Friday, September 30, 2011

Activist group calls for cancellation of seven dams on Irrawaddy River

Mizzima News
Friday, 30 September

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Burma Rivers Network (BRN) released a press statement on Friday saying that China Power Investment must cancel not only the Myitsone Dam project, but all seven dam projects on the Irrawaddy River.

The statement said that it was encouraged by Burmese President Thein Sein's decision on Friday to halt the construction of the Myitsone Dam, but it wanted to see China Power Investment (CPI) remove all its personnel and equipment from the dam construction site.

An artist's conception of the controversial Myitsone Dam project on the
Irrawaddy River, which is the subject of increasing protests by environmental groups.

“Only their actions will confirm whether the dam is indeed suspended,” the statement said. It also urged that villagers who had been forced to move to a relocation camp because of the construction of the dam should be allowed to return to their homes.

Ah Nan, the assistant BRN coordinator, said in the statement, “Until the Chinese project holders publicly declare their cancellation of the Myitsone Dam and pull out from the dam site, we must assume the project is going ahead.”

China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) is a Chinese state-owned electrical company that partnered with Burma’s state power utility Myanma Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE) and the Burmese conglomerate Asia World.

"BRN also urges continued pressure on the military government and the CPI to immediately cancel the other six mega-dams planned on the Irrawaddy source rivers, which will have the same devastating impacts on the country," said the statement.

BRN said that even if construction of the dam is halted and the project cancelled, the group's campaign to stop all seven hydropower dams at the source of Burma's largest river will continue.

"Building these six dams will also cause irreparable environmental destruction, unpredictable water surges and shortages, and inflict social and economic damage to the millions who depend on the Irrawaddy. Thousands of Kachin villagers will also be forced to relocate," the statement said.

BRN sent a letter to the President Hu Jintao of China, urging him to reconsider China's dam policy in Burma and to conduct proper environmental and social impact studies in the areas surrounding the dam sites, Mizzima reported in December 2007.

"If the Myitsone project is indeed cancelled, this would be a great victory for the people of Burma, especially the brave villagers at the Myitsone site who stood up to the Burmese Army and refused to make way for the project," said the BRN statement.

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

တိုင္း၇င္းသားေတြအေပၚ ဘာတခုေကာင္းတာလုပ္ခဲ့ဘူးသလဲ?

Why does Burma want war in Kachin State?

Asian Correspondent
By Zin Linn Sep 26, 2011 3:00PM UTC

When the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) did not support the Myitsone Dam project in Burma, the military-backed President Thein Sein government launched a major offensive, recently targeting the KIA’s Brigade 4 which occupied a key position near the Sino-Burma border.

Myitsone Dam Project Site

After a new military conflict started between the Burmese army and the KIA in June in Kachin State, the KIA post along the Myitkyina-Kambaiti route banned trucks loaded with construction materials and equipment, according to truck drivers on that road. The KIA also damaged key bridges on the road using mines. Part of the Stilwell Road (also called Ledo) was reconstructed in 2006 at a cost of 97 million Yuan (US$15.2 million) by Chinese companies from Yunnan province.

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) has waged revolutionary war for self-determination, including having more power over natural resources in Kachin State. Since June 9, skirmishing has escalated between the KIA and government troops.
The warfare is related to the outsized developmental dam projects on the Irrawaddy River being built by China.

Construction continues on a $3.6 billion hydropower dam project on the Irrawaddy River in the face of widespread objections from many environmentalists and social activists, including several celebrities.

The Myitsone Dam, a joint effort by Burma’s previous military regime and the China Power Investment Corp., is estimated to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity and 90 percent of the output to be exported to China. Under an agreement signed by Chinese and Burmese officials, CPI will receive 70 percent of the project’s profits. CPI has a plan to build and manage six additional dams on the Irrawaddy and its tributaries.

Most analysts believe that Burma Army’s new military maneuver in Kachin State aims to protect the Chinese benefits than the Kachin people’s basic rights. The Burma Army has launched a storm-offensive using more than 1,000 soldiers against the KIA’s Brigade 4, based in Northern Shan State, quoting local witnesses Kachin News Group said Saturday.

According to KIA brigade officers, the battle is continuing at Huphet, Manje, Mung Hkawm, Bang Hpik and Dima. Government troops are firing mortars into the villages in the fighting area.

Burma Army’s Bureau of Special Operations-2 (BSO-2), Lt-Gen Aung Than Htut is the commander of the offensive, KIA officers said. KIA’s Battalion 2, Battalion 8 and Battalion 9 are resisting the government’s offensive by two Light Infantry Divisions, LID No. 88 and No. 99, which consist of 18 battalions. Magway-based LID No. 88 and Meiktila-based LID No. 99 launched the offensive early Saturday morning. Burmese troops mainly fired mortar rounds at the KIA post in Loi Lem Bum in the evening, said a KIA Brigade officer.

The battle is the largest offensive against the KIA troops since the civil war started on June 9. Many Burmese soldiers were killed in action and more than 60 injured in the fighting, confirmed a KIA Brigade officer. The Burma Army’s storm-offensive aims to do away with the KIA’s Brigade 4 troops from the area where the oil and gas pipelines to China will cross in Northern Shan State, said the KIA officers.

According to local sources, civilians in the war zone are being told to leave their villages by the KIA. Thousands of local ethnic Kachin and Shan Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the war zone are fleeing to safe areas and the China border. However, China is strictly refusing entry to ethnic refugees (IDPs) from Burma who are seeking to cross its border, said local witnesses.

Over 100 Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers and over 80 Border Guard Force troops have jointly blocked Burmese IDPs from crossing into Chinese territory at the Chinese Manghai border gate, opposite Mongkoe, said Mongkoe residents. Chinese citizens in Mongkoe and other places in Shan State are allowed to return to their homeland, said witnesses.

Currently, over 20,000 Kachin IDPs are seeking shelter at the KIA headquarters at Laiza and other areas close to China. China is also blocking the delivery of food, emergency shelter and medicines from China for the Kachin IDPs, referring refugee aid groups, Kachin News Group said.

Now, there are some hot questions among the citizens. What is the objective of the Burma Army’s current large offensive against the KIO, and why have their peace talks been discontinued? Has the Thein Sein government an objective to colonize the Kachin State under China’s orders?

Ban to Hold Meeting on Burma, as KIO Calls for UN Help

In this photo taken on September 18, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (L) meets with Burmese foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin at the United Nations in New York. (Photo: Getty Images)

By LALIT K JHA Tuesday, September 27, 2011

WASHINGTON — As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon prepares to hold a meeting of his “Group of Friends on Burma” on Tuesday to discuss the current situation in the country, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) is calling on the world body to take a more active role in resolving its armed conflicts.

Several ministers from key countries are expected to participate in the meeting of the “Group of Friends,” a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the secretary-general’s good offices mandate in Burma.

Among its key members are Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and Britain. Burmese Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, who is in New York to attend this year's session of the UN General Assembly, is expected to attend the meeting.

The announcement of the meeting came on the same day that KIO President Lanyaw Zawng Hra wrote to Ban seeking UN assistance in ending Burma's civil war. In his five-page letter, Lanyaw said that ethnic conflict in Burma directly affects regional development and the stability of neighboring countries.

The KIO urged the international community, including the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Burma's neighbors, to help the country find a way to end its civil war and finally achieve national reconciliation.

“Despite the fact that Burma achieved independence in I 948 as the Union of Burma, it has been operating as a Unitary System, rather than practicing a true federal system as agreed to by independence leader Gen. Aung San and ethnic leaders,” the letter said.

Lanyaw said that over the past 60 years, successive governments have ignored agreements with ethnic groups and broken promises to build a federal union. “In fact they have found new ways to suppress the concerns of the ethnic minority people; continuing to ignore our basic rights despite our willingness to resolve these differences through peaceful means,” he wrote.

“This ongoing disrespect of our original agreement ensured by the Burman majority rulers has driven the ethnic minority to maintain arms to protect our peoples and to ensure our basic rights, self-determination and promised autonomy inside our own lands,” he wrote.

Claiming that since independence in 1948, the ethnic minority territories have been pushed to the outer edges of the country bordering all of the neighboring nations, the letter said the civil war is happening in almost all of the border areas of Burma.

“One can interpret this civil war as a people's war to secure equal rights for not only the ethnic minority, but also the problems of unequal development in the country. It also presents a very complex set of national security issues. As such, these civil wars are not only the concern of our own country but also viewed as problematic and burdensome for our neighboring nations,” he said.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

ျမစ္ဆံုအေရး နယ္ပယ္စံုမွ ေဟာေျပာေဆြးေႏြးပြဲ

Irrawaddy Blog

Saturday, September 24, 2011

KIA, Masat (4) Dapba ginra de Myen Asuya Hpyendap ni laja lana htim wa

KIA, masat (9) dapdung ginra de, Myen asuya, hpyendap ni ginra lai shang wa ai majaw 23 September 2011(Hpan) ya shani hkying 10:16am daram kaw nna Myen hpyen n-gun (200) jan hte KIA, masat (4) dapba npu, masat (9) dapdung ni majan byin ai lam gaw ya ten, laja lana matut byin nga ding-yang rai nga ai lam hpe chye lu ai.

Majan ginra

24 September 2011 (Mashang) ya shani Myen asuya, hpyendap ni kaw nna n-gun laqba hte KIA, masat (4) dapba ginra de hpyen-man (3) hpaw nna htim shang wa ai lam chye lu ai. Myen asuya, hpyendap Sinpraw dingdung hpyen ginra daju (NE RMC)npu, LIB (45),LIB (144),LIB (123), Sinli hkridun MOC – 16 npu, LIB (68), LIB (69), LIR (507), LIR (522),LIB (242),LIR (567) ni hte dapdung yawng (10) pawng nna, hpyen-man lahkawng gaw KIA, masat (9) dapdung ginra de, hpyen-man (1) gaw KIA, masat (2) ginra de htim gasat nga ai lam chye lu ai.

Myen hpyendap ni gaw Dima mare hte Huhpyet mare de na KIA, masat (9) dapdung ginra de laknak kaba ni matut manoi gap bang taw nga ai lam chye lu ai. Dima mare kaw Myen asuya hpyenla ni gaw Nawku Jawng wang, Laika sharin jawng wang, Hpunggyi jawng wang ni hta shara la da ai lam mung chye lu ai.
KIA, masat (2) dapdung ginra de kaw mung Myen asuya hpyenla ni gaw Kutkai Manje mare kata kaw nna, laknak kaba matut manoi gap nga ai lam chye lu ai. Manje mare kata de Myen asuya hpyenla ni mare tup shara la taw ai majaw KIA hpyenla ni htim gap na yak nga ai lam chye lu ai. Dai majaw KIA, masat (2) dapdung ni gaw Manje mare masha ni hpe 24 September 2011 (Mashang) ya shana maga hkying 3:30 ten jahtum da nna, mare kawn le ya na matu lajin ai hpe mung chye lu ai. Raitim, Myen asuya hpyenla ni gaw mare masha ni hpe mare shinggan de le na ahkang n jaw ai sha mare shinggan le ai ni hpe gap sat na nga nna jahkrit nga ai majaw, mare masha ni grai jamjau nga ai lam hpe mung na chye lu ga ai. Daknai mare hta, Myen asuya hpyenla ni gap ai, laknak kata hkrat bun ai majaw nta shatgawk kaw shat shadu rawng nga ai, Palawng amyu shayi langai si hkrum ai lam mung chye lu ai. Majan kata hkala nba jahpan hpe gaw tuphkrak n chye lu shi ga ai.

Friday, September 23, 2011


မိုးမခ website မွကူးယူေဖၚျပပါသည္။

Thursday, September 22, 2011


Myitkyina, September 22, 2011

Amyu sha langai galu kaba kunghpan wa na lam the awmdawm shanglawt lu na matu gaw dai amyu sha ningbaw ni a machye machyang hte shakut shaja ap-nawng ai lam mung ahkyak dik ai lamang langai rai nga ai.

Zahkung Ting Ying

Jinghpaw Wunpawng Amyu sha ni gaw tinang hpe dip-lu dip-sha ai Maigan Mung Maden hpyen ni hpe shawng nnan 1817 ning Hugawng Magam ni kaw na English Mung Maden hpyen ni hpe gasat ninghkap ai majan ni sha nrai 1941-45 Japan Gumshem Mung Maden hpyen hpe mung Jinghpaw mung shara magup hta ninghkap gasat wa sai amyu rai nga ga ai.

1948 ning Myen mung shanglawt lu ai hpang kaw nna Myen Mung Maden hpyen ni hpe bai lam amyu myu hku gasat wa ga ai, jahtum e ndang hkam na zawn re labau ginjang pru wa ai hpang 1961 ning February shata kaw na Laknak lang rawt malan ai lam hpe galaw hpang wa sai.

Rawt Malan Majan chyinghtawng galu wa ai hte maren galai shai wa ai Mungkan mung masa, Myen mung masa hte Jinghpaw Wunpawng mung masa hta la-kap nhtawm Myen Asuya hte KIO/KIA lapran gap hkat jahkring ai lam (4)lang galaw wa yu sai(1963,1973, 1980-81, 1994). Raitim Myen Asuya lang hte lang Jinghpaw Wunpawng ni hpe mung masa ahkaw ahkang jaw na matu myit hta nrawng, nhkraw ai majaw gap hkat jahkring ai lam hten mat nna Simsa lam de nlu du wa ga ai.

Jinghpaw Wunpawng Amyu sha ni a shanglawt shakut ai lam daini du hkra Pandung ndu hkraw ai lawng lam law law nga ai kaw na Jinghpaw Wunpawng amyu sha ni hta nan byin nga ai mayak ni gaw:
1. Awm-dawm shanglawt lu mayu ai myit Jinghpaw WP yawng a myit hta nrawng shi ai.
2. Madu amyu sha, madu mungdan ngu ai myit yawng hta nrawng shi ai.
3. Amyu sha ningbaw hte Sut-du ninghkring nkau Myen Asuya a Lagaw Lata tai nga ai.
4. Amyu sha Shanglawt lu na hpe nra, shanglawt lu na matu shakut nga ai ni hpe mung jahpoi ahhpyak, mara tam re ai ningbaw ningla ni naw nga nga ai.

2011 August shata hta WMR ningbaw Salang Sumhpawng Sin Wa Nawng gaw Mizzima Online Magazine ni hte interview galaw ai shaloi “KIA ni Cease-fire Sen nsa htu yang..Myitkyina kaw nga ai Jinghpaw mung shawa yawng gaw KIO/KIA hpe ninghkap n-gun madun ai lam galaw na re” nga nna tsun lai wa sai.

Ya kalang myi bai, 2011 ning September 16 ya shani Salang Zahkung Ting Ying kaw nna WMR ningbaw Salang Sumhpawng Sin Wa Naw hpang de KIO/KIA hpe Simsa lam la na matu shadut shangun ai, Myen hku ka dat ai laika hta madung ga akreng hku nna-

1. Thein Sein Asuya kaw na simsa lam bawngban na matu masing policy jahkrat sa wa nga ai ten KIO/KIA ningbaw ni Simsa lam hpe tam na lam.

2. Myen Asuya gaw KNDO/KNU hpe majan dang kau ai zawn Miwa KMT ni hpe mung gasat dang kau ai, n-gun grai ja ai Hpyen Asuya re..dai sha n-ga kaga mung masa hpyen amyu myu hpe mung gasat ningla kau lu ai asuya re majaw anhte hku nna matut gasat yang nmai ai.

3. Hpung Sara ni kaw nna KIO/KIA hpe matut gasat na matu n-gun njaw na.
Ngu ai lam ni rai nga ai.

Daini anhte Jinghpaw WP amyu sha ni asan sha chye na hkap la ra ai lam ni hta:-

1. Thein Sein Asuya lakhtak hta:
(a) Jinghpaw WP amyu sha ni mung masa ahkaw ahkang lu sai kun?
(b) Sut masa ahkaw ahkang jaw sai kun?
(c) Laili laika hte Htunghking hpe ndut ndang sharin, hka-ja, sung lang na matu ahkaw ahkang jaw sai kun?
(d) Nawku makam masham hpe ndut ndang galaw lu sai kun?
(e) Anhte a Mare hpe nat jahten ai Myen hpyen Hpung hpe dawm la sai kun?
(f) Anhte a Mara Kata Mung shawa ni hpe rim ai, gap sat ai Myen hpyen hpung hpe dawm la sai kun?
(g) Anhte a myu shayi ni hpe roi rip ai Myen hpyen hpung hpe dawm la mat wa sai kun?

Lahta na ga san/ ahkaw ahkang ni a ntsa langai ngai shing nrai yawng hpe nlu shi ai rai yang..daini na Jinghpaw WP ni a rawt malan majan ndai hpe shazim na lam nnga ai.

Daini Myen Asuya a bungli galaw nhtawm Lagaw Lata tai ya nga ai Jinghpaw WP salang ni kaw nna tinang mai galaw ai shang wang kata.. Hpyen Tsinyam ni hte seng ai lam, Amyu shayi ni hpe roi rip hkrum nga ai lam, hpaji hparat lam, mara kata rim zingri hkrum nga ai amyu sha ni a lam hte kaga anhte amyu sha ni hpe roi rip nga ai lam ni hpe Mungdan Rapdaw hta lachyum pru ahkyak la wa hkra tang madun galaw sa wa na hpe madaw shakut ga. Amyu sha ni a lam hpe seng ang ai Myen Asuya kaw tang du du, magrau grang grang tang madun ai lam ni hpe galaw nga ga. Amyu sha lawt lu na matu rawt malan ai lam hta tinang hku na nlu shang lawm ai gaw manghkang nnga na re, raitim Amyu sha rawt malan ai bungli hpe ninghkap ai, jahpoi ahpyak ai lam gaw n-galaw ga.. daini ten du hkra Jinghpaw WP ni hpe roi mara Sai chyup up sha nga ai Myen Asuya man hta Hputdi di laknak ap shangun ai bungli hpe kadai mung n-galaw shajang ga..Amyu hte mungdan hpe tinang a tinggyeng akyu ara a matu ndut sha ga.. Manang wa hpang de Ta Layung madi mayu yang tinang hkum tinang shawng dinglik yu ga .. myit madang nnga ai zawn Shada mara shagun hkat ..Layung madi hkat nga na malai.. tinang hpe kam-hpa let bungle galaw ya nga ai salang shada ntsa rap-ra ai hku woi awn nga ga..kaja sha wa matsan chyaren-re nga ai amyu sha ni a ra rawng ai lam ni hpe akyu galaw let shakut shaja nga ga ngu amyu sha ni a ningbaw ningla ni hpe lajin dat nngai law.

Malizup Baren Ninggawn

Lahta na laika ngau gaw laika ka Sara Malizup Baren Ninggawn a ningmu sha rai nna OKA a ningmu nre hpe shana ndau dat ga ai.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

US 'no' on Taiwan arms seen as sign of China clout

By PETER ENAV - Associated Press(AP)
September 21, 2011

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — A U.S. decision not to sell Taiwan new F-16 fighter jets is being seen by many U.S. allies in Asia as a sign of China's growing clout.

The pre-eminent military power in East Asia for a half-century, the U.S. has explicitly and implicitly provided a security umbrella for countries from Singapore to Japan, helping to keep the peace that has fostered stunning economic growth.

While few of these allies believe the U.S. is lessening its commitment to the region, they still see Washington's refusal to make the F-16 sale — privately confirmed by congressional aides Sunday and then made public Wednesday — as showing a new deference to Chinese interests.

F-16 Fighter

China is a "big factor ... that can't be discounted," Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin told The Associated Press. "All things are always considered in a decision and China is a world player now."

The top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, publicly confirmed in New York on Wednesday that the Obama administration will upgrade Taiwan's existing fleet of F-16s, postponing for now the sale of new models that Taipei sought. The decision brought a swift, angry denunciation from Beijing, where Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun summoned U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke to warn that exchanges between the militaries, security cooperation and overall ties will suffer.

After reducing its footprint in East Asia during the administration of President George W. Bush, the U.S. began pushing back in last year. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton offered strong support to Asian allies in response to their unease about a more assertive Chinese naval posture in the South China Sea, and the U.S. military conducted high-profile drills with Japan and South Korea.

But doubts about American staying power in the region persist, and Washington's refusal to sell the new F-16s to Taiwan could serve to deepen them.

Admittedly, Taiwan is not a typical case when it comes to security assistance from the U.S. and most other countries. Claims by the self-governing island to sovereignty remain much in doubt, undermined by China's increasingly accepted counterclaim that the island of 23 million people constitutes an integral part of Chinese territory 62 years after the two sides split amid civil war.

But Taiwan's defense ties with the United States still run deep.

It hosted U.S. troops for decades under the terms of a security pact that lapsed only after the U.S. shifted its recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. And since then, Washington has remained bound by a Congressional mandate to sell the island weapons to help defend itself against the attack that China threatens if Taipei moves to make its de facto independence permanent.

The complexity of this relationship helps explains the intense Washington reaction that was engendered by the Obama administration's decision on the fighter planes, which denied Taiwan the 66 new F-16 C/Ds it long coveted, while permitting it a series of upgrades on its existing fleet of F-16 A/Bs.

Supporters of the decision regarded it as a Solomonic compromise, taking account of Taiwan's defense needs — particularly its growing air power gap with China — while also safeguarding the integrity of America's increasingly important relationship with Beijing.

But critics blasted the decision as a sellout of a democratic bastion and long-standing security partner, and a move that could even rattle Asian partners' confidence in U.S. commitments.

Even before news of the decision became final, Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, where the Lockheed Martin plant that would have built the new F-16s is located, described it as a slap in the face to a strong ally, and Howard Berman, the ranking Democrat on the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, called it a "half-measure."

In Asia, it is seen as yet another example of China's growing military and economic power.

The Philippines' Gazmin saw the move as primarily the result of Washington's limited options in the face of China's significant holdings of American Treasuries, and the threat that poses to America's fiscal stability.

"It has a large debt and if China will try to apply pressure, the U.S. can end up in trouble," he said. "The U.S. has to temper its relations with Taiwan for China."

But Gazmin rejected the notion that Washington's decision could point to an eventual unwinding of its long-standing security ties with the Philippines, which include close cooperation in fighting Muslim insurgents in the southern part of the country.

"We have a separate, special relationship with the U.S. that's different from its relations with Taiwan," he said. "The U.S. ties with Taiwan (are) different from ours and other countries, the dynamics are different."

China expert Lee Chang-hyung of Seoul's government-affiliated Korea Institute for Defense Analyses also saw the U.S. decision to deny Taiwan new F-16s as reflecting China's economic leverage in Washington.

"If it sells the fighter jets to Taiwan, it could sustain some big economic damage," he said. "I think the United States has taken that factor into account."

Lee said China's meteoric rise — underlined by its rapidly expanding military and its lightning economic growth — has prompted some South Koreans to conclude that Seoul's best interests lie in downgrading its decades-old security alliance with the United States in favor of closer ties with Beijing.

But he rejected that approach, in part because he believes China is still dozens of years away from catching up with the U.S. militarily.

"We have to maintain and bolster the alliance with the United States — which is far away from us — while expanding and improving exchanges with China — which is close to us," he said.


Associated Press writers Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Jim Gomez in Manila, Philippines, contributed to this report.

KIA, Masat (9) Dapdung Hpyenla ni Myen Htawng langai shang zing

Nam-un Mare grup-yin

KIA, masat (4) dapba npu, masat (9) dapdung hpyenhpung ni September 21, 2011 (Chyanun) ya shani ginra shimlam a matu ginra gawan hkawm nga yang Nam-um hte Dima mare lapran na Shwe Pyi Thit shara hta nga ai Myen asuya a Htawng bungli dabang sin ai Balik ni hkap gap ai majaw 1:00 pm ten daram hta gap hkat ai lam chye lu ai.

Gap hkat ai shara gaw Muse – Lashio mawdaw lam makau na Nam-um mare kaw nna, mile 8 shang ra ai shara kaw rai nga ai. Dai Htawng bungli dabang a hkra maga kaw gaw Myen asuya a Kani Dawn dabang langai nga ai lam mung chye lu ai.

KIA, masat (9) dapdung hpyenhpung ni hpe Myen asuya balik ni shawng gap bun ai majaw, KIA hpyenla ni bai htim gap wa ai hta Myen asuya balik ni yawng hprawng ayai mat wa ai lam mung chye lu ga ai. Dai majan hta Myen asuya balik marai (8) hpe KIA hpyenla ni lu rim la ai hte M-22 sinat lau (4), sinat kadun lau (4) mung lu zing la ai lam chye lu ai. Dai hta, Htawng kata rawng nga ai, Htawng masha marai (55) hpe mung Mungkan Simsa lam masat nhtoi hku nna, yawng hpe shale dat ya ai lam mung chye lu ai. Dai htawng masha ni hta mung masa la, Rawt Malan hpung na hpyenla ni, Kani manghkang byin ai ni lawm ai lam chye lu ai.

Dai ginra hta sin nga ai, Myen asuya Balik ni gaw laiwa laisa ni hte grup-yin mare masha ni hpe jahkrit shama, jep shagyeng ai lam galaw ai ni re hpe mung na chye lu ga ai. KIA hpyela ni kaw nna Htawng bungli dabang hpe shang zing ai lam galaw ai raitim, dai shara a hkra maga kaw nga ai, Kani dawn dabang hpe tsepkawp sa ahtu hkra ai lam hpa galaw ai hpe mung chye lu ga ai.

Monday, September 19, 2011

The Interpreter – Through Chinese eyes: Tang Qifang

by Peter Martin & David Cohen – 6 September 2011 8:58AM

Interview with Tang Qifang, Southeast Asia specialist at the foreign ministry-affiliated China Institute of International Studies by Peter Martin and David Cohen. Peter and David are conducting a series of interviews with Chinese academics and journalists, using reader-submitted questions.

From Alejandro: Do you think China will be forced to send soldiers to potential hotspots to protect their investments in foreign countries, such as hydroelectric dams in Burma? Would they send military forces or would they be willing to lose investments rather than fall into a ‘US war’ trap?

I don’t think so. In 2009 there was a very bad conflict between ethnic groups and the then-military government of Myanmar, right along the border with China. During the period of that conflict, a lot of Chinese people lost their investments, and their shops, their factories, because that area is very near to the China-Myanmar border. There were about 30-40 thousand Chinese immigrants and overseas Chinese in that area, and they had to flee back to China, so that’s a very bad condition for Chinese people and the Chinese government. But although it is very near to the Chinese border, China never thought about sending any troops to help them. We just helped them on the Chinese side, helped our people to come back.

So I think from this example you can see the viewpoint of China: no interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Especially with Burma — you know that when this principle was brought out in 1955, it was during the talk between Chairman Mao and the leader of Burma. So that I think see that we can see that China won’t do that.
From Ocean: What role do ethnic Chinese populations in Southeast Asian countries play in China’s relations with Southeast Asia?

In the past, that used to be a very sensitive topic, to talk about ethnic Chinese, especially in Malaysia, because the Malaysian Communist Party in the 1960s and 70s, and we can see that there were some misunderstandings or some not very pleasant happenings, and these kinds of stories had an impact on the relationship between China and Malaysia and Indonesia at this time. But now that we can see that in the last 20 or 30 years, ethnic Chinese became rich in Southeast Asia.

In 1949, when Communist China was founded, there was a clear policy toward ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: the Chinese government encouraged them to join the nationality of the local country, because China didn’t recognize dual nationality. I think this kind of principle is very good, but later, after the 1970s, overseas Chinese began to find that there are many good opportunities for businesses in China.
Martin/Cohen: You said before that China encouraged Chinese people to leave Myanmar during the 2009 conflict. Could that include ethnic Chinese citizens of Myanmar in a future conflict?

If something like 1998 happened, I think that’s possible. There’s a very big difference between immigrants and overseas Chinese — if they have Chinese nationality, China of course has the responsibility to protect them, but if they choose the nationality of the local country, they are not Chinese people, they are ethnic Chinese, and the Chinese government should respect their personal choice. But if they want to choose Chinese mainland as a place to be protected, of course we should respect their choice. I think if they choose to ask for protection from mainland China, I think mainland China will try its best to help them.

From Alexander: In light of the level and the type of language used in Chinese press statements, words such as ‘indisputable sovereignty’ and ‘core interests’, does China consider its territorial dispute in the South China Sea to be a domestic issue?
To some extent, because all the parties claim it is their sea, China takes it as a domestic issue, but the fact is that now it has become an international conflict between China and the ASEAN countries. So it is not only a domestic issue. Considering the way Deng Xiaoping offered to put aside the sovereignty conflict and to focus on cooperation and development in the South China Sea, I think that’s a sign that China doesn’t only consider it as a domestic issue.

From Linda: how does China assess Indonesia’s current trajectory in the international arena? How would China hope to see Indonesia’s role develop in Southeast Asia and further afield?

Indonesia is the biggest country in Southeast Asia, and it has always wanted to take a key role in the region. But the leadership of the ASEAN countries is not really held by any certain country. Although Indonesia is very big and very important, not only in Southeast Asia, but in the Asia-Pacific region, but so far it hasn’t managed to take as important a role as it wants to. Maybe that’s why Indonesia is very eager to make active communications not only in Southeast Asia but also in other areas of international cooperation, and we can see that especially in climate change, where Indonesia takes a very active role.

From Ho Yi Jian: Could you describe the state of Southeast Asian expertise in China?
In China, frankly speaking, I don’t think there’s enough expertise in Southeast Asia is to support the corporations and the government. There are specialists in Southeast Asian languages, for example, in the foreign languages universities, but most of them only specialize in language. There is also very important expertise in the provinces near to Southeast Asian countries, like Guangxi province, and Yunnan province, and Guizhou province, because they have the advantage of communication. Of course, there are some military institutes, but they are secret. They’re very powerful, but we don’t know what they are doing. Even I don’t know. They do very good research, but we cannot share them.

Just last month I attended an academic conference, and someone said that Southeast Asian countries are not as important to China as in the past, that China is not just a power in East Asia, but also in the Asia Pacific, so it should focus on dealing with other big powers, like the US, like Japan, even countries in Latin America. I will never agree with this kind of analysis — I think your closest neighbors should be your closest friends.

From Nicholas Farrelly of New Mandala: In 2011, longstanding ceasefire agreements are crumbling across Burma. The resumption of hostilities in the Shan and Kachin States has seen particularly heavy fighting already. What is China’s role in these re-ignited border wars? Does the Chinese Government have the capacity to broker permanent peace in those deeply troubled areas? If it does, why has it remained so apparently reluctant to get involved?

This conflict, of course, is not a new one, and has very deep roots in history and tradition. We can see that especially since 2009 the military government has been trying to get more control over these areas. They want to control the local military powers, the local troops, so there has been a very big conflict. Of course, they managed to get rid of the powers of some of them, but other groups like the Kachin are still there.

I am not really an expert on the military, but I think that to some extent China has influence on the military government, especially in the area near the China-Myanmar border, but in other areas, like the area between Myanmar and India, I don’t think China has any space to talk about that.

But because China cares about the security of its immigrants and investment, I think China will try its best to ask the government of Myanmar to keep the peace. But because of the balanced diplomacy of the Myanmar Government, they are also in touch with India and the US, so I don’t think China has a very powerful influence.
From Khmerization: China has invested heavily in the Cambodian economy, but is also heavily involved in the destruction of Cambodian environment through its hydro-electric dam-building and deforestation. Do you think that Chinese investments are good for Cambodia or harmful to Cambodia in the long run? Do you think that, due to China’s economic powerhouse, China can help power Cambodia into economic prosperity? Finally, Chinese leadership have tremendous political leverage over the Cambodian leadership, as strong as the political leverage they had with the Khmer Rouge leadership in the 1970s. With this kind of political influence, is there a risk that Cambodia could plunge into similar situation like during the Khmer Rouge regime?
Since the comprehensive free trade agreement took effect last year, more and more investment has been pouring into Cambodia, especially from the government and agricultural sector and things like that. So some things are happening which are bad for the environment of the Mekong river countries. You mentioned deforestation, which is not only bad for downstream countries, but also for China itself. As far the water problem, China and mother Mekong countries are cooperating and sharing these limited resources, but the problem should be sharing a limited resource, but finding ways to make more water resources.

So what China can do is to protect the environment and the resources of the river, is to keep the forest. But the Chinese Government cannot stop illegal logging inside China, and Chinese resources are not enough, so people are going outside China for them. I think that investment is necessary to support development, but the problem is what kind of development. Development could be just like what China did in the last three decades, depending only on human resources and consuming natural resources. I think we should try to help them avoid this kind of development.
I think an undeveloped country is just one that hasn’t developed yet, so they have more opportunities than developed countries. They have access to more modern technology, so I think countries that want to make investments should think about what kind of welfare it can bring to the local country and the local environment. If development is just like what China did in the last three decades, well…you have the financial wealth, but you completely destroyed the environment. We have to make sure Cambodia doesn’t develop like that.

Maung Ko Oo - Prepare first before taking on China

Kachin ngu tsun hkrup ai majaw Miwa La langai gap hkrum

Namhkam grupyin

18 September 2011 (Majoi) ya shani hta Namhkam, Yangwu mare masha, Slg.Shauyang Naw ngu ai, Miwa amyu sha langai hpe Myen asuya, hpyendap LIB (144) hpyenhpung ni gaw Nmau hka (Shweli) wanjak sa lam kaw sinat gap bun ai lam chye lu ai.

Slg. Shauyang Naw gaw Nra Wa n-ga htaw dut sha ai wa rai nna, 18 September 2011 ya 3:00pm ten daram hta Nmau hka wanjak sa lam ntsa Loi-mare makau, Loi-hkyet mahkrai kaw htawlagyi modaw hka bang nga ai shaloi, Myen asuya, hpyendap LIB (144) na Tau Dapup(2ic) Major Win Htut Le woi-awn ai hpyenhpung ni du wa nna san jep hkrum ai lam chye lu ai.

Major Win Htut Le gaw Slg. Shauyang Naw hpe hpabaw amyu re ngu san ai shaloi, “Slg. Shauyang Naw gaw Lisu amyu re ngu htai ai hte, Kachin nga yang gaw nga nna,” sinat hte lahkawng lang gap ai majaw lahpa hte kan kaw pala hkra hkrum ai lam re hpe chye lu ai. Bai, san jep yu yang, Miwa amyu re majaw, kalang ta Muse tsi-rung de htaw sa ai lam hpe mung chye lu ga ai.

Ndai lam gaw Myen asuya kaw nna Munghpawm kade tsun kajai timmung, tatut hta, Kachin ni hpe shamyit kau mayu ai kraw lawang rawng nga ai hpe asan sha maram lu nga ga ai.

Sunday, September 18, 2011

Mare masha ni hpe Myen asuya, hpyendap ni mara kata rim zing-ri

Bumsen ginra

Waimaw, Shwe Nyaung Pin hkridun, Myen asuya hpyendap, LIR (321) ni gaw 16 September 2011(Hpan) ya shani hta Nmawk muklum lahta na Goi kahtawng mare masha ni hpe mara kata rim zing-ri ai lam chye lu ai. Myen asuya hpyendap, LIR (321) hpyen hpung ni gaw Goi kahtawng de shang wa nna, mare masha marai (12) hpe KIA ni hpe n-gun jaw ai ni re ngu mara hta nna, adup gyit zing-ri ai re lam chye lu ai.

Dai mare masha marai (12) hpe Myen asuya, hpyendap post nga ai, Sanggang ginra de lam woi shatai nna, gyit woi lung mat wa ai lam mung chye lu ai. Ya ten du hkra, dai mare masha ni hpe bai dat dat ya ai lam n nga ai hpe mung chye lu ga ai. Rim hkrum ai mare masha ni hta nta langai kaw nna sha Kawa hte kasha lawm ai dinghku ni mung lawm ai lam chye lu ai. Rim woi hkram mat wa ai ni 18 September 2011 (Majoi) shani hkying 11:00am ten du hkra dum nta de n du wa shi ai majaw “dum nta masha ni hte jinghku jing-yu ni grai myit-tsang nga ai” nga nna, Goi kahtawng mare salang langai tsun dan wa ai.

Rim woi mat wa hkrum ai marai (12)

1. Slg. Pausang Hpang Wa (asak 60 ning),

2. Shd. Pausang La Nu (asak 20 ning),

3. Slg. Labang La (asak 60 ning),

4. Shd. Labang Wan Sawk (asak 22 ning),

5. Shd. Dashi Mun Awng (asak 18 ning)

6. Shd. Dashi La (asak 15 ning),

7. Shd. Gawmaw Brang Seng (asak 21 ning),

8. Slg. Maran Yaw Htung (asak 55 ning),

9. Slg. Myit Hkai (asak 48 ning),

10. Shd. Damau Di (asak 19 ning),

11. Shd. Lahtaw Awng Ra (asak 17 ning),

12. Slg. Lazing Naw Htoi (32 ning)

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Derek Mitchell: Press Conference in Rangoon

Press Conference in Rangoon, Burma

Derek Mitchell
Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma
Rangoon, Burma
September 14, 2011

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Mingalaba. Good Morning. Let me read a brief prepared statement. I have just completed my first visit to Burma as U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator. I have spent the past five days in intensive consultations with a full spectrum of interlocutors in Nay Pyi Taw and in Rangoon to discuss the situation here and ways in which the United States can support and promote democracy, human rights, development and national reconciliation in the country in our common interests.

I want to acknowledge first the government’s excellent hospitality, Chargé d’Affaires Michael Thurston and his outstanding team at the U.S. Embassy for a quick turnaround in organizing a visit, and all my interlocutors for their time and candor during our meetings over the past several days.

Being my initial visit, my primary goal was to introduce myself, listen to local perspectives, and establish relationships that I will build on as I proceed to fulfill my mandate and responsibilities for managing U.S. Burma policy.

In Nay Pyi Taw, I met with Union Parliament Speaker Khin Aung Myint, People’s Parliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Labor and Social Welfare Minister Aung Kyi, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Thein Htay, Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, and USDP Secretary General Htay Oo. I also met with a cross section of opposition MPs, including representatives from ethnic minority regions.

I was encouraged by and pleased with the quality and openness of the exchanges, and the constructive and respectful tone of each interaction I had. During these meetings, my government interlocutors repeatedly stated that this country had opened a new chapter to a civilian-led democratic governing structure and expressed that they were sincerely committed to reform in the interest of human rights, democracy, development, and national reconciliation.

I responded that the United States recognized and welcomed recent gestures from Nay Pyi Taw, such as President Thein Sein’s meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, public emphasis on dialogue with ethnic minority groups in the interest of national reconciliation, and moderate easing of media censorship. Among both the international community and the Burmese people, it is clear from my visit that there are heightened expectations and hopes that change, real change, may be on the horizon.

At the same time, I was frank about the many questions the United States – and others – continue to have about implementation and follow-through on these stated goals. I noted that many within the international community remain skeptical about the government’s commitment to genuine reform and reconciliation, and I urged authorities to prove the skeptics wrong.

To that end, I raised concerns regarding the detention of approximately 2,000 political prisoners, continued hostilities in ethnic minority areas accompanied by reports of serious human rights violations, including against women and children, and the lack of transparency in the government’s military relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

I offered respectfully that the government should take concrete actions in a timely fashion to demonstrate its sincerity and genuine commitment to reform and national reconciliation, including by releasing all political prisoners unconditionally, engaging in meaningful outreach to the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and engaging in dialogue rather than armed conflict with ethnic minority groups. I affirmed the importance of establishing a legitimate and credible mechanism for investigating reported abuses in ethnic areas as a first step toward building trust and promoting national reconciliation through accountability. I also urged the government to adhere to all of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions related to proliferation.

I want to emphasize that our dialogue on these topics was respectful and open, which I greatly appreciated. I noted that progress on these issues will be essential to progress in the bilateral relationship, and that if the government takes genuine and concrete action, the United States will respond in kind.

Here in Rangoon, I continued the conversation on current conditions and trends in the country with a broad cross section of civil society. I consulted with the business and diplomatic communities, and local and international NGOs, including citizens doing heroic and courageous work providing free funeral services for the poor and treating those with HIV/AIDS.

And of course I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the National League for Democracy to discuss their perspectives on recent developments in the country, the future of their party, and U.S. policy approaches. I was reminded consistently during my visit that Daw Suu remains deeply important to the citizens of this country, Burman and ethnic minority alike, and that any credible reform effort must include her participation. It was also clear that she remains fully committed to the cause of peaceful change through dialogue.

Unfortunately, I was only here for a few days and thus was unable to explore the full breadth and diversity of this beautiful country. However, the courage and commitment of those with whom I met give me great hope for the country’s future should genuine reform and reconciliation proceed. I will be following developments closely from afar, and look forward to many return visits here to continue the United State’s principled engagement policy.

Again, I would like to thank the government for hosting me so warmly for my inaugural visit in my new post, and to all my interlocutors for sharing their valuable insights. I consider this a highly productive visit. I will now take a few questions before I have to catch a plane.

QUESTION: Did you get any assurance of the release of political prisoners from the government?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: As I suggested, we had a very candid dialogue on this subject. There were no absolute commitments on anything. But we had a very productive exchange on the subject, so nothing further I can say on that.

QUESTION: And my second question is would it be possible for your government to lift the sanctions if the political prisoners were not released?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: The issue of sanctions, again, that was not a primary point of discussion. There are a lot of issues that we need to deal with in terms of the relationship, and sanctions are one component, as I said. Most of this is about our engagement, our principled engagement, with the regime. I know yesterday there was a report that came out unfortunately, sad to say, that I think mischaracterized my position on this, referring to a roadmap to lift sanctions. I think it took my words out of context. It mischaracterized what I said in response to a question. I never presented, nor have I developed such a roadmap. The conversation flow and tone were as I just described earlier about the full range of issues being addressed concerning exchange of views, concerning what we would need to see in order to truly develop a productive relationship and to change the parameters of the bilateral relationship.

QUESTION: What is the most important criterion for assessing the situation in this country?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: There's no particular single issue, obviously. I listed the things we needed to see that we thought were elements of demonstrating credible and genuine commitment to reform. So there's no single answer to that, but if we see some of the things that I outlined, I think it would demonstrate the kind of genuine commitment that people are looking for, not just probably -- obviously from the outside, but people within the country. And the issue of skepticism and uncertainty about how far this is going and where it's leading, I think the government recognizes that the skepticism is out there and we'll just see how this proceeds. And as I say, if we see actions that are credible, the United States will respond.

QUESTION: I would like to ask if you've seen any change of attitude from the current government during your visit?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Well this is my first visit, so I can't compare it to any previous visit to say whether they've changed or not. I can answer that question during my second visit, which I hope will be soon. I have to say though, that I know there were concerns about my position, coming in. My position was, as many of you know, was mandated by Congress under the JADE Act. In the United States, the JADE Act is the sanctions act. So there were concerns that I was purely a function of sanctions, that I was simply here to talk sanctions, and not to talk more broadly about the relationship and to get a feel for the place and what's happening here. So my sense was, again, I was very pleased with the reception I got, very pleased with the nature of the conversations, very pleased with how welcoming they were. And I detected no nervousness about me or my position. And I look forward to continuing those relationships in a very frank and candid manor that befits a healthy relationship.

QUESTION: Yesterday the State Department released an annual religious freedom report, and Burma being designated as one of the eight nations, countries of most particular concern. Did you have a chance to meet the various religious organizations? If so, what is their concern? Do they still have these concerns? How likely is Burma to be out of this list soon?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: I did not meet with representatives of those organizations. So I can't speak for them in terms of how they view the situation in the country. There's a separate section of the State Department that looks at these things independently and I can't comment any further on the context or substance

QUESTION: I need a little clarification. Does it mean that the U.S. will continue to employ the two-track policy, retaining the sanctions and engaging with the government at the same time? So in view of the current developments that you just mentioned, are you going to, is the U.S. going to establish Ambassadorial-level engagement soon? And another one is, does the government give any indication that they're initiating any tri-partite dialogue that involves ethnic minorities?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: On the latter, we didn't discuss that, so I don't know what their intentions are, or the prospects of that. I know there's been discussion of that here. Before I came I read there was some kind of discussion of a potential peace commission through the legislature, but that's in process. But I heard nothing specifically on this during my visit, on a tri-partite process.

Yes, our policy has not changed. My trip is consistent with the policy. That sanctions remain in place is a component of our policy. But really this trip was about going beyond that to engage in a principled fashion, to discuss a broad range of issues, but particularly to talk about the relationship and what would be required to change the parameters of the relationship to date. And to get a feel for what's happening here on the ground. You can't learn about a country from afar. You have to come. You have to talk to people directly. You have to get a lot of different perspectives. You have to listen. My point in coming here was to listen as well as provide very candidly the U.S. perspective so that people here were not misunderstanding our policy. I'm sure there's not a clear understanding of what does principled engagement mean, what are your intentions, how far can this go, and the same here. So again, I didn't see enough of the country in some fashion. I didn't see everybody that maybe I could see while here. Believe me, I worked very hard. I was having meetings from the first thing in the morning until late at night, trying to meet as many people as I possibly could to get as broad a perspective on what's happening here. And as I said, my sense is people are hopeful about change. People do have high expectations and are hopeful that something real may happen. The question is how far that will go and what the concrete steps will be going forward. So it's a long answer to the question; our policy has not changed.

QUESTION: (Inaudible – repeat of question about reestablishing Ambassador-level engagement from Rangoon.)

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Oh, well the issue is… that's a hypothetical. We've made no decisions on that. Again, no changes to the way we've done things to date along those lines.

QUESTION: (Interpreted from Burmese). Yesterday you met with the Human Rights Commission here. If the commission is formed by former government officials, so do you think they will genuinely investigate the abuses here? What is your comment?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was a very good meeting. They gave us an overview of their plans, their thinking. But they're at the very, very early stages of thinking about it themselves. I have some sympathy for them. They're trying to get up and running quickly and think things through. I have no preconceptions about what they will or will not be able to do. I certainly have an open mind about that and they're struggling themselves, I think, about it. They said they will have to work with Nay Pyi Taw and send things, report up to Nay Pyi Taw. So I'm hopeful. I think it is a positive gesture. It's one of those things that I said to counterparts and put in my statement that is certainly a positive move to establish a human rights commission. But like everything else, the proof of its legitimacy will be how they proceed to implement that mandate after establishment. So I was grateful for the opportunity to have the conversation. We'll obviously be watching them.

The other thing is we offered that given there is not a lot of expertise in this, and there is some skepticism about whether it will be a real commission looking at abuses, reported abuses, alleged abuses here that it might be useful to have some partnership with international organizations, individuals with experience. And I said that also to the folks in Nay Pyi Taw that we remain open to assisting with helping them do a job like investigating or doing accountability in ethnic minority areas in the interests of national reconciliation. So again our minds are open but are arms are outstretched too to assist as we can in making them a fully credible and productive institution in the interests of national reconciliation, human rights and democracy.

QUESTION: When you go back to the States you'll be reporting to the Congress, right? So if somebody from the Congress asks you what is the most significant outcome of your trip, what would you answer?

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: Significant outcome… I think it's the remarkable sense of hope that we see here among people. That they see something happening. There is, something is happening, something may be changing. It may be small gestures now. But again that sense of expectation is very, very important. And as I say, I really hope that I think everybody who follows this country knows that there have been stops and starts, that expectations have been dashed. That things only go so far, and then they stop or they reverse themselves. And I really urged the leadership to prove the skeptics wrong. But it was very encouraging to me that my reception was as warm and welcome as it was. And that the leadership in Nay Pyi Taw were open to having discussions, having exchanges. Again, no commitments made. No outcomes that are tangible. But we were open to have a dialogue with respect, and I was able to say that I and the international community need to see the concrete action and genuine action for us to feel that something is not only hope but real change here over time. So I'll have a very frank exchange with my friends in Congress and they I think, they're just like the rest. They want the best - everyone in America. I hope it's clear to folks that people in the United States wish this country no ill will at all. We want to do what's best to help this country develop itself. Those four goals that were outlined by the government – democracy, human rights, development, and national reconciliation – we share. If the government is serious and committed to those goals in a credible fashion they will have a partner in the United States and I think Congress and others will be watching very closely to see what this government decides to do in order to move credibly forward toward those goals.
One last question.

QUESTION: You said that this is your very first trip. So when will you be coming again? And also I would like to know your opinions on the rising China influence here.

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL: It was not a topic of conversation, really, with the leadership. I do get a sense, talking to some citizens and others here that there is a palpable sense of Chinese influence, Chinese presence. But we really didn't have much of a discussion of that topic. The leadership here and the citizens here will have to decide how they deal with their neighbor. Obviously whenever you have neighbors, there are challenges, there are opportunities. But there's really nothing more I would say about Chinese influence in that regard.

Thank you all very much. I do have to catch the plane. I appreciate this and I will see you next time I'm sure.

အိမ္ျပန္ဖုိ႔အေရး ဦး၀င္းတင္ ဘာေျပာသလဲ

Life Visits an Army Hospital in Burma

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Kachin aid groups running on empty

Kachin aid groups running on empty

BANGKOK, 13 September 2011 (IRIN) – Kachin aid groups are running out of means to help more than 25,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the border between Myanmar and China.

“The situation is worsening now because no one here has the capacity to support them,” La Rip, coordinator for the Relief Action Network for IDPs and Refugees (RANIR), incorporating 12 local community organizations, told IRIN from the border town of Laiza.

Civil departments from the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) – the political wing of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) – have been providing most of the food at 15 makeshift camps around the border, La Rip said. But as the conflict enters it fourth month, additional support is urgently needed, he added.

“People are getting only a small amount of rice a day, without any nutritional support,” said La Rip. “We are at the moment worried about their food security and shelter, with winter advancing.”

Since 9 June, tens of thousands of civilians have fled from rural parts of eastern Kachin State, when the Burmese Army attacked the KIA, ending a 17-year-old ceasefire between the two armies and sending thousands of civilians fleeing to the Kachin-China border, towns and jungle areas.

Much of the conflict focuses on Kachin resistance to a government plan to recruit their men into a single state-run border guard force.

Most IDPs are living in temporary bamboo shelters with plastic sheet roofing. The crowded living conditions, poor sanitation and lack of clean water have led to illness – seven children died, mainly of diarrhoea and malaria, in Laiza during August. At one site, 2,000 people are sharing 10 toilets, say aid workers.

“We are in very urgent need of medicine,” said Mai Ja, an aid worker with the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, who is based in a camp supporting 3,000 IDPs along the border.

The uprooted civilians also need school supplies, psycho-social support, and shelter as winter approaches, La Rip said.
ANIR has raised more than US$312,000 for relief needs, mainly from the KIO and Kachin communities in Myanmar, China and abroad. But that money is nearly gone, Mai Ja said.

A $2.4 million request sent to the international funding community in July has had little response, aside from some $38,000 donated by two European NGOs, money that is still being processed.

Meanwhile, as of 13 September, the fighting continues.

“People are really afraid to go back to their villages,” La Rip said.

Since fighting broke out in June, the UN and other international agencies have not had access to the area.

Sunday, September 11, 2011

Wunpawng Ninghtoi IDP Update Information (July-August 2011)

WPN IDP Update Information August 2011


မုိးမခ စာမ်က္ႏွာမွ ကူးယူ ေဖာ္ျပသည္။

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Myen Hpyen ni KIA/KIO hpe Hkrup Mara hte Gasat sai.

Myen Hpyen Ni KIA Hpe Hkrup Mara Hte Gasat Sai

Monday, September 5, 2011

Kachin Church's Appeal letter to Kachin State Prime Minister

Appeal Letter to Kachin State Prime Minister

Sunday, September 4, 2011

Bangdu La Amyawk a lam Maumwi

Bangdu La Amyawk a lam Maumwi
(WP Ramma ni a matu yaw shada let ka lajang ai re.)

English-Myen Majan Labau

1885 hta Third Anglo-Burmese War, English-Myen Majan #3 byin nna Myen hkawhkam dan yawng British colony byin mat wa sai. Sam, Kaya, Kachin hte Chin buga ni hpe 1886 ning e hpang nna laksan jat bang la mat wa nna British Burma ngu masat ai mungdan byin pru wa sai. 1947 Panglung Myit-hkrum Ga-shaka hta British Burma a masat Bhamo hte Myitkyina Distitict lahkawng hpe "Kachin State" ngu nna masat la sai re. Anglo-Burmese War yawng masum lang byin ai; First Anglo-Burmese War, 1826 hta byin hpang ai, Myen hkawhkam sum mat ai, Mali hka-nu panglai de wa shang ai daw hte Sittawng hka nu panglai hkin-gau ni, Tavoy-Meik (Mon ga) ni hpe jaw kau ra ai.

Majan #2 gaw 1844 hta hpang sai, Myen hkawhkam sum nna Pegu kaw nna lawu daw yawng jaw kau ra ai. Ndai majan hta Myen hpyen hpung a jaubu-daju gaw Maha Bandoola ngu shamying la ai wa re. Shi a Jinghpaw mying gaw Bangdu La (Labang ni du du ai lawu Sam mung Balawng nga ai ga nna pru ai) ngu ai. Hpyen dap gaw magwi jawn nna chyingbau hte garu gachyi nga let, Mali hka kau e hkap nga ai. British ni a "gun boat" - amyawk kaji hte jak sinat sharawt tawn nna hpri ninggang shakap ai sanghpaw hte lung wa nna amyawk gap dat ai shaloi magwi ni kahpra hprawng dimbri dumbra rai wa nna lagaw dap hpyen la tsawm ra hpe kabye sat kau hkrum mat wa ai majaw asum hkam kau ai. Tim Bangdu La Amyawk ngu ai gaw Majan #3 hta she lang ma ai, dai gaw 1885 October shata e rai sai.

Majan #3, English hte Myen Hkawhkam Thibaw gasat gala byin yang, Myen maga uphkang masa ayai aya n ru n ra rai mat wa ai aten re. Hkawhkam Thibaw gaw Hkawhkam-jan Su-hpaya-Lat nau gumshem ai majaw aten law law nba htinggrum kata e shi makoi nga ra mat ai, nga nna shiga mawng ai manghkang nga ai da. Gasat gala n gun n nga ai hpe chye na nna lagut damya nau sawng nna hpaga lam hta aja awa hkra ai, nga nna British ni ga-up la kau na ngu dawdan dat sai. Shanhte n la kau yang Thibaw wa French ni hte mazum wa na mung tsang ai; dai aten hta French ni gaw Vietnam hte Camobodia de du shang mat sai, Thai hkawhkam dan gaw French ni hte shani nna mazum mat wa sai majaw tsang ai lam re.

Myen maga na manghkang
Hkawhkam Thibaw gaw hpyen dap laknak n lu, magwi mung n law mat sai; larau ladau rai atsam rawng ai hpyen jaubu mung n lu ang mat sai. English hpyen sanghpaw dap langai Mali hka hku nna rawt lung wa sai nga ai na ai majaw Mali hka kau e "bandoola amyawk" sa sharawt tawn na aming jahkrat dat nu ai. Shi a hkringmang ni mung, Bandoola amyawk ngu ai hpa re n chye nna mau ai kaw nna lama mi hpe shabyin tawn manu ai.

English hpyen sanghpaw ni Sagaing lawu e du sai; kaning re hpyen hpung kaba shajin tawn ai lam n chye ai majaw sadi nna angwi sha hka nu a sinna hkingau garet lung wa ai, gan jahkring nna sumtsan yu manpyawng sharawt nna mada yu yang Bandoola amyawk 3-4 tsa sharawt tawn ai hpe mu nna grai kajawng mat sai. Tsan ai kaw nna hpa ba laknak re atsawm n mu lu ai, dai majaw "Aru e....ndai loi sadi ra na re" ngu dawdan nna lawu de htingnut yu mat wa ai. Aten hkying hkum matsat la nna hkan masem shangun yu yang, lu la ai report gaw, "Bandoola amyawk ngu ai re da, tsan tsan n lu gap ai, tim ni ai hkan gaw gara hku rai na n chye tsun ai" ngu wa ma ai da.

English captain wa grai sadi let angwi sha sinpraw hka kau de shani nna manpyawng hte kalang bai yu yu dat yang she Bandoola amyawk ngu ai gaw shawa anum ala 3-4 tsa, labu malu nna maidang dangkang achyang nre mana maka hpe kadawng dinghkrem tawn ai she re hpe mu sai. Shaloi shi nau mani nna kan hpyi machyi mat wa ai, n lu tsap nna gadawng daw yin mat wa sai; shi a npu na wa bai manpyawng sharawt nna mada yu dat, mani nna kadawng galau taw ma mat wa, hpyen la ni mung yawng dai hku rai mat wa nna hkying hkum 4 bai shalai kau ai. Jan shang nsin sin wa mahka e she mahkrai jahkrat nna hpyenla ni laknak hte grim kabye shang wa masai.

Hkawhkam Thibaw hte Hkawhkam-jan Su-hpaya-lat mung woi mat wa na matu shajin tawn chyalu rai taw nga la ai da. Bawng hku hta la nna India Mungdan a sinna maga zunlawng kaji langai kaw sa sa tawn kau ai, dai kaw aprat htum hkra nga mat masai.

2011 Bangdu La Amyawk kun?
Dai ni mung kalang bai shanhte kata e ayai aya rai wa ai zawn zawn, larau ladau hpa-awn atsam kaba ai lam woi ninghkrig n nga mat wa sai zawn zawn, rai masai. Bangdu La amyawk zawn rai n kai, n shawp n kap ai baw shiga shabra wa ai zawn zawn rai nga ai. Anhte a sanghpaw mahkrai jahkrat nna shang wa na aten du wa nga ai kun?

WP shawa hte ramma ni hpe laksan shading nna laiwa sai shaning 50-60 daram hta hkai ai maumwi hpe bai htawn hkai dat nga nngai re.