ceasefire army in August 2009, when its Border Guard Force (BGF) plan was rejected. But the mainstream ceasefire armies like KIA, UWSA, SSA-N and NDAA continue to resist the Burma Army’s BGF plan.

As such, the ceasefire armies have every right to defend themselves and their homelands, and owe no legal commitment to the 2008 constitution, much less the paragraph 338.

To wind it up, the central issue is still the “constitutional crisis”. And in order to make a meaningful approach leading to a more accommodating, win-win outcome, there is no way around rather than the amendment of the present constitution, or better still, drafting a new constitution. For all the warring parties, negotiating the differing positions along the line of “pluralism” and “unity in diversity” is the only hope left to resolve the ongoing armed, ethnic conflict.

The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.

Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting

Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting

Remarks
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Ayodhya Hotel
Bali, Indonesia
July 24, 2011

________________________________________
FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: A very good afternoon, dear colleagues from the media. (In Indonesian.) I would like to begin once again by welcoming and expressing our appreciation to Secretary Clinton, as well as her delegation, for having attended and participated actively in this second Joint Commission meeting between the United States and Indonesia.

I had begun our discussion this morning by expressing one key thought. First, that during the past few days, as you are aware, Secretary Clinton has given Bali to attend the ASEAN-U.S. meeting, the East Asia Summit meeting at the ministerial level, as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum. And during the course of those sets of meetings, Indonesia and the United States worked very closely, all for the purpose of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity for our region.

But I have also suggested the idea that all those endeavors would not be possible without being anchored by strong bilateral relations, as Indonesia and the United States today enjoy. And that is why today's second JMC is extremely strategic and extremely important. As colleagues will be aware, the JMC process was launched last September 2010 for the purpose of injecting momentum and ensuring concrete (inaudible) to the vision of a comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the United States.

And during the course of that period, since September 2010 until today, we have seen, based on the report that we have just now received from the six working groups -- namely the working groups on democracy and civil society, working group on climate and environment, working group on education, on trade and investment, on security issues, and on energy -- based on the submission from the six working groups, I think both Secretary Clinton and I feel ever more confident that the comprehensive partnership between our two countries are in a good state, and that we are actually further deepening and strengthening our collaboration and partnership.

And more specifically, each of the working groups were able to share with the Secretary and myself the kind of progress they have made in their own respective domain, and lay out the concrete work plan for their year ahead, in order to ensure that the momentum is maintained.

More specifically, as you are aware, come next November, in 2011, we are to have the East Asia Summit here in Bali. And on that occasion, we are anticipating, of course, the first participation by the United States, by President Obama, to that summit. And, at the same time, there will be, no doubt, a bilateral meeting between the two presidents: of Indonesia and President Obama. In other words, the work that we are doing now, today, of the JCM, becomes a useful (inaudible) for us to be able to take stock where we are and where we wish to become next November.

So, all in all, I would say, Secretary, it has been -- and I am sure you would agree with me -- a most productive meeting, and encouraging, as well, because not only have the working groups been extremely diligent and energetic in their work over the past few months, but they continue to be driven by a sense of wanting to achieve better achievement and identifying more potentials for the future.

Of course, besides the issue of bilateral relations, the Secretary and I had the advantage on this occasion to compare notes on various regional and international issues, following on from the discussions that we have been having at the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as the East Asia Summit at the ministers level.

That is by way of introduction for myself. I should now like to give the floor to Secretary Clinton to also deliver her remarks. Please.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much. I want to express my appreciation to the Foreign Minister and the delegation from Indonesia for not only welcoming us today, but preparing the opportunity for such a productive second meeting of our joint commission. As the foreign minister said, we covered a lot of ground. I want to just touch on a few of the highlights.

First, we discussed how to increase trade and investment between our countries. Because while Indonesia is the largest economy in ASEAN, trade between our two countries still lags between others in the region. For example, our trade this year with Indonesia was $20 billion, but our trade with Malaysia was $40 billion. So we want to look at what are the impediments and the potential barriers. How do we reduce tariffs? How do we create more dynamic trade and investment between Indonesia and the United States?

Secondly, we discussed how we can work together more closely to protect the environment and to address the challenge of climate change. I know that is something that the Government of Indonesia and President Yudhoyono has been particularly focused on. I emphasize that, as we enter the final stage of negotiations on a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact that aims to promote low carbon development, we look forward to the quick creation of an accountable national trust fund to implement the compact, and to spur sustainable growth here in Indonesia.

Third, we discussed our shared goal of expanding educational exchanges. And I was so pleased to hear the report from the two chairs of the education working group. We are well on the way to doubling the number of Indonesians who study in the United States, and increasing the number of American students who come to study in Indonesia. We have expanded study abroad initiatives, such as our Fulbright Program, and we are eager to continue to build on that, as we will at a higher education summit to be held in Washington on October 31st.

Finally, we discussed Indonesia's growing role as a regional and global leader, and the important leadership that Indonesia is providing in ASEAN, in the ASEAN Regional Forum, in the East Asia Summit, in APEC, in the G-20, in all the major multilateral fora where the hard problems facing us in the world today are addressed.

This is an exciting time, and I was very impressed by the work that has been done by the working groups. And I think that this comprehensive partnership is, indeed, producing results for both of our people. Because, after all, we have to report to the people of Indonesia, and the people of the United States. And I think they can be reassured that we are not meeting for the sake of meeting; we are meeting to build relationships, to explore potential, and to deliver results for both of our people.

So, again, let me thank the Foreign Minister for his hospitality and his friendship, and to commend you, Marty, on the excellent job done in hosting these important gatherings in the last week.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Thank you very much, Hillary. Before opening the floor for questions, may I express a sentiment which I am sure Hillary would want to associate herself to, as well? Once again, to reaffirm and communicate our (inaudible) with regard to the attacks that took place in Norway just recently, the loss of life, of innocent lives lost, and our condemnation for that event, yet, at the same time, our confidence in the strength of the Norwegian nation, of its government, to be able to overcome this particular challenge, and that we, as members of the international community, stand by them in expressing our solidarity and support.

QUESTION: Thank you very much (inaudible). I have a question for you, ma'am, and one question to you, Mr. Marty.

First question, I would like to know what is your opinion on how ASEAN works on problems such as the border disputes (inaudible), issues of human rights (inaudible), and especially South China Seas issue. And do you think that we should always be (inaudible)?

My second question. There has been (inaudible) on the human (inaudible) Indonesia following the statement of Human Rights Watch. How (inaudible) participation of human rights in Indonesia, especially (inaudible).
And to Mr. Marty, (inaudible).

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Ah, right. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Let me begin with responding. I want to commend Indonesian leadership of ASEAN this past year. Because of its active role in promoting a resolution to the border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand. Indonesia played that role very effectively, to the point that both countries have asked Indonesia to continue playing such a role, even after its chairmanship of ASEAN expires.
And I think the international court of justice's decision about the disputed territory between two ASEAN members itself highlighted the importance of ASEAN continuing to seek a permanent resolution.

Secondly, with respect to human rights in Burma, we discussed that in our meetings, in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and in the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue. And I think it is very important that we continue to press the new Government of Burma to take action that will demonstrate a break with the past. And again, here I commend Indonesia's leadership, both as chair of ASEAN, in reaching out to the new government, but also, based on your own experience, I think there is much for Indonesia to share, as to how you make a successful peaceful transition to a democracy as vibrant and successful as the one here in Indonesia.

And with respect to the South China Sea, as you know, that took up a great deal of our time in discussions, both prior to and during the meetings. I have to comment Indonesia's leadership again. Because, as chair of ASEAN, Indonesia led the way to the adoption of the declaration of conduct. I think that it is important for all of us to realize what is at stake here. Because, clearly, the South China Sea is absolutely essential to global trade. At least 50 percent of all global trade goes through the South China Sea every single year. And it is important for us to support freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, so there is no question as to the rights of every nation for its ships, its goods to pass through the South China Sea. But it is especially important for the region.

And the United States takes no position on any claim made by any party to any disputed area. What we want to see is a resolution process that will be aided by the code of conduct that ASEAN is working toward, based on the Declaration of Conduct, and that the principles of international law will govern, so that there can be peaceful resolution of all the claims. In order to achieve that, every claimant must make their claim publicly and specifically known, so that we know where there is any dispute. And secondly, all claims must be related to territorial characteristics.

So, we think that it was an important first step, but only a first step in adopting the Declaration of Conduct. And we commend, again, Indonesia's leadership in achieving that, and urge that ASEAN move quickly -- I would even add urgently -- to achieve a code of conduct that will avoid any problems in the vital sea lanes and territorial waters of the South China Sea.

With respect to -- you had two questions in there -- with respect to human rights, we have a working group in our Commission on democracy on human rights. We had a very positive discussion about those important issues during the reporting from that working group, and we look forward to continuing to support Indonesia in its important leadership on democracy and human rights, not only in the region, but globally. And, therefore, we look forward to continuing to make progress.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: If I may just also add to the point that Secretary Clinton has made on the South China Sea, Indonesia is acutely aware of the need to maintain momentum. Of course, the conclusion of the guidelines just now -- a couple of days ago now -- is a very important development. I would not wish to underestimate its importance. But, at the same time, it reminds us of the further work that needs to be done maintaining momentum, maintaining a sense of urgency. And we have a road map at the back of our minds of what needs to happen between now and then, whenever the "then" is. But you can be assured that we have a clear outline and expectations of what needs to happen. And not least, of course, the identifications of elements for Code of Conduct within the process of its eventual conclusion, as well.

On the specific question asked -- addressed to myself, namely Indonesia and the United States with regard to the East Asia Summit, as you are very much aware, of course, the process, the very process of United States participation and addition to the East Asia Summit was, among others, a product of a process that Indonesia and the United States bilaterally (inaudible) about.

I remember my first conversation with you, Hillary, in Singapore, if I am not mistaken, at the sideline of a conference. This was an issue that you raised then. And, therefore, even from the beginning, the United States and Indonesia have been engaged in a very thorough way to discuss, to compare notes of our strategic vision of what the East Asia Summit is all about. And now that the United States is part of the East Asia Summit, it is our task, together with the other members of the EAS to give flesh to this -- to give value to this forum. And I think that the discussion that we had yesterday was extremely instructive -- a couple of days ago now -- among others, to ensure that the East Asia Summit, besides discussing the five priority issues that we have been discussing, also deepen and broaden its engagement or discussion on so-called broad strategic issues.

The East Asia Summit must provide solutions to many of the region's challenges, and opportunities, as well. And I am glad that, with the United States being part of the equation, being part of the architecture, then the chances of having this summit providing that answer is suitably enhanced. Thank you.

QUESTION: I am going to follow up on a couple of human rights issues. Foreign Minister, do you believe that the change that occurred in Myanmar, Burma, this year is sufficient for Burma to take its place, for instance, as head of ASEAN? I don't believe the United States thinks so. I mean you both can comment on that.

And in advance of the Secretary's visit, a number of media groups, a human rights group, issued statements critical of Indonesia's handling of the situation in Kampar, saying that aid groups and journalists were being barred, and that there were reports that -- of a crackdown on the indigenous people. And I was just wondering if you both can comment on those specifics.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Thank you. In a way, the questions are somewhat related, as relates to human rights and democratization.

One thing that we have learned in the course of our decade-long now -- nearly -- democratization is that it is a process. It is impossible to have a snapshot of one moment in time and sort of decide, "Are we there yet, or are we not there yet?" And this is most definitely the case with respect to Myanmar. Myanmar is obviously a work in process, in terms of democratization. To put it more -- in a more -- I guess -- yes, I don't want to use -- describe it as a work in progress.

But it is very much related to the issue of chairmanship. As you know, at the moment, the decision has not been made by ASEAN. When we last met as foreign ministers, the decision has been left -- not quite done yet. But we have to see and have a sense of -- comfort level whether Myanmar is actually prepared and ready to assume chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014. I am aware -- we are aware -- of the responsibilities and the expectations that is inherent in a particular country chairing ASEAN, especially on the eve of 2015. So we are well aware of that, and we are going to have plenty more discussions among ASEAN member states to ensure that there is a real comfort level about the issue.

On the issue of human rights situation in Indonesia, the kind of concerns that we have expressed, many -- we hear such comments and expectations on a regular basis. But the only thing is nowadays it is also a concern that is shared by all Indonesians alike. So it doesn't take an external party to suggest to us we need to do this and that, because it is being -- efforts are being made to ensure that our own democratic and human rights expectations are fulfilled, as we expect them to be.

But, you know, as Secretary Clinton has said, we have this working group within this forum on human rights and civil society that has been working not only in promoting bilateral cooperation on human rights issue, but also increasingly now, of cooperation of a multilateral character, as well, a lot of experience sharing that we are disseminating to some other countries in transition, including in the Middle East and North Africa, which shows the potential demonstrative effect that countries like Indonesia, working together with United States, can impact -- impart upon our partners, as well. Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we greatly appreciate Indonesia's leadership in promoting progress toward political reconciliation and democracy in Burma. And, as the foreign minister said, Indonesia's own recent history provides an example for transition to civilian rule and building strong democratic institutions.
And we have, in many different settings, expressed our deep concern about the oppressive political environment in Burma. We have called on the newly-elected government to release political prisoners, open a meaningful dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi by utilizing decision-makers who can respond to her legitimate suggestions and concerns, and we will continue to press for the kind of changes that we see benefiting the people of Burma in the future.

With respect to Papua, the United States supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, which includes the Papua and West Papua provinces. We, of course, believe in open dialogue between Papuan representatives and the Indonesian Government to address grievances and support development. But, as the Foreign Minister said, this is a matter for the Indonesian Government, and they are addressing it. And we hope to see full implementation of the special autonomy law for Papua, which is a commitment on the part of the Indonesian Government to address many of the concerns that have been expressed.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madam Secretary and Mr. Foreign Minister. I want to ask about how far this relation has progressed since you (inaudible), especially about the (inaudible) and security sector.

And then, what will U.S. President Barack Obama of United States bring to the East Asia Summit next November? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that there has been a discernable amount of progress in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia under the Obama Administration. President Obama came to office very committed to deepen, broaden, and strengthen the bilateral relationship between our two countries. And, based on the work that I have overseen, and that I have been able to analyze, given the work of the Commission, I am very pleased by the progress that our bilateral relationship is making.

We, on both sides, have more to do. And so, this is a continuing process that we will be focused on. I know President Obama is looking forward both to attending the East Asian Summit and the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and his bilateral meetings with President Yudhoyono and others. But this is a very important relationship, one that the United States highly values, and that we are deeply invested in. And I think, based on the progress we have made in a very short period of time, there is a tremendous potential for future cooperation.

QUESTION: Hi. I am Anthony Kuhn with NPR, National Public Radio of the U.S., and I would like to hear both from Secretary Clinton and Minister Marty on this.
To go back to the South China Sea, Secretary Clinton, you have asked claimants to back up their claims in international law. This is probably the most -- as China would put it -- core interest, or core matter, the thorniest issue you could raise. It has taken the better part of a decade just to come up with a non-binding resolution that says very little about what to do when there are spats. What about the medium term? What about the short term?

What do you propose to address -- to prevent incidents which you say threaten security? Might you -- although you are both not claimants in this -- for example, engage in diplomacy in, say, to claimants, at least try to get to your different domestic departments in line, reading from the same page on this issue? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, Anthony. I think that the progress that we saw this year stands in marked contrast to our meeting last year. The achievement of a declaration, as you point out, had been a long time coming, thanks to the hard work and leadership of the foreign minister and the Indonesian Government as chair of the ASEAN meeting, as well as the ARF. There has been progress on the dialogue between China and ASEAN.

The Declaration is a first step. Nobody claims it is more than that. It is a first step. It needs to be quickly followed up on by the code of conduct. There needs to be a lot of dialogue between ASEAN and China in their already-existing mechanism. And the rest of the world needs to weigh in, because all of us have a stake in ensuring that these disputes don't get out of control. And in fact, the numbers have been increasing. The intimidation actions of (inaudible), of cutting of cables, the kinds of things which will raise the cost of doing business for everyone who travels through the South China Sea, which, as I said earlier, is half of all global commerce.

So, we support a collaborative, diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve all of their disputes. What we do not support, and are strongly against, is the use or threat of force by any nation to advance its claims. Therefore, we think simultaneously there needs to be a very concerted effort to realize a code of conduct, and there needs to be a call by the international community for all parties to clarify their claims, both land and maritime, and to conform them to international law, including as reflected in the UN Convention on Law of the Seas.
This is the way the world is supposed to work. And in the 21st century, this is the way it must work. Because no nation can, on its own, manage everything that needs to happen. And those days are and must be over. And, therefore, we have to have the kind of cooperative, collaborative effort that Indonesia has led.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you very much for that question. Collaborative and cooperative mindset is an effort -- is certainly exactly the kind of spirit and outcome we are promoting as Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, for our region. Of course, the obvious recent manifestation among others has been on South China Sea, as well as on the Thai-Cambodia situation.

In other words, we are keen to avoid for our region the kind of fault lines and schisms and divisions that may not be -- that would not be to the interest of any countries in this part of the world. And the South China Sea, the guideline itself, the Declaration and its guidelines, when you look at it, it may not seem to suggest much. It may not. However, if you look at the broader picture of what it represents, the fact that after about eight years, finally, this year, after much strong effort, and in contrast to -- like Secretary Clinton said, in contrast to last year's ambience and conditions, we were able to get this done. I think that is a good start. And it is an asset for us to develop on.

The key point here is that we must make sure that this is not the end of the line. This is but the beginning. And I can assure you that Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, we have a road map -- as I said before in my earlier remarks, we have a clear road map of what needs to happen between now and, say, November. That is the next junction, when we will be having the summit of ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, to ensure a constant sense of progress and momentum. Because we do sincerely and genuinely feel letting things not going anywhere, letting things be state of status quo can be possibly destabilizing, and creating uncertainty and opening up the potentials for miscalculation. And this is what we wish to avoid. Transparency, in terms of intent, in terms of claims, is extremely important.

But all this must be done within the diplomatic process. And I don't mind having very difficult debate -- frank and candid, as we say it in diplomatic parlance -- as long as it is all done in the construct of a conference room, rather than out there at sea. And there has certainly been, as Secretary Clinton said, recent incidents at sea. I am afraid it is a general trend, not only in the South China Sea; the other seas of all parts of the world also have been marked by tensions. The militarization of fishing vessels, for example, that -- how fishing vessels have been protected by the navies of different countries and creating incidences at sea, and these are very serious developments.

That is why, among our initiatives just now, was to have a maritime forum for our region, an East Asia or Asia Pacific ASEAN maritime forum, where all the different assets of maritime ocean issues can be discussed in a cohesive way. Indonesia, you recall, is an archipelago. It is a country that is not small, made up of some 17,000 islands. We used to think of the oceans as a factor that divides us. But, thanks to the foresight of our founding fathers, the oceans, the seas between the islands, becomes an issue that binds us in accordance with this archipelagic outlook.
Now, we would like to think that East Asia and the Asia Pacific, a great deal of which is made up of the seas, can also have a similar integrative outlook, to look at the seas as a potential for cooperation, rather than a source for conflict and tensions. That is certainly the kind of outlook we would like to promote. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

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Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma

Ethnic Conflicts are the Generals’ Golden Goose

By Dr. ZARNI Tuesday, June 21, 2011

The last 10 days saw the breakdown of the ceasefire between Burmese generals and the Kachin minority, one of modern Burma’s founding ethnic communities. But it’s important not to view this primarily through prism of ethnicity—emphatically, the generals are equal opportunity oppressors who discriminate not on the basis of ethnicity or religious faith, but in terms of their personal and institutional interests.

While there are “natural” ethnic prejudices among Burma’s “communities of difference” (in terms of religion, ethnicity and ideology) these prejudices don’t automatically evolve and deepen themselves into ethnic hatred and intractable conflicts. After all, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father—the slain national hero Aung San—was able to work out a multi-ethnic treaty on the eve of the country’s independence.

On the basis of ethnic and political equality, the country’s minorities, with legitimate historical claims over their own ancestral regions, agreed to join the post-independent Union of Burma.

This was no small achievement in the face of various attempts to mobilize ethnic grievances by local minorities and majority political elites, as well as some external players such as conservative elements within the British colonial and military establishments. As sincere as he was when he won over the Kachin, Shan and Chin leaders with his pledge of “Bama one Kyat, Shan one Kyat”, the strategic importance of the adjacent minority regions to the Bama majority’s interests was not at all lost on him.

The country’s conflicts regarding different ethnic communities are political because they are fundamentally rooted in the minorities’ demands for, and the Burmese ruling classes’ rejections of, the recognition that modern, post-independence Burma was the result of the voluntary coming together of different ethnic groups where were all equally indigenous to the land.

The politically defiant minority organizations and communities have been fighting the Burmese government since 1947—that is, just months before the country’s independence from Britain. The historic agreement to unite Burma as a voluntary federation based on the inviolable principle of ethnic equality was buried along with Aung San’s remains that same year. Virtually all of his Bama nationalist contemporaries, soldiers and civilians, held the mistaken view that federalism was about secession, and have done everything to kill minorities’ federalist aspirations accordingly.

The result was the minority groups feel the dissolution of British rule only brought them under the internal colonial arrangement imposed on them by the Bama post-colonial civilian elites, the likes of Prime Minister Ba Swe and Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein, with the help of their allies in the military who helped institute this “internal colonialism.”

Even before the decisive military coup of 1962, successive military leaderships since the country’s independence have pursued policies or strategies on a broad continuum between minimal accommodation of ethnic minorities at best, to total annihilation at worst.

During a nearly 10-hour interview with me in 1995, the well-respected nationalist former Colonel Chit Myaing said that the founding of the Bahtoo army town in Shan State as the original seat of the country’s Defense Services Academy in the early 1950s was one of the first attempts to build military bases in strategic locations throughout non-Bama ethnic regions.

The hidden objective was to ready the Bama Tatmadaw or Royal Army for preemptive strikes against any minority group with federalist and independence aspirations. The resultant dynamic is the crux of the ethnic conflicts in Burma.

Because the generals have come to view the conflicts, especially the “ethnic conflicts”, as their main justification to maintain their power structures, they have shown no interest or political will for establishing genuine and lasting peace.

In fact, the generals have turned domestic conflicts into their golden goose. That is one of the reasons why the generals have never attempted to translate the “gentleman’s ceasefire agreements”—reached in the early and mid-1990s with around 17 different armed minority organizations—into lasting political agreements.

In keeping these conflicts alive, the Burmese military regime has retained the old colonial-era politics of exploiting ethnic differences in order to suit its strategy of “divide and rule”. Typically, the Burmese military have induced, searched, amplified and exploited detectable differences of interests, generations, religious faiths and visions between the Burmese majority and the minorities, between one single minority community, between families and clans, and among minorities themselves.

For instance, in Shan State where there was strong armed resistance by Shan nationalists, the military would encourage, facilitate and support formation of the Kokang Han Chinese and Shan-Chinese into minority militias and allow the latter to engage in lucrative narcotics trade.

In turn, the militias formed under the military’s indirect patronage would cooperate with the Burmese military, for instance, in terms of local intelligence gathering or providing Burmese military commanders a share in their economic spoils.

Contrary to the empirically false academic view which paints Burma’s generals as simple-minded “war-fighters” who don’t do politics, these men in uniform have proven themselves adept at manipulating both domestic and external developments.

During the past 50 years of military dictatorships under different disguises, ethnic and dialectic differences get multiplied and amplified by the regime in order to create an impression that—with more than “100 different ethnic groups”—the dreadful Balkan scenario lurks just beneath the surface of the country’s ethnic politics and will be unleashed without the strong central hand of the military to hold these centrifugal forces together.

Within Asian regional context as well as internationally, the military has maintained a very active propaganda campaign, tailoring the content to resonate with the target governments and organizations.

With Burma’s neighbors, generally stability-conscious national governments and UN agencies, the military propaganda regarding ethnic minorities is designed to stoke the general fear of Burma’s balkanization, perceived or real. In this context, the military paints itself as the only strong hand which is capable of guaranteeing the integrity of territorial boundaries and internal stability.

For the dominant Burmese majority and the Burmese-dominated military rank and files, the military maintains and propagates its own revisionist history where the ethnic minorities are secessionists hell bent on triggering the balkanization of Burma, a country where the Burmese majority have always been a superior group whose contributions—vis-à-vis those of other ethnic groups—to state and nation-building are unparalleled. From this racist and statist standpoint, genuine federalism based on ethnic equality is tantamount to nation-disintegrating political arrangement.

As a matter of fact, the generals have been modulating the volume of these conflicts, depending on the international climate of the day. Throughout the Cold War, under Britain’s arrangement, anti-Communist Burmese generals would be on study tours in Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia to observe first-hand how the British military was applying “Four Cuts Strategies” (cutting the enemy of intelligence/information, supplies, new recruits and finance) against the Malay communists—strategies which the Burmese would later apply against not only their own communist troops but also minority rebel strongholds.

Within the Burmese Army itself, the uncompromising military leadership has consistently crushed any moderate cliques who begin to seek genuine understanding and peace arrangements with armed resistance leaderships such as the Kachin or the Karen minorities.

Recurring waves of dissent within the military and corresponding wholesale purges are in part related to signs of some sub-cliques within the military wanting to pursue a more peaceful—as opposed to annihilationist—policy towards both the minorities and majority Burmese dissidents.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been the shifting alliances and/or business partnerships among Burma’s military, neighboring governments such as Thailand, India and China, and various armed ethnic organizations along the 3,000-plus kilometer Indo-, Sino- and Thai-Burmese borders. These have had significant impact on the dynamic and political economy of ethnic conflicts in Burma. In this connection, the two unfolding phenomena warrant a close-up look: the resurgence of economic developmentalism and the creation of a single, integrated lucrative energy market in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS).

In Burma’s neighborhood, governments are focused on development and economic growth through large-scale projects such as dam constructions, overland cross-border trade, special trans-boundary economic zones which will turn displaced Burmese populations into cheap laborers in assembly lines and dirty industries such as oil refineries.

The integrated energy market in Southeast Asia intends to draw much of its resources and electricity from the border areas of Burma. Most of these projects are situated across ethnic minority lands.

The generals’ insensitivity to the survival needs of local communities results in the rise in military tensions with respective ethnic armed organizations. This the military uses as a way of re-framing itself as the guarantor of physical safety of these mega-development projects and provider of market stability. Ominously for the multi-ethnic communities of Burma, a confluence of interest and (pro-market) ideology between the generals and external players is emerging.

Dr. Zarni is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science.