December Log - new entry
Nawng Mi Village, Hpakant, Kachin State
December 19, 2009
At the Baptist Church of Nawng Mi, near Hpakant, Sunday School children were singing and rehearsing the nativity story when Sgt. Kyaw Myint and two Burman junta soldiers of HK.L.Y 37, came in quite inebriated, and began to yell insults. Youth leader Lama Brang pleaded to calm things down but was grabbed by the chest and threatened. The terrorist Burman Army men next stabbed Lama Grang's younger brother Lama Naw Seng in the thigh, causing serious wounds.
A Kachin farmer Lahpai Naw Seng was passing by and stopped to look; he was immediate stabbed in the mouth and then deep into his chest. He died later that day at about 8:45pm of the injuries. The police at Kamaing and Hpakant later investigated the unprovoked attack on harmless Kachin civilians at a Christian church. This kind of terrorist attacks have become more frequent these days, KOA has learned.
On December 20th the Deputy Commander of Danai military region, Col. Aung Kyaw Htun came and explanied that this happened because of "bad blood" between Kachins and Burmans. He gave kyat 100,000 to the church and kyat 30,000 to the victims of stabbing.
OKA asks, given 47 years of brutal oppression of Kachin civilians, is Col. Aung Kyaw Htun complaining that there is now bad blood? We only hope that this Kachin bad blood does not apply to Burman civilians who are also victims of SPDC terrorist repressive acts.
OKA will soon publish a complete log of terrorist attacks on Kachin civilians on church grounds for the month of December, 2009.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Monday, December 21, 2009
The fascist and feudal Than Shwe – Zarni
In his doctrine, ‘The Art of War’, Sun Zi, the master Chinese strategist, stressed that “all warfare is based on deception.” No one in Burma politics appears to appreciate this principle more than Than Shwe.
The element of Than Shwe’s leadership that has escaped serious scrutiny is not how he has, so far, successfully met internal and external challenges to his despotic rule. This has been well documented. It is how he is forging ahead, largely unobstructed, with his personal vision of Burma as a semi-feudal economic and political system, deceiving both the army and the domestic commercial and political elite, both of which are desperate for change.
In his plan to safeguard his own future and that of his extended family, the aging despot cleverly and sinisterly strings the entire class of warriors along, who perceive themselves as the sole guardians of Burma’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and civilization.
Specifically, the aging despot is deceiving his own officer corps while confusing the opposition and its international supporters by promising the supposedly more liberal political process under the banner of the “Roadmap for Democracy.”
To explain further, it is under Than Shwe’s leadership that the Tatmadaw [Burmese army] officer corps has suffered enormous reputational damage to themselves and their once venerable institution.
While material gains for the historically respected warrior-administrators may have increased since Than Shwe assumed power in 1992, the loss in their social standing is incalculable. With every callous order from Than Shwe that the Tatmadaw officer corps tragically executes, its social and global standing descends further into the abyss. Blinded by rabid nationalism and personal gains, the officer corps appears not to understand that its material gains and professional advancement today are not adequate compensation for its loss of corporate honor in the eyes of the public in whose name it justifies its existence.
To be sure, it was Than Shwe’s late boss, General Ne Win, who in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and later Defense Minister, arrested the military’s evolutionary course from a Fascist-trained, anti-British organization to a modern, multi-ethnic national defense institution which valiantly defended from multi-color insurgencies a nascent, if struggling, parliamentary democracy following independence in 1948.
But for the past 20 years, starting from his position as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and having directly overseen the massacres of protestors during the 1988 popular uprisings, Than Shwe has sped up the process of reviving and reinforcing the less honorable fascist-militarist ethos and practices of the Tatmadaw.
Most dangerously, under his leadership the people are increasingly alienated from their own defense force. For Than Shwe’s reign depends and thrives on sowing the bad blood between the people and their soldiers. In place of civil-military reconciliation, Than Shwe calls for the consolidation of this divide which he dangerously exploits.
Regressive army
By encouraging commanders at different levels to “eat” revenues, human and natural resources and land in their respective military-administrative areas, Than Shwe is taking the Tatmadaw back in time: this was a key feudal practice which sustained pre-colonial Burma’s warrior-monarchs and their imperial systems.
The fact that the Tatmadaw’s officer corps has failed to make any significant move against Senior General Than Shwe, in spite of the latter’s cold-blooded decision to bloodily crackdown on peaceful monk protestors and further launch military-style raids on hundreds of monasteries during the Saffron Revolution in 2007, and his callous attempts to delay the provision of aid to a few million cyclone victims in 2008, is testament to the revival of the fascist ethos of “One Voice, One Nation” within the officer corps.
I attribute all these worrying psychological trends and institutional practices to Than Shwe’s brilliant ability to deceive his own officers and manipulate their patrioism.
While, under his leadership, the Tatmadaw is being dragged back to its less-than-honorable fascist institutional and ideological roots, its rank and file members are generally made to believe that they and their beloved institution are marching the country towards “discipline-flourishing democracy,” economic development and political stability. In their view, it is Western sanctions and Aung San Suu Kyi-led Burmese opposition that stand in the way of realizing this grand vision. The economic and social ills in the country are attributable to these two non-Tatmadaw factors, or so the rank and file members and the officer corps generally feel.
Here “Than Shwe’s soldiers” born and bred in cultural and intellectual isolation, away from the modernizing currents of globalization, may be excused for thinking that theirs is a march forward into the future.
But how do we explain the fact that Burmese intellectual and commercial elites, for their part have failed to grasp the alarming ascendency of the semi-feudal and fascist behavior of the military leadership? Further, what of pro-election Western Burma experts, policy makers and advisors who have so far overlooked these features of the country’s emerging political economic system?
The regime has repeatedly violated key foundational principles on which the centuries-old Burmese society rests – such as universal reverence towards the Buddhist Order or acting with compassion to those who suffer from war, disaster and other calamities.
The much-anticipated political space or complex institutional structures which are to emerge post-2010 election have little or no potential to either facilitate the gradual evolution of the militarized polity and military-controlled economy, or undermine the current military’s monopoly over political and economic domains. For the power-holders, Senior General Than Shwe or his successors, and their institution are determined not to allow the emergence of any real alternative organizations or powers to emerge within their system of governance. To paraphrase the famous lyricist and singer Audrey Lorde, the master’s tools will not dismantle the master’s house.
To my dismay, both Western liberal governments and the Western-inspired opposition leadership have somehow failed to come to terms with the empirical reality that Than Shwe is succeeding in turning the Tatmadaw into a semi-feudal armed organization, with revived fascist ideological views. As a result of this analytical failure, they are deceived by Than Shwe into thinking that the aging despot will potentially retire or that dialogue with fascist leadership is either conceivable or desirable.
A quick historical glance at how fascist and feudal regimes rose and fell may offer a clue as to what it will take for the Burmese people to liberate themselves from such a dark force in history. Fascist, feudal, colonial and other parasitical regimes entrench themselves in power at all costs to society and live off the back of the population. While they are in power, no domestic social and political force alone is capable or should be expected to be able to overthrow or otherwise change fascist rule, unaided by external factors.
For the Burmese, both Bama and non-Bama, the ways in which the Burmese feudal rule, the British colonial rule and the Japanese occupation were ended, offer a more realistic model of how these socio-pathological systems of control, exploitation and domination are forced to end, than current liberal theories of democratic transition. Indeed Burma’s problems can be effectively addressed through the Burmese Way, and it may not necessarily take a fundamentally liberal or evolutionary route.
Dr Zarni is founder of the Free Burma Coalition and Research Fellow on Burma at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
The element of Than Shwe’s leadership that has escaped serious scrutiny is not how he has, so far, successfully met internal and external challenges to his despotic rule. This has been well documented. It is how he is forging ahead, largely unobstructed, with his personal vision of Burma as a semi-feudal economic and political system, deceiving both the army and the domestic commercial and political elite, both of which are desperate for change.
In his plan to safeguard his own future and that of his extended family, the aging despot cleverly and sinisterly strings the entire class of warriors along, who perceive themselves as the sole guardians of Burma’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and civilization.
Specifically, the aging despot is deceiving his own officer corps while confusing the opposition and its international supporters by promising the supposedly more liberal political process under the banner of the “Roadmap for Democracy.”
To explain further, it is under Than Shwe’s leadership that the Tatmadaw [Burmese army] officer corps has suffered enormous reputational damage to themselves and their once venerable institution.
While material gains for the historically respected warrior-administrators may have increased since Than Shwe assumed power in 1992, the loss in their social standing is incalculable. With every callous order from Than Shwe that the Tatmadaw officer corps tragically executes, its social and global standing descends further into the abyss. Blinded by rabid nationalism and personal gains, the officer corps appears not to understand that its material gains and professional advancement today are not adequate compensation for its loss of corporate honor in the eyes of the public in whose name it justifies its existence.
To be sure, it was Than Shwe’s late boss, General Ne Win, who in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and later Defense Minister, arrested the military’s evolutionary course from a Fascist-trained, anti-British organization to a modern, multi-ethnic national defense institution which valiantly defended from multi-color insurgencies a nascent, if struggling, parliamentary democracy following independence in 1948.
But for the past 20 years, starting from his position as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and having directly overseen the massacres of protestors during the 1988 popular uprisings, Than Shwe has sped up the process of reviving and reinforcing the less honorable fascist-militarist ethos and practices of the Tatmadaw.
Most dangerously, under his leadership the people are increasingly alienated from their own defense force. For Than Shwe’s reign depends and thrives on sowing the bad blood between the people and their soldiers. In place of civil-military reconciliation, Than Shwe calls for the consolidation of this divide which he dangerously exploits.
Regressive army
By encouraging commanders at different levels to “eat” revenues, human and natural resources and land in their respective military-administrative areas, Than Shwe is taking the Tatmadaw back in time: this was a key feudal practice which sustained pre-colonial Burma’s warrior-monarchs and their imperial systems.
The fact that the Tatmadaw’s officer corps has failed to make any significant move against Senior General Than Shwe, in spite of the latter’s cold-blooded decision to bloodily crackdown on peaceful monk protestors and further launch military-style raids on hundreds of monasteries during the Saffron Revolution in 2007, and his callous attempts to delay the provision of aid to a few million cyclone victims in 2008, is testament to the revival of the fascist ethos of “One Voice, One Nation” within the officer corps.
I attribute all these worrying psychological trends and institutional practices to Than Shwe’s brilliant ability to deceive his own officers and manipulate their patrioism.
While, under his leadership, the Tatmadaw is being dragged back to its less-than-honorable fascist institutional and ideological roots, its rank and file members are generally made to believe that they and their beloved institution are marching the country towards “discipline-flourishing democracy,” economic development and political stability. In their view, it is Western sanctions and Aung San Suu Kyi-led Burmese opposition that stand in the way of realizing this grand vision. The economic and social ills in the country are attributable to these two non-Tatmadaw factors, or so the rank and file members and the officer corps generally feel.
Here “Than Shwe’s soldiers” born and bred in cultural and intellectual isolation, away from the modernizing currents of globalization, may be excused for thinking that theirs is a march forward into the future.
But how do we explain the fact that Burmese intellectual and commercial elites, for their part have failed to grasp the alarming ascendency of the semi-feudal and fascist behavior of the military leadership? Further, what of pro-election Western Burma experts, policy makers and advisors who have so far overlooked these features of the country’s emerging political economic system?
The regime has repeatedly violated key foundational principles on which the centuries-old Burmese society rests – such as universal reverence towards the Buddhist Order or acting with compassion to those who suffer from war, disaster and other calamities.
The much-anticipated political space or complex institutional structures which are to emerge post-2010 election have little or no potential to either facilitate the gradual evolution of the militarized polity and military-controlled economy, or undermine the current military’s monopoly over political and economic domains. For the power-holders, Senior General Than Shwe or his successors, and their institution are determined not to allow the emergence of any real alternative organizations or powers to emerge within their system of governance. To paraphrase the famous lyricist and singer Audrey Lorde, the master’s tools will not dismantle the master’s house.
To my dismay, both Western liberal governments and the Western-inspired opposition leadership have somehow failed to come to terms with the empirical reality that Than Shwe is succeeding in turning the Tatmadaw into a semi-feudal armed organization, with revived fascist ideological views. As a result of this analytical failure, they are deceived by Than Shwe into thinking that the aging despot will potentially retire or that dialogue with fascist leadership is either conceivable or desirable.
A quick historical glance at how fascist and feudal regimes rose and fell may offer a clue as to what it will take for the Burmese people to liberate themselves from such a dark force in history. Fascist, feudal, colonial and other parasitical regimes entrench themselves in power at all costs to society and live off the back of the population. While they are in power, no domestic social and political force alone is capable or should be expected to be able to overthrow or otherwise change fascist rule, unaided by external factors.
For the Burmese, both Bama and non-Bama, the ways in which the Burmese feudal rule, the British colonial rule and the Japanese occupation were ended, offer a more realistic model of how these socio-pathological systems of control, exploitation and domination are forced to end, than current liberal theories of democratic transition. Indeed Burma’s problems can be effectively addressed through the Burmese Way, and it may not necessarily take a fundamentally liberal or evolutionary route.
Dr Zarni is founder of the Free Burma Coalition and Research Fellow on Burma at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Where Impunity Reigns
December 18, 2009
By BENEDICT ROGERS
The world needs to be reminded, again and again, that the military regime in Burma ( Myanmar ) continues to perpetrate every conceivable human rights violation.
Any Burmese showing any dissent is brutally suppressed, as the world witnessed two years ago when peaceful Buddhist monks demonstrated. Many monks were killed or have disappeared; several hundred remain in prison.
Beyond that, more than 2,000 political activists are in Burmese prisons today, subjected to torture, denial of medical treatment and ludicrous sentences.
Student leader Bo Min Yu Ko is serving a 104-year prison term; Shan ethnic leader Hkun Htun Oo has been imprisoned for 93 years; democracy activist Min Ko Naing for 65 years. The most famous human rights activist, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been under house arrest for almost 14 years, and the term was extended for a further 18 months after a sham trial.
Many of these activists are in prisons thousands of miles from their families, and several are critically ill.
One category of victims of the military dictatorship that gets far less attention is Burma ’s ethnic minorities.
In eastern Burma , the regime has been conducting a brutal military campaign against people of the Karen, Karenni and Shan groups. Since 1996, more than 3,300 villages have been destroyed and more than a million people internally displaced. A Karenni friend of mine has described it as “Pol Pot in slow motion.”
The catalogue of terror includes the widespread, systematic use of rape as a weapon, forced labor, the use of human minesweepers and the forcible conscription of child soldiers.
In northern and western Burma , the predominantly Christian Chin and Kachin peoples also face systematic religious persecution.
The Muslim Rohingyas, targeted for their faith and ethnicity, are denied citizenship, despite living in Burma for generations. Thousands have escaped to miserable conditions in Bangladesh .
I have travelled more than 30 times to Burma and its borderlands. I have met former child soldiers, women who have been gang-raped, and many people who have been forced to flee from their burned villages.
Earlier this year, I met a man who had lost both his legs following an attack on his village.
When the Burmese Army came, he fled, but after the troops had moved on, he returned to his smoldering village to see if he could salvage any remaining belongings. Where his house had stood, he found nothing except ashes — hidden in which was a landmine laid by the troops. He stepped on the mine, and lost both legs.
He was carried for an entire day for basic medical treatment and then, a few weeks later, he walked on crutches through the jungle for two days to escape. He fled to a camp for internally displaced people near the Thai border. Four months later, that camp was attacked and he had to flee again.
An eyewitness once told me that in a prison camp in Chin State , prisoners who tried to escape were repeatedly stabbed, forced into a tub of salt water, and then roasted over a fire. A woman in Karen State described to me how her husband was hung upside down from a tree, his eyes gouged out, and then drowned.
The United Nations has documented these atrocities. For years, General Assembly resolutions have condemned the abuses. Previous special rapporteurs have described the violations as “the result of policy at the highest level, entailing political and legal responsibility.” A recent General Assembly resolution urged the regime to “put an end to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”
The U.N. has placed Burma on a monitoring list for genocide, the Genocide Risk Indices lists Burma as one of the two top “red alert” countries for genocide, along with Sudan, while the Minority Rights Group ranks Burma as one of the top five countries where ethnic minorities are under threat. Freedom House describes Burma as “the worst of the worst.”
This year, the United States reviewed its Burma policy and adopted a new approach of engagement while maintaining existing sanctions.
While this is the right approach in principle, and one advocated by the democracy movement, the danger is that the message has been misinterpreted, both by the regime and countries in the region.
Even though President Obama and senior U.S. officials have consistently emphasized that sanctions will not be lifted until there is substantial and irreversible progress in Burma, including the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners and a meaningful dialogue between the regime, the democracy movement and the ethnic nationalities, the impression created in the region is that the U.S. is going soft.
This is unfortunate, as it has let Burma ’s neighbors off the hook just when they were showing tentative signs of toughening up their approach. Trying to talk to the generals is right, but it needs to be accompanied by strong and unambiguous pressure.
In short, little action has been taken by the international community. Countries continue to sell the regime arms, impunity prevails.
The violations perpetrated by the regime amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Harvard Law School’s report, “Crimes in Burma,” commissioned by five of the world’s leading jurists, concludes that there is “a prima facie case of international criminal law violations occurring that demands U.N. Security Council action to establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate these grave breaches.”
Last week marked the 61st anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If that is to mean anything in Burma , the time has come for the U.N. to impose a universal arms embargo on the regime, to invoke the much-flaunted “Responsibility to Protect” mechanism, and to investigate the regime’s crimes. The time to end the system of impunity in Burma is long overdue.
Benedict Rogers is East Asia Team Leader with the human rights organization Christian Solidarity Worldwide, and author of several books on Burma, including “Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma ’s Tyrant.”
----------------------------------------
Benedict Rogers
East Asia Team Leader
Christian Solidarity Worldwide UK
PO Box 99
New Malden
Surrey KT3 3YF
www.csw.org.uk
www.changeforburma.org
Direct dial: (+44) (0)208-329-0041
General line: (+44) (0)845 456 5464
Fax: (+44) (0) 208-942-8802
Christian Solidarity Worldwide is a human rights organisation which specialises in religious freedom, works on behalf of those persecuted for their Christian beliefs and promotes religious liberty for all.
Confidentiality: The information contained in this email and any attachments are confidential. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. If you are not the named recipient please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person other than the intended recipient.
Virus Checking: Whilst all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that this communication is free from viruses, Christian Solidarity Worldwide accepts no liability in respect of any loss, cost, damage or expenses suffered as a result of accessing this message or any of its attachments.
By BENEDICT ROGERS
The world needs to be reminded, again and again, that the military regime in Burma ( Myanmar ) continues to perpetrate every conceivable human rights violation.
Any Burmese showing any dissent is brutally suppressed, as the world witnessed two years ago when peaceful Buddhist monks demonstrated. Many monks were killed or have disappeared; several hundred remain in prison.
Beyond that, more than 2,000 political activists are in Burmese prisons today, subjected to torture, denial of medical treatment and ludicrous sentences.
Student leader Bo Min Yu Ko is serving a 104-year prison term; Shan ethnic leader Hkun Htun Oo has been imprisoned for 93 years; democracy activist Min Ko Naing for 65 years. The most famous human rights activist, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been under house arrest for almost 14 years, and the term was extended for a further 18 months after a sham trial.
Many of these activists are in prisons thousands of miles from their families, and several are critically ill.
One category of victims of the military dictatorship that gets far less attention is Burma ’s ethnic minorities.
In eastern Burma , the regime has been conducting a brutal military campaign against people of the Karen, Karenni and Shan groups. Since 1996, more than 3,300 villages have been destroyed and more than a million people internally displaced. A Karenni friend of mine has described it as “Pol Pot in slow motion.”
The catalogue of terror includes the widespread, systematic use of rape as a weapon, forced labor, the use of human minesweepers and the forcible conscription of child soldiers.
In northern and western Burma , the predominantly Christian Chin and Kachin peoples also face systematic religious persecution.
The Muslim Rohingyas, targeted for their faith and ethnicity, are denied citizenship, despite living in Burma for generations. Thousands have escaped to miserable conditions in Bangladesh .
I have travelled more than 30 times to Burma and its borderlands. I have met former child soldiers, women who have been gang-raped, and many people who have been forced to flee from their burned villages.
Earlier this year, I met a man who had lost both his legs following an attack on his village.
When the Burmese Army came, he fled, but after the troops had moved on, he returned to his smoldering village to see if he could salvage any remaining belongings. Where his house had stood, he found nothing except ashes — hidden in which was a landmine laid by the troops. He stepped on the mine, and lost both legs.
He was carried for an entire day for basic medical treatment and then, a few weeks later, he walked on crutches through the jungle for two days to escape. He fled to a camp for internally displaced people near the Thai border. Four months later, that camp was attacked and he had to flee again.
An eyewitness once told me that in a prison camp in Chin State , prisoners who tried to escape were repeatedly stabbed, forced into a tub of salt water, and then roasted over a fire. A woman in Karen State described to me how her husband was hung upside down from a tree, his eyes gouged out, and then drowned.
The United Nations has documented these atrocities. For years, General Assembly resolutions have condemned the abuses. Previous special rapporteurs have described the violations as “the result of policy at the highest level, entailing political and legal responsibility.” A recent General Assembly resolution urged the regime to “put an end to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”
The U.N. has placed Burma on a monitoring list for genocide, the Genocide Risk Indices lists Burma as one of the two top “red alert” countries for genocide, along with Sudan, while the Minority Rights Group ranks Burma as one of the top five countries where ethnic minorities are under threat. Freedom House describes Burma as “the worst of the worst.”
This year, the United States reviewed its Burma policy and adopted a new approach of engagement while maintaining existing sanctions.
While this is the right approach in principle, and one advocated by the democracy movement, the danger is that the message has been misinterpreted, both by the regime and countries in the region.
Even though President Obama and senior U.S. officials have consistently emphasized that sanctions will not be lifted until there is substantial and irreversible progress in Burma, including the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners and a meaningful dialogue between the regime, the democracy movement and the ethnic nationalities, the impression created in the region is that the U.S. is going soft.
This is unfortunate, as it has let Burma ’s neighbors off the hook just when they were showing tentative signs of toughening up their approach. Trying to talk to the generals is right, but it needs to be accompanied by strong and unambiguous pressure.
In short, little action has been taken by the international community. Countries continue to sell the regime arms, impunity prevails.
The violations perpetrated by the regime amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Harvard Law School’s report, “Crimes in Burma,” commissioned by five of the world’s leading jurists, concludes that there is “a prima facie case of international criminal law violations occurring that demands U.N. Security Council action to establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate these grave breaches.”
Last week marked the 61st anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If that is to mean anything in Burma , the time has come for the U.N. to impose a universal arms embargo on the regime, to invoke the much-flaunted “Responsibility to Protect” mechanism, and to investigate the regime’s crimes. The time to end the system of impunity in Burma is long overdue.
Benedict Rogers is East Asia Team Leader with the human rights organization Christian Solidarity Worldwide, and author of several books on Burma, including “Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma ’s Tyrant.”
----------------------------------------
Benedict Rogers
East Asia Team Leader
Christian Solidarity Worldwide UK
PO Box 99
New Malden
Surrey KT3 3YF
www.csw.org.uk
www.changeforburma.org
Direct dial: (+44) (0)208-329-0041
General line: (+44) (0)845 456 5464
Fax: (+44) (0) 208-942-8802
Christian Solidarity Worldwide is a human rights organisation which specialises in religious freedom, works on behalf of those persecuted for their Christian beliefs and promotes religious liberty for all.
Confidentiality: The information contained in this email and any attachments are confidential. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. If you are not the named recipient please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person other than the intended recipient.
Virus Checking: Whilst all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that this communication is free from viruses, Christian Solidarity Worldwide accepts no liability in respect of any loss, cost, damage or expenses suffered as a result of accessing this message or any of its attachments.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
China's vice-president arrives in Myanmar for talks
32 mins ago
YANGON (AFP) – Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping arrived in Myanmar Saturday, an official told AFP, for an overnight visit as part of a regional tour as his country's likely next leader.
Xi landed at 2.15pm (0745 GMT) in Myanmar's economic hub and former capital Yangon and was expected to travel to a gem emporium and later pay homage at the sacred Shwe Dagon pagoda, the official said.
Security was very tight around the city and no media were allowed at the airport or at the Sedona hotel where he is staying.
Many Chinese nationals wearing suits and holding the Myanmar state flag gathered by the airport to greet their vice-president, an AFP correspondent said.
Xi is expected to fly to Myanmar's remote capital Naypyidaw on Saturday evening before meeting the government's military leadership including junta chief Than Shwe on Sunday.
The two leaders are expected to sign various agreements, according to another official, before Xi departs for Cambodia in the afternoon.
Xi is expected to take over as party leader in 2012, and president in 2013. His current trip started in Japan and ends in Cambodia on Tuesday.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091219/wl_asia_afp/myanmarchinadiplomacy
ENC Information
www.encburma.org
YANGON (AFP) – Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping arrived in Myanmar Saturday, an official told AFP, for an overnight visit as part of a regional tour as his country's likely next leader.
Xi landed at 2.15pm (0745 GMT) in Myanmar's economic hub and former capital Yangon and was expected to travel to a gem emporium and later pay homage at the sacred Shwe Dagon pagoda, the official said.
Security was very tight around the city and no media were allowed at the airport or at the Sedona hotel where he is staying.
Many Chinese nationals wearing suits and holding the Myanmar state flag gathered by the airport to greet their vice-president, an AFP correspondent said.
Xi is expected to fly to Myanmar's remote capital Naypyidaw on Saturday evening before meeting the government's military leadership including junta chief Than Shwe on Sunday.
The two leaders are expected to sign various agreements, according to another official, before Xi departs for Cambodia in the afternoon.
Xi is expected to take over as party leader in 2012, and president in 2013. His current trip started in Japan and ends in Cambodia on Tuesday.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091219/wl_asia_afp/myanmarchinadiplomacy
ENC Information
www.encburma.org
PANGLUNG AGREEMENT A LACHYUM HTE LABAU
DAW I
THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT
Dated the12th February 1947,
Panglong,
A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain Members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representative of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills:
(British Governor a ningrum rai ai) Executive Council malawm hkringmang nkau mi, Sam du-zauhpa ni yawng hte Sam, Kachin hte Chin amyu kasa masat ni hkrum zup hpawng sai hte:
The Members of the conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government:
(Zuphpawng malawm ni yawng gaw), mungdan hta shanglawt ahkaw ahkang hpe lawan lu la na matu, Sam, Kachin hte Chin amyu ni Interim Burmese Government (Lapran Masat Myen Atsuya) hte rau jawm galaw la ai lam rai nga ai, ngu kam let:
1. A Representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be appointed a Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
1. Bumlang-nga amyu ni (Hill Peoples) a kasa langai mi hpe, British Governor wa gaw, Supreme Council of United Hill Peoples-SCOUHP- (Bum-nga Amyu Myithkrum Council Daju) kaw nna lata masat ya ai kasa langai mi hpe, Frontier Areas Counsellor, ngu nna laksan masat san tawn nna, executive authority (seng ai makan lam hta dawdan lu ai ahkaw ahkang) jaw ya na lam.
2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's Executive Council, without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive Council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
2. Dai Frontier Areas (FA) a matu Counsellor hpe, Governor a Executive Council (Governor ningrum Council-daju) hta malawm salang san tawn nna, bungli makan dap kaga n masat ai sha (without portfolio) shalawm na lam; Ndai hku nna Frontier Areas hpe, Governor a ningrum Executive Council a makan lit yi-ngam hta shalawm bang la na re lam; ndai hku gram ai lam hpe Constitutional Convention (gawda ai tara gawgap zuphpawng) galaw ai aten hta, Defence hte External Affair (makawp-maga hpyen hpung hte maigan kyithkai makan) dap ni hpe gawgap la na matu lajang ai mahkyen hte maren shabyin la na lam.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors representing races of which he is not a member. While the two Deputy Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility.
3. Dai FA Counsellor hpe garum na matu Ningtau FA Counsellor marai lahkawng hpe mung, FA Counsellor tai ai wa a amyu n rai ai FA amyu ni hta na lata san tawn na lam. Dai Ningtau Counsellor yan lahkawng gaw, tinang a FA amyu hte laksan seng ai makan lit hpe shawng hkam la gun hpai nna, Constitutional Convention hpawng ai aten du ai kaw nna, FA yawng hte seng ai lit hpe garan gun mat wa na lam.
4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed.
4. FA Counsellor gaw Executive Council malawm rai nga ai rai nna, dai Council hta Frontier Area a malai kasa masat gaw, shi langai sha rai na re; raitim, Ningtau Counsellor yan lahkawng gaw, tinang makan hte seng ai lam hpe bawng ban ai shaloi Executive Council zuphpawng hta dung lawm lu na re ai lam.
5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of those Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.
5. Governor a ningrum Executive Council gaw, lahta e masing matsun tawn ai hte maren, Frontier Area makan lam ni hpe jat bang la wa na re ai raitim, dai hku lajang dat ai majaw, seng ang ai Frontier Area hkan grin nga chyalu rai sai uphkang masa hte shawa ahkaw ahkang ni hpe gara hku nna mung n shagrit shayawm lu na re lam; Frontier Area uphkang masa hta grin nga sai tinang nan dawdan lu ai daru magam ahkaw ahkang masa hpe Executive Council hkap la na lam.
6. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separated Kachin State within a Unified Burma is one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellor for Frontier Areas and the Deputy Counsellors shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.
6. Kachin State (Jinghpaw Mung) ngu nna Unified Burma (yawng lawm ai Myen Mung) kata hta laksan jarit masat tawn na lam gaw, Constituent Assemby (mungbawng rapdaw) hta e dawdan ra ai lam rai nga ai, raitim Jinghpaw Mung hpe dai hku masat ya lu na lam gaw ra sharawng nna mu mayu ai lam rai nga ai. Dai tsang de du lu na lam de shading nna, FA Counsellor hte Ningtau Counsellor ni hpe, Myitkyina hte Manmaw Ginwang ni hpe FA malawm mungdaw hku uphkang na lam sagawn shangun ra na re lam (ndai aten hta Myitkyina hte Manmaw Ginwang hta Government of Burma Act, 1935, Part II Scheduled Areas masa hte kaga uphkang masa ni lang ai lam mung gayau lawm ai lam byin nga ai. )
7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.
7. FA hta machyu nga ai amyu yawng a mungchying sha shawa gaw, democracy uphkang masa hkan ai mungdan shagu hta ningpawt ninghpang ahkaw ahkang ngu nna masat tawn ai ahkaw ahkang yawng hpe hkam la lu na re.
8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States.
8. Ndai hku myit hkrum masat tawn ai lam a majaw Federated Shan States (Sam Munghpawm) kata e laksan grin nga sai sut masa up ai lam hpe n hkra na re lam.
9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy Counsellors the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills financial arrangement similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States.
9. Ndai myit hkrum lam hta hkap la tawn ai malawm ni gaw, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills a matu Myen Mung kaw nna lu la ang ai ahkun sut gumhpraw hpe lu la nga na lam hta n hkra na lam. FA Counsellor hte Ningtau Counsellor ni gaw, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills ni hta mung, Sam Munghpawm hte Burma a lapran e lajang tawn nga ai mahkyen zawn, sut gumhpraw lam hpe lajang tawn lu na lam hpe sagawn hkyen na re lam.
Burmese Government.
(Signed) Aung San
Kachin Committee.
(Signed) Sinwa Naw, Myitkyina
(Signed) Zaurip, Myitkyina
(Signed) Dinra Tang, Myitkyina
(Signed) Zau La, Bhamo
(Signed) Zau Lawn, Bhamo
(Signed) Labang Grong, Bhamo
Chin Committee
(Signed) U Hlur Hmung, Falam
(Signed) U Thawng Za Khup, Tiddim
(Signed) U Kio Mang, Haka
Shan Committee
(Signed) Saohpalong of Tawngpeng State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Yawnghwe State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of North Hsenwi State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Laihka State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Mong Pawn State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Hsamonghkam State
(Signed) Representative of Hsahtung Saohpalong. Hkun Pung
(Signed) U Tin E
(Signed) U Htun Myint
(Signed) U Kya Bu
(Signed) Hkun Saw
(Signed) Sao Yape Hpa
(Signed) Hkun Hte
Daw II
Myit hkrum lam malawm lachyum hte labau
1. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas. Frontier ngu masat ai hta, Kachin Hills, Chin Hills, Shan (saopha mung) states ni lawm ai. Matsing ra ai lam ni hta,
A. Myen Hkawhkam Anglo-Burmese War #3 1885 hta lawan ai hku hkrat sum mat wa sai. Hkawhkam Thi Baw wa up sha ai Burmese Empire hpe British ni la kau dat sai. Ndai daw hpe 1935 aten du yang Ministerial Burma, ngu masat shamying nna Colonial Government dasang uphkang hkrat wa nga sai re. Ndai uphkang masa hta Myen masha ni ahkaw tinang uphkang dawdan ai lam law law n jaw tawn ai; hpang e angwi sha ahkaw ahkang jaw mat wa ai lam re.
Ministerial Burma daw hte British Government dasang lajang nna jat bang la ai daw, Frontier Areas, lahkawng hpe tsep kawp ginhka nna uphkang tawn nga ai. Lachyum gaw, Panglung zuhpawng hpe shawng na lang (March 1946) hpawng ai ten hta Ministerial Burma (M-Burma) hte Frontier Areas (FA-Burma) ni hpe tsep kawp kaga ga ginhka tawn da nga ai lam rai nga ai.
B. British ni lu la ai Burmese Empire hta n lawm nna, kaga laksan, langai hte langai hpe lajang la nna British Burma hta jat bang la ai daw hpe Frontier Areas (FA) ngu nna dingyang uphkang mat wa ai daw hta na malawm ni ndai ni re.
1) Karenni (Kayah), shawng e simsa lam lajang la kau ai, n hkap gasat ai. Ndai lam a majaw Karenni amyu hpe shanglawt lu ai buga hku sawn la kau dat nna, Frontier Areas hta n sawn shalawm ai. Tim, Majan Kaba #2 ngut ai hpang British Empire hpe bai dawm kau na masa pru wa ai majaw, Karenni amyu ni gaw, Frontier Areas amyu ni hte mazum mat wa sai. Dai majaw, Panglong Agreement 1947 (PLA-1947) hta “Frontier Areas” ngu ai amyu ni hta Karenni/Kayah mung gumchya lawm mat wa sai.
2) Sam Saopha ni mung, British Government hte myit hkrum lam dasang lajang la nna, Colonial Government hpe ntsa nna jahkrat ai uphkang masa hku hkap la kau ma ai, tim, laiwa sai aten na zawn, kata e n jashawn ai hku matut nga pra mat wa sai.
3) Kachin hte Chin ni gaw, British ni hpe aja awa hkap gasat ai amyu ni rai ma ai; Jinghpaw gumsa du langai hte British Colonial Government 1928 ning hta she simsa lam myit hkrum lajang la ma ai re. Ndai amyu ni a matu mung, ntsa nna Colonial Government uphkang masa dagraw tawn ya tim, kata e gahtawng masawn hkan nga nga chyalu htunghking labau hkan ai uphkang masa hpe tsep kawp hkap la shangang tawn nna matut galaw sa wa shangun sai.
Kachin Hills Area ngu ai hta Manmaw hte Myitkyina ginwang na bum marawn yawng lawm ai; Mali Hka makau na mare kaba, Myitkyina hte Bhamo hpe hpaga ginra ni re majaw, Kachin Hills Regulation hta n bang ai; colony uphkang tara kata hta laksan bang ai lam re. Hpa majaw nga yang, ndai mare kaba ni hta Sam-Myen ni law nga ai, tim Kachin Hills Area hta Jinghpaw htunghking hkan nna uphkang ai bai re majaw nau shai hkat ai lam nga nga ai lam re.
4) Dai re majaw, Panglung zuphpawng hpang ai aten, March 1946 hte February 1947 hta, Frontier Areas hta Sam, Kachin, Chin hte Karenni lawm nga sai. Ministerial Burmahta gaw Myen, Yahkaing, Mon hte Karen ni lawm nga ai.
Matsing: PLA-1947 gaw, ndai zawn colony prat labau hta ginhka garan tawn ai daw lahkawng hpe gahkin gumdin la dat na kun, langai sha tai wa hkra gyin gumhpawn mai na kun, malawm ni yawng myit hkrum lu ai daw, myit n hkrum lu ai daw ni hpe chye na lu nna, shanglawt lu la na lam hta gara hku jawm galaw lu na rai kun, ngu ai lam ni hte seng nna hpawng hpang wa ai lam re. Ndai hpawng hta myit hkrum lu ai lam gaw, munghpawm hpawm wa ai rai yang, hkridun shatai na ningpawt ninghpang hpe tam ai hpawng ai re.
2. Aung San, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas ladat masa mabyin lam.
Aung San gaw, Myen amyu hte Ministerial Burma hta woi awn ningshawng wa rai nga sai; tim shi a labau hte myit jasat ai lam hpe PLA-1947 hte seng ai daw hpe chyu sha sawn yu na re.
A. Aung San gaw British Governor a Executive Council hta malawm san hkam ai wa re; shi ningtau tingnyang-up tsang du hkra lit shatsam hkam ai wa re. HpSPL ningbaw rai nna Sinna colony masa hpe adawt ai wa re majaw, British Governor of Burma gaw, Aung San hpe n shalawm la yang hpyen shatai tawn ai lam rai na re ngu chye na nna shalawm la ai lam byin sai.
Matsing: Ndai aten, Majan Kaba #2 wai ai ten hta,
1) Governor a ningtau Executive Council gaw Ministerial Burma hte sha seng nga ai; Frontier Areas hte n seng nga ai. Frontier Areas hpe laksan ginhka nna up ai majaw ndai hku rai nga ai.
2) Tim, British Empire mungkan shara magup hkan hta colony byin mungdan ni hpe shang lawt (independence) jaw na mahkyen hpang mat wa nga sai. Dai re majaw, British Burma hta mung, shanglawt la na lam pru wa nga ai. Rai yang, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas ngu nna ginhka tawn ai uphkang masa nga nga ai majaw, British Burma gaw, uphkang masa lam hta mungdan lahkawng zawn rai nga ai manghkang byin nga ai, gara hku mahtai tam na rai kun?
3) British Burma Governor gaw, shanglawt mahtai lam hte seng nna Executive Council salang Aung San hte tsun shaga nga sai; Frontier Areas a matu gara hku lajang na lam mung tsun hkra masai. Frontier Areas kasa Executive Council hta n lawm ai; kadai hte bawngban shaga na kun?
Ndai manghkang ni gaw ya dingbai dingna hku rai taw nga sai.
a. Frontier Areas gaw, Governor ta-tut uphkang ai lit kaba langai rai nga ai, tim shi a ningtau Executive Council gaw, Ministerial Burma hte chyu sha seng nga ai manghkang lam.
b. British Burma hta shanglawt jaw ai lam byin na rai yang FA masha ni a myit jasat lam n chye ai majaw mahkyen n mai galaw ai lam.
c. Governor a hkra lata ngu na gaw Aung San rai nga sai, tim shi hta FA uphkang masa lam tsun shaga na lam n hku nga ai.
Ndai manghkang ni a majaw shabyin la wa ai lam masum byin wa sai.
Langai, British Governor wa hku nna Aung San hpe Frontier Areas amyu ni a shawng lam hpe gara hku sawn yu nna lajang mai na kun? ngu dasang san wa ai lam langai mi re. British Governor wa a myit hta Ministerial Burma gaw shanglawt lu la na sha re; dai rai yang, Frontier Areas hkan shanglawt lama n la mayu yang, British Government gaw shanglawt lu ai Myen Mung hpe lai di nna Frontier Areas uphkang masa hta matut lawm ra na re lam mung dan leng wa nga ai. Dai majaw British Governor wa Aung San hpe matsun ai hta Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Araeas lapran e, hpa mi byin wa timung, “free access”, n dut n dang pru shang lu ai lam nga ra ai, ngu ai lam tsun shalawm dat sai.
Lahkawng, British Governor wa dai zawn san jep wa ai gaw, Aung San a matu Frontier Areas hte seng nna ta-tut sagawn yu yang sha chye lu ai baw re majaw, Governor wa san ai Frontier Areas lam hte seng ai daw hpe shi Aung San gaw, Executive Council salang hku nna, matut mahkai wa na lam hpe shatsam ya nga ai, ngu ai hku mu lu wa sai.
PLA-1947 hpe azin ayang yu yu yang, Governor a Executive Council makan lit hta Frontier Areas lit hpe jashawn bang la dat ai lam gaw, PLA-1947 a myit hkrum lam hta madung langai mi re ai hpe mu lu nga ai re. FA hpe shalawm la na rai yang FA ni hta shanu ai shinggyim masha ni nga nga ai re majaw, shanhte a myit mada ai lam hpe n chye n mai, re ai de du ra sai.
Masum, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas a lapran e matut mahkai hkat ra ai lam pru wa sai majaw, gara ladat hku nna dai kyit-hkai lam hpe shabyin na kun? ngu ai lam hpe n mai koi mat sai rai. Ndai lam hta Aung San wa myitsu ai, hpaji kaba ai, myit jasat dam lada ai wa re ai lam ram ram mu lu nga ai. Shi sawn yu ai hta masing masum lawm nga ai lam hpe chye lu nga ai.
A. 1946 ning HpSPL ningbaw lata hkam la ai ten hta shi tsun ai hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas hpe shanglawt rau la ai mungdan lahkawng laksan byin wa na hku sawn yu ai. Dai hku rai wa yang, lahkawng yan hta rap ra nna maren sha rai ai democracy uphkang masa hpe sharawt tawn yang, mungdan lahkawng rai tim, uphkang masa bung ai majaw ni kap hkau chyap ai hku mai byin na re, ngu nna sawn yu nu ai. Ndai gaw masing langai re.
B. 1946 hta British Prime Minister Clement Atlee shaga nna shanglawt lu wa na lam sa bawngban na re; shi London de pru wa mahka e htawn tsun masing hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas gaw, uphkang masa langai a hkrang npu e mungdan langai, state lahkawng hku ginhka nna nga na masing re. Ministerial Burma state langai, Frontier Areas state langai ngu nna masing ai rai lu ai.
Masing A. hte B. hpe sawn aru yu ai aten hta Aung San gaw, Frontier Areas masha ni ra sharawng ai lam gara hku re hpe mahkrum madup hku n chye na ai aten re.
C. 1947 Panglung zuphpawng de sa du yang FA amyu ni a myit jasat gara hku rai nga ai hpe na lu nna maram lu sai. Dai aten hta Munghpawm Hkrang Masing byin mai ai, ngu chye na sai. PLA-1947 gaw ndai masing hpe shabyin na lam hpe FA masha amyu ni a yu-jut hku shadan dan ai lam rai nga ai.
Matsing: Aung San a matu yak htum ai manghkang hta Kachin amyu ni “Myen hpe n kam ai lam” lawm nga ai. Dai majaw 1946 hta Myitkyina-Manhkring mare kaw Jinghpaw du-salang marai 34 hte aja awa hkrum shaga nna Jinghpaw ni myit hkrum lu ai masa hpa re ai lam hpe shi chye na lu hkra, lahkawng lang hpawng masai. Ndai kaw nna pru wa ai machyu machyanng lam ni hpe PLA-1947 hta madung hku bang tawn nga ai hpe mu lu ai. Frontier Areas hta British uphkang masa kaw nna jaw tawn sai uphkang masa ahkaw ahkang ni hpe “shanglawt lu wa yang” n hkra lu na, ngu ai gaw Myitkyina hpawng kaw pawt jung nga ai.
Matsing: Hpa majaw Myitkyina zuphpawng ahkyak a ni nga yang lam lahkawng nga nga ai: langai, Jinghpaw “uphkang masa” gaw htunghking lailen masa re; lahkawng, htunghking masa hta jung ai lam hpe shagrin tawn na lajang ai re majaw, nga-sat nga-sat sat lawat lam a awm dawm ahkaw ahkang hpe, “Ndai n lu yang anhte myit n hkrum lu ai” ngu ai “manu jahpu” jahkrat tawn ai hta bang tawn saga ai. Ndai n lawm yang anhte British Government kaw na shanglawt hpe anhte a matu sha la na re, ngu ai kaw du hkra tsun sai.
Aung San Masing #3 hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas hpe gumhpawn gahkyin gumdin ai shanglawt lu mungdan byin wa na matu uphkang masa hte seng ai lam kaba masum hpe lang nna gyin gumdin shaprat la na lam byin pru wa ai. Dai uphkang lam ni gaw:
1) Frontier Areas malawm ni munghpawm kata e mungdaw malawm tai na lam,
2) mungdaw shagu hta hkam la lu chyalu rai ai uphkang masa hpe “tinang dawdan la ai masa” hku nna grin nga shangun lu na lam,
3) munghpawm ting hta democracy uphkang hkrang dagraw la nna democracy htung hta masat tawn ai shinggyim ahkaw ahkaw ni yawng hpe munghpawm ting hta grin nga nna rapra shangun na lam ni rai nga ai.
Ndai hku nna “shai ra ai kaw shai lu na, bung ra ai hta bung mai na” lam lajang ai masing masa rai nga ai.
Panglung Zuphpawng a laklai ai lam gaw, PLA-1947 hta ka bang tawn ai myit hkrum lam ni hta asan sha mu lu nga ai; dai hpe lahta na lam madung masum hku mai sang lang nga ai. Ndai gaw munghpawm a ahkyak kaba dik ai gawda masa hkridun re hpe mu lu nga ai. PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum gaw ndai ninggawn hkridunnan masum hpe ngu lu nga ai.
PLA-1947 Sung ai lachum ginsi masum
PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum hpe ta-tut masa hku bai yu yu yang ndai lam ni hpe mu nga ai.
I. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas lahkawng hpe gumhpawn tawn ya ai tsang gaw, Governor a Executive Council daru-daju tsang nna galaw tawn ai lam re; daru-daju gaw, Ministerial Burma hta n re ai, Frontier Areas hta mung n re ai, ndai mungdaw lahkawng hta grau tsaw ai tsang e tawn da ai lam re.
II. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas daw lahkawng hta maren bung pre nna rapra na lam gaw, democracy htung masa hta masat jaw ya ai a ahkaw ahkang ni rai na lam.
III. Frontier Areas hta amyu labau mausa htunghking hkan ai uphkang masa ni hpe munghpawm hta hkap la ra ai, shagrin tawn lu na re lam ni re.
Dai ni 2009 hta “Munghpawm” ngu ai mying a lachyum hpe sawn yu yang dum ra ai ninggawn hkridun masum gaw ndai ni nan nan rai nga ai.
Daw III. Myit hkrum lam hpe sang lang ai daw
A. #1-#5¨Ndai myit hkrum lam malawm ni gaw, British Governor a Executive Council makan lit gambum de, Frontier Areas makan lit hpe bang shalawm la ai hte seng ai lam ni rai nga ai.
B. #6 hta Frontier Areas malawm, Kachin Hills Area hpe “Kachin State” ngu nna laksan masat la lu na hkrang masa lajang ai lam hpe shapraw tawn ya ai. 1947 du shang wa yang Constituent Assemby gaw, Ministerial Burma a matu sha naw rai nga ai aten re; Kachin State shabyin na matu hpa majaw Ministerial Burma hte seng a ta? Manmaw hte Myitkyina mare-ginwang lahkawng gaw, Kachin Hills hta n lawm ai, Ministerial Burma hte mahtang seng ang mat ai majaw gram sharai la ra ai lam byin pru wa nga ai. Dai majaw ‘Kachin State” hpe constituent convention, 1947 hta dawdan ai lam re.
C. #7 hta Frontier Areas hta shanu ai ni “democracy htung hkrang” hta masat tawn ai ahkaw ahkang hpe lu la na lam masat tawn ai. Ndai hku nna Ministerial Burma kaw nna byin pru wa ai mungdaw gaw, Frontier Areas kaw nna byin pru wa a mungdaw ni a ntsa e ahkaw ahkang jan nna n lang lu na lam rai nga ai.
D. #8 - #9 hta Sam Mung, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills ni hta, munghpawm malawm byin wa ai majaw, sut-ahkun lam hta hkra wa ai lam n pru wa hkra, makawp maga tawn da ya nga ai.
Ndai hku nna PLA-1947 gaw, Frontier Areas amyu ni hpe, Governor a Executive Council daru-marai atsam lang nna, munghpawm malawm shabyin shalat tawn ai lam, ahkaw ahkang lam hte makawp maga tawn da ra ai hpe makawp maga tawn ya ai (tinang dawdan na ahkang) lam, rapra ra ai kaw rapra shangun ai lam (democracy masa) lam, yawng byin mai na matu masing jahkrat tawn nga ai.
Ndai hku nna PLA-1947 hta Frontier Areas ni a maga de nna htap htuk ai munghpawm mahkyen langai hpe laksan masing tawn da nga ai.
Daw IV. Panglung Spirit Hpa rai ta?
Panglung Spiritgaw, PLA-1947 a matsun masing masa hpe dai ni mung myit masin hta na n tat kau ai ni a myit mang sat lawat hpe ngu nga ai. Sat tim n si hkraw ai myit, shagyeng zingri tim n daw n hten ai myit, hpe ngu mayu ai. Ndai Panglung Spirit gaw dai ni mung Munghpawm shawa law malawng a matu lung rawk hkridun zawn naw grin nga ai; hpa rai nna rai ta?
1. PLA-1947 gaw, nga nga chyalu masing masa hpe katsing galang hta la nna shamying lang ai lam n re; shakut shaja ai lam hte galaw la ai lam rai nga ai. Hpa majaw shakut shaja mayu ai kun? Tinang amyu kam ai lam, myit mada ai lam, byin shangun mayu ai lam, tara ai lam ni re majaw re.
A. Majan Kaba ngut ai hte rau “Jinghpaw amyu ni” ngu hkam la ai du-salang sara-sarama ni Myityina padang manau ten hta hkrum hpawng ai kaw nna “Jinghpaw Mungdan sharawt na rawt sa wa ga” ngu ai nsen bum pa hkaraw nhkap yawng hta chyam mat wa hkra byin wa sai.
B. British Governor wa a hkra-lata rai ai HpSPL hpung ningbaw Aung San gaw, Jinghpaw amyu ni n lawm yang kaga Frontier Areas amyu ni Myen ni hte shanglawt hpyi ai kaw n lawm na re, ngu nna chye na ai. Dai majaw 1946, November 28-December 1 ya laman Myitkyina-Manghkring mare e wa du nna Jinghpaw ningbaw kasa ni hte bawng ban shaga ai lam byin sai. Ndai gaw, Aung San a matu Frontier Areas malawm ni hte shawng ningnan matut wa ai lam re.
Dai hkrum hpawng hta Jinghpaw salang ni gaw, Myen hte mazum nna shanglawt hpyi la ai kaw lawm na matu Jinghpaw ni shawng lu ra ai manu jahpu hpe tsun dan masai; dai gaw ndai ni re.
1) Jinghpaw ga hpe Jinghpaw ni sha uphkang lu na lam.
2) Myen ni Jinghpaw ga e wa shang nna a n up lu na lam.
3) Jinghpaw bumga hkan Jinghpaw ni ra ai uphkang masa hpe lang lu na lam.
4) Munghpawm tsang uphkang masa hte seng ai sut-hpaga lam, makawp maga dap, shawa shim lam, maigan matut mahkai lam makan lam ni hta mung, uphkang masa hpe Jinghpaw kasa ni masat lajang tawn ya na re lam.
5) Jinghpaw ni tinang a nawku makam masham lam hpe sha hkan na re lam.
C. 1946 hta Sam du Yawnghwe-zauhpa Sao Shwe Thaik woi ndau dat nna Panglung mare hta Sam, Jinghpaw, Hkang, Kayin ni hte hpawng dung sai; dai kaw nna Supreme Council of United Hill Peoples, Bum-masha Ninggawn Myit-hkrum Council, ngu hpaw tawn wa sai re.
D. 1947 January hta Panglung de lahkawng lang HpSPL kasa ni hte sa hkrum nna bawng ban sai re. Dai aten hta British Governor kaw na laika lu la sai; dai hta Frontier Areas masha ni myit n hkrum ai hku n galaw na lam aja awa tsun shana let ga sadi jaw sai.
2. PLA-1947 gaw hkam la ai lam re. Frontier Areas masha Sam, Jinghpaw hte Hkang ni gaw, Panglung de Myen hte hkrum na matu garai n sa du yang, ndai lam C. hte D. hpe hkap la sai. PLA-1947 spirit gaw madung ningpawt hta ga sadi jaw hkat nna hkap la hkat ai lam re.
3. PLA-1947 a Myit Masin Hkridun.
A. Hkap la hkat ai lam (mutual acceptance). Amyu shada da hkap la hkat ai lam; nang grau ngai grau n re, maren hku hkap la hkat ai lam. Langai hte langai a labau, htunghking lailen hte buga ni hpe hkap la hkungga ya hkat ai lam.
B. Kam hkat na lam (mutual trust). Frontier Areas amyu masha ni shada da kam hkat nna shawng lam de rau, lata hkindun nna sa wa na lam hkam la ai lam.
C. Sadi dung na lam (commitment). Frontier Areas masha amyu shada da rau mazum nna gam maka lam jawm lajang la mat wa ai hta sadi dung na lam hpe kaang e tawn nna hkam la ai lam.
D. Tara ai ahkaw ahkang lam (just rights). Jaw ai, tara ai, rapra ai, wanglu wangling ahkaw ahkang hpe yawng lu la na lam re.
Ndai hkam lam kaba mali hpe sharawt shagrin la ai hkridun ningtsa e tsap nna nna, Aung San wa hte PLA-1947 hpe lajang shalat lawm sai re. Ndai zawn, Jinghpaw amyu ni a matu n-gun atsam hte aten manu mana arang bang nna tinang amyu a shawng lam hpe hkangzing pawn ai lam re.
4. Panglung Spirit dai ni gara kaw rai ta?
A. PLA-1947 hpe n malap kau lu ai myit masin yawng hta re.
B. Rawt malan labau hte hkrat sum mat wa sai ni bang ya ai arang hta re.
C. Dai ni hkindit ra ai hpe hkindit gwi ai myit jasat hta re.
D. Dai ni myit n chye htum ai lailen hta mung PL Spirit rawng nga ai.
“Mawru hkrat ai hta na lawt lu tim, htenza hkrat sum ai mabyin hpe myit machyi let tut dum nga ra ai gam maka a ntsa e tsap nna shawng lam hpe azi yu ai lam”–Abraham Lincoln. Wunpawng Panglung Spririt 2009
Hpungdim dat numhtet:
PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum hpe sawk sagawn aru yu at ten hta shawng lam e woi awn lai wa sai ndai ni hpe myit dum shagrau mayu nngai. Panglung Zuphpawng malawm lekmat htu ai ni hta: Manmaw – Lawdan Duwa Zau La (kagu majing re), Dagaw Duwa Zau Lawn (kahkri hpe la ai), Myitkyina- Wabaw Duwa Zau Rip (kahkau, kamoi a kasha) ni re. Bai nna Sinli- Sara Kaba Maran Ebbyu (tinang kawa, shawng ningnan lang ai Substate ga-sumla ngai hpe lata hta soi shangun ai, 1947); KIO Ningbaw Kaba Usa Maran Brang Seng (lawu lahta kahpu kaba, shi a lagaw hkang hpe dai ni hkan nga ai.)
Kachin-Americans & Friends, USA for Democracy & Human Rights
2 November 2009
THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT
Dated the12th February 1947,
Panglong,
A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain Members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representative of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills:
(British Governor a ningrum rai ai) Executive Council malawm hkringmang nkau mi, Sam du-zauhpa ni yawng hte Sam, Kachin hte Chin amyu kasa masat ni hkrum zup hpawng sai hte:
The Members of the conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government:
(Zuphpawng malawm ni yawng gaw), mungdan hta shanglawt ahkaw ahkang hpe lawan lu la na matu, Sam, Kachin hte Chin amyu ni Interim Burmese Government (Lapran Masat Myen Atsuya) hte rau jawm galaw la ai lam rai nga ai, ngu kam let:
1. A Representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be appointed a Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
1. Bumlang-nga amyu ni (Hill Peoples) a kasa langai mi hpe, British Governor wa gaw, Supreme Council of United Hill Peoples-SCOUHP- (Bum-nga Amyu Myithkrum Council Daju) kaw nna lata masat ya ai kasa langai mi hpe, Frontier Areas Counsellor, ngu nna laksan masat san tawn nna, executive authority (seng ai makan lam hta dawdan lu ai ahkaw ahkang) jaw ya na lam.
2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's Executive Council, without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive Council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
2. Dai Frontier Areas (FA) a matu Counsellor hpe, Governor a Executive Council (Governor ningrum Council-daju) hta malawm salang san tawn nna, bungli makan dap kaga n masat ai sha (without portfolio) shalawm na lam; Ndai hku nna Frontier Areas hpe, Governor a ningrum Executive Council a makan lit yi-ngam hta shalawm bang la na re lam; ndai hku gram ai lam hpe Constitutional Convention (gawda ai tara gawgap zuphpawng) galaw ai aten hta, Defence hte External Affair (makawp-maga hpyen hpung hte maigan kyithkai makan) dap ni hpe gawgap la na matu lajang ai mahkyen hte maren shabyin la na lam.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors representing races of which he is not a member. While the two Deputy Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility.
3. Dai FA Counsellor hpe garum na matu Ningtau FA Counsellor marai lahkawng hpe mung, FA Counsellor tai ai wa a amyu n rai ai FA amyu ni hta na lata san tawn na lam. Dai Ningtau Counsellor yan lahkawng gaw, tinang a FA amyu hte laksan seng ai makan lit hpe shawng hkam la gun hpai nna, Constitutional Convention hpawng ai aten du ai kaw nna, FA yawng hte seng ai lit hpe garan gun mat wa na lam.
4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed.
4. FA Counsellor gaw Executive Council malawm rai nga ai rai nna, dai Council hta Frontier Area a malai kasa masat gaw, shi langai sha rai na re; raitim, Ningtau Counsellor yan lahkawng gaw, tinang makan hte seng ai lam hpe bawng ban ai shaloi Executive Council zuphpawng hta dung lawm lu na re ai lam.
5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of those Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.
5. Governor a ningrum Executive Council gaw, lahta e masing matsun tawn ai hte maren, Frontier Area makan lam ni hpe jat bang la wa na re ai raitim, dai hku lajang dat ai majaw, seng ang ai Frontier Area hkan grin nga chyalu rai sai uphkang masa hte shawa ahkaw ahkang ni hpe gara hku nna mung n shagrit shayawm lu na re lam; Frontier Area uphkang masa hta grin nga sai tinang nan dawdan lu ai daru magam ahkaw ahkang masa hpe Executive Council hkap la na lam.
6. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separated Kachin State within a Unified Burma is one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellor for Frontier Areas and the Deputy Counsellors shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.
6. Kachin State (Jinghpaw Mung) ngu nna Unified Burma (yawng lawm ai Myen Mung) kata hta laksan jarit masat tawn na lam gaw, Constituent Assemby (mungbawng rapdaw) hta e dawdan ra ai lam rai nga ai, raitim Jinghpaw Mung hpe dai hku masat ya lu na lam gaw ra sharawng nna mu mayu ai lam rai nga ai. Dai tsang de du lu na lam de shading nna, FA Counsellor hte Ningtau Counsellor ni hpe, Myitkyina hte Manmaw Ginwang ni hpe FA malawm mungdaw hku uphkang na lam sagawn shangun ra na re lam (ndai aten hta Myitkyina hte Manmaw Ginwang hta Government of Burma Act, 1935, Part II Scheduled Areas masa hte kaga uphkang masa ni lang ai lam mung gayau lawm ai lam byin nga ai. )
7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.
7. FA hta machyu nga ai amyu yawng a mungchying sha shawa gaw, democracy uphkang masa hkan ai mungdan shagu hta ningpawt ninghpang ahkaw ahkang ngu nna masat tawn ai ahkaw ahkang yawng hpe hkam la lu na re.
8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States.
8. Ndai hku myit hkrum masat tawn ai lam a majaw Federated Shan States (Sam Munghpawm) kata e laksan grin nga sai sut masa up ai lam hpe n hkra na re lam.
9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy Counsellors the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills financial arrangement similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States.
9. Ndai myit hkrum lam hta hkap la tawn ai malawm ni gaw, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills a matu Myen Mung kaw nna lu la ang ai ahkun sut gumhpraw hpe lu la nga na lam hta n hkra na lam. FA Counsellor hte Ningtau Counsellor ni gaw, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills ni hta mung, Sam Munghpawm hte Burma a lapran e lajang tawn nga ai mahkyen zawn, sut gumhpraw lam hpe lajang tawn lu na lam hpe sagawn hkyen na re lam.
Burmese Government.
(Signed) Aung San
Kachin Committee.
(Signed) Sinwa Naw, Myitkyina
(Signed) Zaurip, Myitkyina
(Signed) Dinra Tang, Myitkyina
(Signed) Zau La, Bhamo
(Signed) Zau Lawn, Bhamo
(Signed) Labang Grong, Bhamo
Chin Committee
(Signed) U Hlur Hmung, Falam
(Signed) U Thawng Za Khup, Tiddim
(Signed) U Kio Mang, Haka
Shan Committee
(Signed) Saohpalong of Tawngpeng State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Yawnghwe State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of North Hsenwi State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Laihka State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Mong Pawn State.
(Signed) Saohpalong of Hsamonghkam State
(Signed) Representative of Hsahtung Saohpalong. Hkun Pung
(Signed) U Tin E
(Signed) U Htun Myint
(Signed) U Kya Bu
(Signed) Hkun Saw
(Signed) Sao Yape Hpa
(Signed) Hkun Hte
Daw II
Myit hkrum lam malawm lachyum hte labau
1. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas. Frontier ngu masat ai hta, Kachin Hills, Chin Hills, Shan (saopha mung) states ni lawm ai. Matsing ra ai lam ni hta,
A. Myen Hkawhkam Anglo-Burmese War #3 1885 hta lawan ai hku hkrat sum mat wa sai. Hkawhkam Thi Baw wa up sha ai Burmese Empire hpe British ni la kau dat sai. Ndai daw hpe 1935 aten du yang Ministerial Burma, ngu masat shamying nna Colonial Government dasang uphkang hkrat wa nga sai re. Ndai uphkang masa hta Myen masha ni ahkaw tinang uphkang dawdan ai lam law law n jaw tawn ai; hpang e angwi sha ahkaw ahkang jaw mat wa ai lam re.
Ministerial Burma daw hte British Government dasang lajang nna jat bang la ai daw, Frontier Areas, lahkawng hpe tsep kawp ginhka nna uphkang tawn nga ai. Lachyum gaw, Panglung zuhpawng hpe shawng na lang (March 1946) hpawng ai ten hta Ministerial Burma (M-Burma) hte Frontier Areas (FA-Burma) ni hpe tsep kawp kaga ga ginhka tawn da nga ai lam rai nga ai.
B. British ni lu la ai Burmese Empire hta n lawm nna, kaga laksan, langai hte langai hpe lajang la nna British Burma hta jat bang la ai daw hpe Frontier Areas (FA) ngu nna dingyang uphkang mat wa ai daw hta na malawm ni ndai ni re.
1) Karenni (Kayah), shawng e simsa lam lajang la kau ai, n hkap gasat ai. Ndai lam a majaw Karenni amyu hpe shanglawt lu ai buga hku sawn la kau dat nna, Frontier Areas hta n sawn shalawm ai. Tim, Majan Kaba #2 ngut ai hpang British Empire hpe bai dawm kau na masa pru wa ai majaw, Karenni amyu ni gaw, Frontier Areas amyu ni hte mazum mat wa sai. Dai majaw, Panglong Agreement 1947 (PLA-1947) hta “Frontier Areas” ngu ai amyu ni hta Karenni/Kayah mung gumchya lawm mat wa sai.
2) Sam Saopha ni mung, British Government hte myit hkrum lam dasang lajang la nna, Colonial Government hpe ntsa nna jahkrat ai uphkang masa hku hkap la kau ma ai, tim, laiwa sai aten na zawn, kata e n jashawn ai hku matut nga pra mat wa sai.
3) Kachin hte Chin ni gaw, British ni hpe aja awa hkap gasat ai amyu ni rai ma ai; Jinghpaw gumsa du langai hte British Colonial Government 1928 ning hta she simsa lam myit hkrum lajang la ma ai re. Ndai amyu ni a matu mung, ntsa nna Colonial Government uphkang masa dagraw tawn ya tim, kata e gahtawng masawn hkan nga nga chyalu htunghking labau hkan ai uphkang masa hpe tsep kawp hkap la shangang tawn nna matut galaw sa wa shangun sai.
Kachin Hills Area ngu ai hta Manmaw hte Myitkyina ginwang na bum marawn yawng lawm ai; Mali Hka makau na mare kaba, Myitkyina hte Bhamo hpe hpaga ginra ni re majaw, Kachin Hills Regulation hta n bang ai; colony uphkang tara kata hta laksan bang ai lam re. Hpa majaw nga yang, ndai mare kaba ni hta Sam-Myen ni law nga ai, tim Kachin Hills Area hta Jinghpaw htunghking hkan nna uphkang ai bai re majaw nau shai hkat ai lam nga nga ai lam re.
4) Dai re majaw, Panglung zuphpawng hpang ai aten, March 1946 hte February 1947 hta, Frontier Areas hta Sam, Kachin, Chin hte Karenni lawm nga sai. Ministerial Burmahta gaw Myen, Yahkaing, Mon hte Karen ni lawm nga ai.
Matsing: PLA-1947 gaw, ndai zawn colony prat labau hta ginhka garan tawn ai daw lahkawng hpe gahkin gumdin la dat na kun, langai sha tai wa hkra gyin gumhpawn mai na kun, malawm ni yawng myit hkrum lu ai daw, myit n hkrum lu ai daw ni hpe chye na lu nna, shanglawt lu la na lam hta gara hku jawm galaw lu na rai kun, ngu ai lam ni hte seng nna hpawng hpang wa ai lam re. Ndai hpawng hta myit hkrum lu ai lam gaw, munghpawm hpawm wa ai rai yang, hkridun shatai na ningpawt ninghpang hpe tam ai hpawng ai re.
2. Aung San, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas ladat masa mabyin lam.
Aung San gaw, Myen amyu hte Ministerial Burma hta woi awn ningshawng wa rai nga sai; tim shi a labau hte myit jasat ai lam hpe PLA-1947 hte seng ai daw hpe chyu sha sawn yu na re.
A. Aung San gaw British Governor a Executive Council hta malawm san hkam ai wa re; shi ningtau tingnyang-up tsang du hkra lit shatsam hkam ai wa re. HpSPL ningbaw rai nna Sinna colony masa hpe adawt ai wa re majaw, British Governor of Burma gaw, Aung San hpe n shalawm la yang hpyen shatai tawn ai lam rai na re ngu chye na nna shalawm la ai lam byin sai.
Matsing: Ndai aten, Majan Kaba #2 wai ai ten hta,
1) Governor a ningtau Executive Council gaw Ministerial Burma hte sha seng nga ai; Frontier Areas hte n seng nga ai. Frontier Areas hpe laksan ginhka nna up ai majaw ndai hku rai nga ai.
2) Tim, British Empire mungkan shara magup hkan hta colony byin mungdan ni hpe shang lawt (independence) jaw na mahkyen hpang mat wa nga sai. Dai re majaw, British Burma hta mung, shanglawt la na lam pru wa nga ai. Rai yang, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas ngu nna ginhka tawn ai uphkang masa nga nga ai majaw, British Burma gaw, uphkang masa lam hta mungdan lahkawng zawn rai nga ai manghkang byin nga ai, gara hku mahtai tam na rai kun?
3) British Burma Governor gaw, shanglawt mahtai lam hte seng nna Executive Council salang Aung San hte tsun shaga nga sai; Frontier Areas a matu gara hku lajang na lam mung tsun hkra masai. Frontier Areas kasa Executive Council hta n lawm ai; kadai hte bawngban shaga na kun?
Ndai manghkang ni gaw ya dingbai dingna hku rai taw nga sai.
a. Frontier Areas gaw, Governor ta-tut uphkang ai lit kaba langai rai nga ai, tim shi a ningtau Executive Council gaw, Ministerial Burma hte chyu sha seng nga ai manghkang lam.
b. British Burma hta shanglawt jaw ai lam byin na rai yang FA masha ni a myit jasat lam n chye ai majaw mahkyen n mai galaw ai lam.
c. Governor a hkra lata ngu na gaw Aung San rai nga sai, tim shi hta FA uphkang masa lam tsun shaga na lam n hku nga ai.
Ndai manghkang ni a majaw shabyin la wa ai lam masum byin wa sai.
Langai, British Governor wa hku nna Aung San hpe Frontier Areas amyu ni a shawng lam hpe gara hku sawn yu nna lajang mai na kun? ngu dasang san wa ai lam langai mi re. British Governor wa a myit hta Ministerial Burma gaw shanglawt lu la na sha re; dai rai yang, Frontier Areas hkan shanglawt lama n la mayu yang, British Government gaw shanglawt lu ai Myen Mung hpe lai di nna Frontier Areas uphkang masa hta matut lawm ra na re lam mung dan leng wa nga ai. Dai majaw British Governor wa Aung San hpe matsun ai hta Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Araeas lapran e, hpa mi byin wa timung, “free access”, n dut n dang pru shang lu ai lam nga ra ai, ngu ai lam tsun shalawm dat sai.
Lahkawng, British Governor wa dai zawn san jep wa ai gaw, Aung San a matu Frontier Areas hte seng nna ta-tut sagawn yu yang sha chye lu ai baw re majaw, Governor wa san ai Frontier Areas lam hte seng ai daw hpe shi Aung San gaw, Executive Council salang hku nna, matut mahkai wa na lam hpe shatsam ya nga ai, ngu ai hku mu lu wa sai.
PLA-1947 hpe azin ayang yu yu yang, Governor a Executive Council makan lit hta Frontier Areas lit hpe jashawn bang la dat ai lam gaw, PLA-1947 a myit hkrum lam hta madung langai mi re ai hpe mu lu nga ai re. FA hpe shalawm la na rai yang FA ni hta shanu ai shinggyim masha ni nga nga ai re majaw, shanhte a myit mada ai lam hpe n chye n mai, re ai de du ra sai.
Masum, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas a lapran e matut mahkai hkat ra ai lam pru wa sai majaw, gara ladat hku nna dai kyit-hkai lam hpe shabyin na kun? ngu ai lam hpe n mai koi mat sai rai. Ndai lam hta Aung San wa myitsu ai, hpaji kaba ai, myit jasat dam lada ai wa re ai lam ram ram mu lu nga ai. Shi sawn yu ai hta masing masum lawm nga ai lam hpe chye lu nga ai.
A. 1946 ning HpSPL ningbaw lata hkam la ai ten hta shi tsun ai hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas hpe shanglawt rau la ai mungdan lahkawng laksan byin wa na hku sawn yu ai. Dai hku rai wa yang, lahkawng yan hta rap ra nna maren sha rai ai democracy uphkang masa hpe sharawt tawn yang, mungdan lahkawng rai tim, uphkang masa bung ai majaw ni kap hkau chyap ai hku mai byin na re, ngu nna sawn yu nu ai. Ndai gaw masing langai re.
B. 1946 hta British Prime Minister Clement Atlee shaga nna shanglawt lu wa na lam sa bawngban na re; shi London de pru wa mahka e htawn tsun masing hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas gaw, uphkang masa langai a hkrang npu e mungdan langai, state lahkawng hku ginhka nna nga na masing re. Ministerial Burma state langai, Frontier Areas state langai ngu nna masing ai rai lu ai.
Masing A. hte B. hpe sawn aru yu ai aten hta Aung San gaw, Frontier Areas masha ni ra sharawng ai lam gara hku re hpe mahkrum madup hku n chye na ai aten re.
C. 1947 Panglung zuphpawng de sa du yang FA amyu ni a myit jasat gara hku rai nga ai hpe na lu nna maram lu sai. Dai aten hta Munghpawm Hkrang Masing byin mai ai, ngu chye na sai. PLA-1947 gaw ndai masing hpe shabyin na lam hpe FA masha amyu ni a yu-jut hku shadan dan ai lam rai nga ai.
Matsing: Aung San a matu yak htum ai manghkang hta Kachin amyu ni “Myen hpe n kam ai lam” lawm nga ai. Dai majaw 1946 hta Myitkyina-Manhkring mare kaw Jinghpaw du-salang marai 34 hte aja awa hkrum shaga nna Jinghpaw ni myit hkrum lu ai masa hpa re ai lam hpe shi chye na lu hkra, lahkawng lang hpawng masai. Ndai kaw nna pru wa ai machyu machyanng lam ni hpe PLA-1947 hta madung hku bang tawn nga ai hpe mu lu ai. Frontier Areas hta British uphkang masa kaw nna jaw tawn sai uphkang masa ahkaw ahkang ni hpe “shanglawt lu wa yang” n hkra lu na, ngu ai gaw Myitkyina hpawng kaw pawt jung nga ai.
Matsing: Hpa majaw Myitkyina zuphpawng ahkyak a ni nga yang lam lahkawng nga nga ai: langai, Jinghpaw “uphkang masa” gaw htunghking lailen masa re; lahkawng, htunghking masa hta jung ai lam hpe shagrin tawn na lajang ai re majaw, nga-sat nga-sat sat lawat lam a awm dawm ahkaw ahkang hpe, “Ndai n lu yang anhte myit n hkrum lu ai” ngu ai “manu jahpu” jahkrat tawn ai hta bang tawn saga ai. Ndai n lawm yang anhte British Government kaw na shanglawt hpe anhte a matu sha la na re, ngu ai kaw du hkra tsun sai.
Aung San Masing #3 hta, Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas hpe gumhpawn gahkyin gumdin ai shanglawt lu mungdan byin wa na matu uphkang masa hte seng ai lam kaba masum hpe lang nna gyin gumdin shaprat la na lam byin pru wa ai. Dai uphkang lam ni gaw:
1) Frontier Areas malawm ni munghpawm kata e mungdaw malawm tai na lam,
2) mungdaw shagu hta hkam la lu chyalu rai ai uphkang masa hpe “tinang dawdan la ai masa” hku nna grin nga shangun lu na lam,
3) munghpawm ting hta democracy uphkang hkrang dagraw la nna democracy htung hta masat tawn ai shinggyim ahkaw ahkaw ni yawng hpe munghpawm ting hta grin nga nna rapra shangun na lam ni rai nga ai.
Ndai hku nna “shai ra ai kaw shai lu na, bung ra ai hta bung mai na” lam lajang ai masing masa rai nga ai.
Panglung Zuphpawng a laklai ai lam gaw, PLA-1947 hta ka bang tawn ai myit hkrum lam ni hta asan sha mu lu nga ai; dai hpe lahta na lam madung masum hku mai sang lang nga ai. Ndai gaw munghpawm a ahkyak kaba dik ai gawda masa hkridun re hpe mu lu nga ai. PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum gaw ndai ninggawn hkridunnan masum hpe ngu lu nga ai.
PLA-1947 Sung ai lachum ginsi masum
PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum hpe ta-tut masa hku bai yu yu yang ndai lam ni hpe mu nga ai.
I. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas lahkawng hpe gumhpawn tawn ya ai tsang gaw, Governor a Executive Council daru-daju tsang nna galaw tawn ai lam re; daru-daju gaw, Ministerial Burma hta n re ai, Frontier Areas hta mung n re ai, ndai mungdaw lahkawng hta grau tsaw ai tsang e tawn da ai lam re.
II. Ministerial Burma hte Frontier Areas daw lahkawng hta maren bung pre nna rapra na lam gaw, democracy htung masa hta masat jaw ya ai a ahkaw ahkang ni rai na lam.
III. Frontier Areas hta amyu labau mausa htunghking hkan ai uphkang masa ni hpe munghpawm hta hkap la ra ai, shagrin tawn lu na re lam ni re.
Dai ni 2009 hta “Munghpawm” ngu ai mying a lachyum hpe sawn yu yang dum ra ai ninggawn hkridun masum gaw ndai ni nan nan rai nga ai.
Daw III. Myit hkrum lam hpe sang lang ai daw
A. #1-#5¨Ndai myit hkrum lam malawm ni gaw, British Governor a Executive Council makan lit gambum de, Frontier Areas makan lit hpe bang shalawm la ai hte seng ai lam ni rai nga ai.
B. #6 hta Frontier Areas malawm, Kachin Hills Area hpe “Kachin State” ngu nna laksan masat la lu na hkrang masa lajang ai lam hpe shapraw tawn ya ai. 1947 du shang wa yang Constituent Assemby gaw, Ministerial Burma a matu sha naw rai nga ai aten re; Kachin State shabyin na matu hpa majaw Ministerial Burma hte seng a ta? Manmaw hte Myitkyina mare-ginwang lahkawng gaw, Kachin Hills hta n lawm ai, Ministerial Burma hte mahtang seng ang mat ai majaw gram sharai la ra ai lam byin pru wa nga ai. Dai majaw ‘Kachin State” hpe constituent convention, 1947 hta dawdan ai lam re.
C. #7 hta Frontier Areas hta shanu ai ni “democracy htung hkrang” hta masat tawn ai ahkaw ahkang hpe lu la na lam masat tawn ai. Ndai hku nna Ministerial Burma kaw nna byin pru wa ai mungdaw gaw, Frontier Areas kaw nna byin pru wa a mungdaw ni a ntsa e ahkaw ahkang jan nna n lang lu na lam rai nga ai.
D. #8 - #9 hta Sam Mung, Kachin Hills hte Chin Hills ni hta, munghpawm malawm byin wa ai majaw, sut-ahkun lam hta hkra wa ai lam n pru wa hkra, makawp maga tawn da ya nga ai.
Ndai hku nna PLA-1947 gaw, Frontier Areas amyu ni hpe, Governor a Executive Council daru-marai atsam lang nna, munghpawm malawm shabyin shalat tawn ai lam, ahkaw ahkang lam hte makawp maga tawn da ra ai hpe makawp maga tawn ya ai (tinang dawdan na ahkang) lam, rapra ra ai kaw rapra shangun ai lam (democracy masa) lam, yawng byin mai na matu masing jahkrat tawn nga ai.
Ndai hku nna PLA-1947 hta Frontier Areas ni a maga de nna htap htuk ai munghpawm mahkyen langai hpe laksan masing tawn da nga ai.
Daw IV. Panglung Spirit Hpa rai ta?
Panglung Spiritgaw, PLA-1947 a matsun masing masa hpe dai ni mung myit masin hta na n tat kau ai ni a myit mang sat lawat hpe ngu nga ai. Sat tim n si hkraw ai myit, shagyeng zingri tim n daw n hten ai myit, hpe ngu mayu ai. Ndai Panglung Spirit gaw dai ni mung Munghpawm shawa law malawng a matu lung rawk hkridun zawn naw grin nga ai; hpa rai nna rai ta?
1. PLA-1947 gaw, nga nga chyalu masing masa hpe katsing galang hta la nna shamying lang ai lam n re; shakut shaja ai lam hte galaw la ai lam rai nga ai. Hpa majaw shakut shaja mayu ai kun? Tinang amyu kam ai lam, myit mada ai lam, byin shangun mayu ai lam, tara ai lam ni re majaw re.
A. Majan Kaba ngut ai hte rau “Jinghpaw amyu ni” ngu hkam la ai du-salang sara-sarama ni Myityina padang manau ten hta hkrum hpawng ai kaw nna “Jinghpaw Mungdan sharawt na rawt sa wa ga” ngu ai nsen bum pa hkaraw nhkap yawng hta chyam mat wa hkra byin wa sai.
B. British Governor wa a hkra-lata rai ai HpSPL hpung ningbaw Aung San gaw, Jinghpaw amyu ni n lawm yang kaga Frontier Areas amyu ni Myen ni hte shanglawt hpyi ai kaw n lawm na re, ngu nna chye na ai. Dai majaw 1946, November 28-December 1 ya laman Myitkyina-Manghkring mare e wa du nna Jinghpaw ningbaw kasa ni hte bawng ban shaga ai lam byin sai. Ndai gaw, Aung San a matu Frontier Areas malawm ni hte shawng ningnan matut wa ai lam re.
Dai hkrum hpawng hta Jinghpaw salang ni gaw, Myen hte mazum nna shanglawt hpyi la ai kaw lawm na matu Jinghpaw ni shawng lu ra ai manu jahpu hpe tsun dan masai; dai gaw ndai ni re.
1) Jinghpaw ga hpe Jinghpaw ni sha uphkang lu na lam.
2) Myen ni Jinghpaw ga e wa shang nna a n up lu na lam.
3) Jinghpaw bumga hkan Jinghpaw ni ra ai uphkang masa hpe lang lu na lam.
4) Munghpawm tsang uphkang masa hte seng ai sut-hpaga lam, makawp maga dap, shawa shim lam, maigan matut mahkai lam makan lam ni hta mung, uphkang masa hpe Jinghpaw kasa ni masat lajang tawn ya na re lam.
5) Jinghpaw ni tinang a nawku makam masham lam hpe sha hkan na re lam.
C. 1946 hta Sam du Yawnghwe-zauhpa Sao Shwe Thaik woi ndau dat nna Panglung mare hta Sam, Jinghpaw, Hkang, Kayin ni hte hpawng dung sai; dai kaw nna Supreme Council of United Hill Peoples, Bum-masha Ninggawn Myit-hkrum Council, ngu hpaw tawn wa sai re.
D. 1947 January hta Panglung de lahkawng lang HpSPL kasa ni hte sa hkrum nna bawng ban sai re. Dai aten hta British Governor kaw na laika lu la sai; dai hta Frontier Areas masha ni myit n hkrum ai hku n galaw na lam aja awa tsun shana let ga sadi jaw sai.
2. PLA-1947 gaw hkam la ai lam re. Frontier Areas masha Sam, Jinghpaw hte Hkang ni gaw, Panglung de Myen hte hkrum na matu garai n sa du yang, ndai lam C. hte D. hpe hkap la sai. PLA-1947 spirit gaw madung ningpawt hta ga sadi jaw hkat nna hkap la hkat ai lam re.
3. PLA-1947 a Myit Masin Hkridun.
A. Hkap la hkat ai lam (mutual acceptance). Amyu shada da hkap la hkat ai lam; nang grau ngai grau n re, maren hku hkap la hkat ai lam. Langai hte langai a labau, htunghking lailen hte buga ni hpe hkap la hkungga ya hkat ai lam.
B. Kam hkat na lam (mutual trust). Frontier Areas amyu masha ni shada da kam hkat nna shawng lam de rau, lata hkindun nna sa wa na lam hkam la ai lam.
C. Sadi dung na lam (commitment). Frontier Areas masha amyu shada da rau mazum nna gam maka lam jawm lajang la mat wa ai hta sadi dung na lam hpe kaang e tawn nna hkam la ai lam.
D. Tara ai ahkaw ahkang lam (just rights). Jaw ai, tara ai, rapra ai, wanglu wangling ahkaw ahkang hpe yawng lu la na lam re.
Ndai hkam lam kaba mali hpe sharawt shagrin la ai hkridun ningtsa e tsap nna nna, Aung San wa hte PLA-1947 hpe lajang shalat lawm sai re. Ndai zawn, Jinghpaw amyu ni a matu n-gun atsam hte aten manu mana arang bang nna tinang amyu a shawng lam hpe hkangzing pawn ai lam re.
4. Panglung Spirit dai ni gara kaw rai ta?
A. PLA-1947 hpe n malap kau lu ai myit masin yawng hta re.
B. Rawt malan labau hte hkrat sum mat wa sai ni bang ya ai arang hta re.
C. Dai ni hkindit ra ai hpe hkindit gwi ai myit jasat hta re.
D. Dai ni myit n chye htum ai lailen hta mung PL Spirit rawng nga ai.
“Mawru hkrat ai hta na lawt lu tim, htenza hkrat sum ai mabyin hpe myit machyi let tut dum nga ra ai gam maka a ntsa e tsap nna shawng lam hpe azi yu ai lam”–Abraham Lincoln. Wunpawng Panglung Spririt 2009
Hpungdim dat numhtet:
PLA-1947 a sung ai lachyum hpe sawk sagawn aru yu at ten hta shawng lam e woi awn lai wa sai ndai ni hpe myit dum shagrau mayu nngai. Panglung Zuphpawng malawm lekmat htu ai ni hta: Manmaw – Lawdan Duwa Zau La (kagu majing re), Dagaw Duwa Zau Lawn (kahkri hpe la ai), Myitkyina- Wabaw Duwa Zau Rip (kahkau, kamoi a kasha) ni re. Bai nna Sinli- Sara Kaba Maran Ebbyu (tinang kawa, shawng ningnan lang ai Substate ga-sumla ngai hpe lata hta soi shangun ai, 1947); KIO Ningbaw Kaba Usa Maran Brang Seng (lawu lahta kahpu kaba, shi a lagaw hkang hpe dai ni hkan nga ai.)
Kachin-Americans & Friends, USA for Democracy & Human Rights
2 November 2009
Yawn Hkyen Shiga
The KachinNet Correspondence, Laiza.
08 December 2009, Tuesday.
Wunpawng Mungdan Shanglawt Hpyen Dap, Ninggawn Daji Dai Lawn Rung na Lat Du Up Jum La-ung Sam Yaw hte Du up Nlum Zau mai gaw si sum mat wa sai.
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| Lat Du Up Jum La-ung Sam Yaw (1953 - 2009.) | Du Up Nlum Zau Mai (1943 - 2009) |
Lat Du Up Jum Sam Yaw gaw, 2009 ning, December (6), Laban shani, shana maga hkying 12:40 PM hta n nga mat ai rai nna, Du Up Nlum Zau Mai gaw, 2009 ning, December (6), Laban shana maga de hkying 8:00 PM hta si sum mat wa sai.
Myanmar accuses separatists over deadly bomb blast
AFP / December 17, 2009
Myanmar's government accused armed separatists Friday of a bomb attack that killed eight people and left 13 others injured at a market in the country's restive Karen state, state media and officials said.
Myanmar's government accused armed separatists Friday of a bomb attack that killed eight people and left 13 others injured at a market in the country's restive Karen state, state media and officials said.
The bomb exploded late Wednesday as members of the ethnic Karen minority celebrated their New Year at a bazaar in the eastern state bordering Thailand, an official told AFP.
Six people died at the scene and two died later in hospital.
"The New Year's ceremony had already ended so there were not many people still around," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The bomb exploded in Phapun town in Karen State, around 200 kilometres (120 miles) from the economic hub and former capital Yangon, he said.
It was not clear who was responsible for the attack, but English-language daily New Light of Myanmar newspaper, a mouthpiece for the ruling junta, blamed ethnic Karen separatists.
The Karen National Union (KNU) has been fighting the Myanmar government for autonomy for more than five decades.
"The offender is from the KNU terrorists insurgent group that is active in the area between Phapun and the border," the New Light said.
The regime has in recent months stepped up its decades-long campaign against minority groups, with offensives against ethnic Chinese Kokang rebels in the northeast in August and the Christian Karen insurgents in June.
Civil war has wracked the country since independence in 1948, and while most rebel groups have reached ceasefire deals with the junta, analysts say the army is determined to crush the rest before national elections scheduled for 2010.
The government has co-opted some previously hostile rebel groups to become junta-backed border forces that have taken on their former brothers-in-arms.
Military ruler Than Shwe has long made the struggle for the "stability of the state" the main justification for the army's continued dominance over the Southeast Asian nation.
Myanmar has been ruled by the military since 1962
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