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Burma’s ethnic conflict product of flawed constitution - Unity in diversity the sole way out

Burma’s ethnic conflict product of flawed constitution - Unity in diversity the sole way out

Friday, 29 July 2011 18:31 Sai Wansai
By: Sai Wansai
Friday, 29 July 2011

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter to President Thein Sein, together with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA), is a move which must be welcomed.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has pinpointed the importance of peaceful co-existence among co-inhabitants of the Union of Burma and that it is a paramount task for every party concerned to make it a reality.

The letter added that armed conflicts within the non-Burman ethnic areas have created human tragedy, suffering, loss of lives, economic deterioration and destruction of costly physical infrastructures.

The use of force wouldn’t bring the warring parties nearer and that only negotiation and political dialogue could deliver the desired genuine peace and reconciliation.

She added that only within the atmosphere of peace would a genuine nation-building process be successfully implemented.

In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.

While this is, undoubtedly, a sincere and noble act from the part of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it is also essential to look deeply into the underlying core conflict issues and Burmese military leadership mindset, as to why it is so uncompromising and unyielding, when it comes to facilitating genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.

First, successive military dominated regimes, including the present military-backed Thein Sein government, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans - Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.

On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.

Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting "national sovereignty" and "national unity" at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to "racial supremacy" and political domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD, SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set. And as such, the non-Burman ethnic groups aspiration of “unity in diversity” or “genuine federalism” is viewed by successive military regimes, including the present Thein Sein government, as a “disintegration ploy “, which will break up the country, if ever allowed to be implemented.

Secondly, the woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognised as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.

Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of Burma.

Again, instead of reforming and addressing the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, the junta’s orchestrated the present 2008 constitution - dubbed Nargis constitution, due to the rigging of referendum vote by the junta shortly after Cyclone Nargis - is just doing the opposite, which is designed to give the military a clear political monopoly and military supremacy in all aspects of governing the country.

As a result, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ aspiration of “federalism, proportional share of power, in a true sense, in at least one major decision-making body in the central government so that they can protect themselves, and plausible guarantees that the military will not resume attacks on them” were not mentioned or provided in the 2008 constitution.( Source: Analysis of the 2008-SPDC Constitution for Burma - David C. Williams, Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy)

Thirdly, rightly or wrongly, the Burmese military has appointed itself to be the sole saviour of the country and the believe that the army under its command is the only institution that is capable of governing the country. In other words, the junta is entitled to rule over the civilian, with the help of the army.

Fourthly, Burmese military leadership urge for assimilation of non-Burman ethnic nationalities is closely intertwined with its version of forging national identity.

The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present, military-backed Thein Sein regime, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words, national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar", "Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they also belong.

For about a little more than a decade ago, the then Burmese military regime changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals is doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.

The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.

Finally, the misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so entrenched; at least in media and academic studies, it needs some clarification.
The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become a minority in the Shan, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within their own territories.

Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial, current Burma.

Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are neither minorities nor majorities, but equal partners or co-inhabitants in a union of territories, the Union of Burma.

Fundamentally, the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities stem from the inadequate drafting of constitutions, whether they are 1947, 1974 or the recent one in 2008. The flare up of the recent armed conflict in Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states has its root in the flawed constitutional drafting.

On 9 June 2004, during the SPDC's held national convention to draw up the 2008 constitution, 13 ethnic ceasefire armies put forward a joint proposal for the formation of a federal union. But no action or follow up action was taken on this advice till the end of national convention. This has been taken as a real drawback and disappointment for the ethnic ceasefire armies.

Thereafter, many instances of the non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal within the national convention and outside of it were only met with deafening silence from the part of the then ruling junta, the SPDC. (Please see appendix for more information on ethnic initiatives and statements)

According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”,

Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.

This paragraph has been quoted, time and again, as an argument that the ceasefire armies must come under the Burma Army. But the point is that the suggestion and proposal of a federal set up as a political system, during the drafting of 2008 constitution, by the attending ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties were rejected. And the aftermath half-hearted participation of the ceasefire armies, due to the heavy handedness of the junta could not be viewed as a whole-hearted acceptance of this particular paragraph, which in effect would mean the end of their self-determination struggle.

The junta was pressuring the ceasefire armies, even before the change of military-back, Thein Sein government. It even was able to overrun the Kokang ceasefire army in August 2009, when its Border Guard Force (BGF) plan was rejected. But the mainstream ceasefire armies like KIA, UWSA, SSA-N and NDAA continue to resist the Burma Army’s BGF plan.

As such, the ceasefire armies have every right to defend themselves and their homelands, and owe no legal commitment to the 2008 constitution, much less the paragraph 338.

To wind it up, the central issue is still the “constitutional crisis”. And in order to make a meaningful approach leading to a more accommodating, win-win outcome, there is no way around rather than the amendment of the present constitution, or better still, drafting a new constitution. For all the warring parties, negotiating the differing positions along the line of “pluralism” and “unity in diversity” is the only hope left to resolve the ongoing armed, ethnic conflict.

The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.

အင ္တာနက ္ တ ုိက ္ခ ုိက ္သ ူထ ဲ ျမန္မာထ ိပ္ဆ ုံး

DASSK a Laika

Tsaw ra hkungga ai myitsu ni,
DASSK a laika hpe lu hti sai, Ginjaw de na shalai jaw ai majaw grai chyeju dum let ndai sumtsan shakram laika gadun hpe hpang dat nngai re.

1. DASSK a laika hpe grai myit n dik, myit n-gun n lu ai hku hkam sha nngai. Hpa majaw kun?
A. Shi shawng ningnan ga-hpaw hku nna Munghpawm hpe "myu-hpawm" hku gaw gap sharawt tawn ai re, nga sai. Teng ai, jaw sai. Tim 1947 e hpang nna dai ni du hkra dai "munmghpawm = myu-hpawm" ngu ai ningmu masing mahkyen hpe matut nna n tat kau ai sha manat tawn ai ni hta rawt malan masa hkan ai kaw du hkra shakut ai gaw "ethnic" ngu shamying hkrum ai anhte Myen n re malawm ni sha rai ga ai. Ndai lam shi soi-sam pyi n tsun hkra ai. "Panglung " a lachyum dai ni KIO, KNU, NMSP hte SSA a lata hta, myit masin kraw lawang kata e chyu sha ngam mat sai kun? DASSK ndai lam hpe malap kau sai kun?

B. DASSK a laika hta KIO, KNU, NMSP, SSA ni hpe Thein Sein hte mungmasa ladat hku bawng ban jahkrup hkat na matu simsa lam jawm tam ga, nga ai. Maisa, rai yang anhte malawm amyu ni 1947 nna dai ni du hkra bang hkrat wa ai du-daw sai-hkaw arang hpe shi hpa rai n tsun hkra ai kun? Simsa ai lam galaw yang mung dai arang hpe n mu ai, n sawn shalawm ai hku rai ra na kun?

C. Hpa rai nna gap-hkat jahkring ai hpe chyu sha madung tawn nna anhte a kaba la ai arang hpe n mu ya ai kun? Shanhte Myen gumshem uhpung kata e n ru n ra rai gan byin ai ten hta sharai la na matu "aten mari ai - buying time" mahtang lama madung rai kun? Myit hta asan sha mahtai n mu lu nngai law. Asan sha chye na ai ni nga yang garum la marit.

D. DASSK anhte hpe simsa lam galaw na shadut ai shani hta nan nan Tin Aung Myint Oo maga de nna 1) Miwa kaw na hkoi la ai gumhpraw lu la jang lawu tsang hpyen du ni hte hpyen ma ni hpe jarit malu masha bai lu jaw na re, 2) dai aten hta SSA hpe shamyit kau, 3) Wa hpe bai la kau re ai mai byin na re, nga ai nsen mung pru ai hpe n madat nna ASSK hpe sha madat na hku rai kun?

E. Ndai ten hta sinpraw htingbu wa gara hku rai nga ai kun? KIO hpe simsa la na shadut nga ninglen Tin Aung Myint Oo alat nga ai gumhpraw shapraw ya na rai kun?

F. October shata hta UN rapdaw kaba zuphpawng galaw na aten re; ya aten hta mawng ai shiga hta EU gaw, Thein Sein gumshem jaubu ni hpe A. human rights tara tawt lai ai manghkang, B. mungdan shawa hpe mungup masa e n shalawm ai gumshem lailen ladat lam ni a majaw, EU woi awn nna Myanmar hpe adawt na zawn nga ai lam mawng nga ai. Ndai majaw "gap-hkat jahkring simsa lam" wa manu grai tsaw wa ai hku rai kun?

G. Gap-hkat jahkring simsa lam gaw, KIO, KNU, NSMP hte SSA hpe shading nna tsun nga ma ai. Ndai ni gaw, jet ai democracy masa shadut ai ni re, dai majaw Thein Sein a uphkang masa hte nhtan shai taw nga ai mahkrun hkan ai ni re. Ndai ni hpe gan shazim ai masa gaw Thein Sein a matu myiman n sum na lam sha rai kun?

Dai ni na mabyin shiga mawng ai hta DASSK a laika mung mawng lawm shang wa nna baw nu loi mi hkanu mat sali ai. Nanhte tsaw ra ai hpu nau ni gara hku mu lu myit ta?

Hkungga let,
SK

ASSK open letter on the unfolding conflicts in Burma UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION by Dr. Zarni

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S OPEN LETTER TO U THEIN SEIN, KIO, KNU,

Statement from UN Secretary-General

Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting

Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting

Remarks
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Ayodhya Hotel
Bali, Indonesia
July 24, 2011

________________________________________
FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: A very good afternoon, dear colleagues from the media. (In Indonesian.) I would like to begin once again by welcoming and expressing our appreciation to Secretary Clinton, as well as her delegation, for having attended and participated actively in this second Joint Commission meeting between the United States and Indonesia.

I had begun our discussion this morning by expressing one key thought. First, that during the past few days, as you are aware, Secretary Clinton has given Bali to attend the ASEAN-U.S. meeting, the East Asia Summit meeting at the ministerial level, as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum. And during the course of those sets of meetings, Indonesia and the United States worked very closely, all for the purpose of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity for our region.

But I have also suggested the idea that all those endeavors would not be possible without being anchored by strong bilateral relations, as Indonesia and the United States today enjoy. And that is why today's second JMC is extremely strategic and extremely important. As colleagues will be aware, the JMC process was launched last September 2010 for the purpose of injecting momentum and ensuring concrete (inaudible) to the vision of a comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the United States.

And during the course of that period, since September 2010 until today, we have seen, based on the report that we have just now received from the six working groups -- namely the working groups on democracy and civil society, working group on climate and environment, working group on education, on trade and investment, on security issues, and on energy -- based on the submission from the six working groups, I think both Secretary Clinton and I feel ever more confident that the comprehensive partnership between our two countries are in a good state, and that we are actually further deepening and strengthening our collaboration and partnership.

And more specifically, each of the working groups were able to share with the Secretary and myself the kind of progress they have made in their own respective domain, and lay out the concrete work plan for their year ahead, in order to ensure that the momentum is maintained.

More specifically, as you are aware, come next November, in 2011, we are to have the East Asia Summit here in Bali. And on that occasion, we are anticipating, of course, the first participation by the United States, by President Obama, to that summit. And, at the same time, there will be, no doubt, a bilateral meeting between the two presidents: of Indonesia and President Obama. In other words, the work that we are doing now, today, of the JCM, becomes a useful (inaudible) for us to be able to take stock where we are and where we wish to become next November.

So, all in all, I would say, Secretary, it has been -- and I am sure you would agree with me -- a most productive meeting, and encouraging, as well, because not only have the working groups been extremely diligent and energetic in their work over the past few months, but they continue to be driven by a sense of wanting to achieve better achievement and identifying more potentials for the future.

Of course, besides the issue of bilateral relations, the Secretary and I had the advantage on this occasion to compare notes on various regional and international issues, following on from the discussions that we have been having at the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as the East Asia Summit at the ministers level.

That is by way of introduction for myself. I should now like to give the floor to Secretary Clinton to also deliver her remarks. Please.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much. I want to express my appreciation to the Foreign Minister and the delegation from Indonesia for not only welcoming us today, but preparing the opportunity for such a productive second meeting of our joint commission. As the foreign minister said, we covered a lot of ground. I want to just touch on a few of the highlights.

First, we discussed how to increase trade and investment between our countries. Because while Indonesia is the largest economy in ASEAN, trade between our two countries still lags between others in the region. For example, our trade this year with Indonesia was $20 billion, but our trade with Malaysia was $40 billion. So we want to look at what are the impediments and the potential barriers. How do we reduce tariffs? How do we create more dynamic trade and investment between Indonesia and the United States?

Secondly, we discussed how we can work together more closely to protect the environment and to address the challenge of climate change. I know that is something that the Government of Indonesia and President Yudhoyono has been particularly focused on. I emphasize that, as we enter the final stage of negotiations on a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact that aims to promote low carbon development, we look forward to the quick creation of an accountable national trust fund to implement the compact, and to spur sustainable growth here in Indonesia.

Third, we discussed our shared goal of expanding educational exchanges. And I was so pleased to hear the report from the two chairs of the education working group. We are well on the way to doubling the number of Indonesians who study in the United States, and increasing the number of American students who come to study in Indonesia. We have expanded study abroad initiatives, such as our Fulbright Program, and we are eager to continue to build on that, as we will at a higher education summit to be held in Washington on October 31st.

Finally, we discussed Indonesia's growing role as a regional and global leader, and the important leadership that Indonesia is providing in ASEAN, in the ASEAN Regional Forum, in the East Asia Summit, in APEC, in the G-20, in all the major multilateral fora where the hard problems facing us in the world today are addressed.

This is an exciting time, and I was very impressed by the work that has been done by the working groups. And I think that this comprehensive partnership is, indeed, producing results for both of our people. Because, after all, we have to report to the people of Indonesia, and the people of the United States. And I think they can be reassured that we are not meeting for the sake of meeting; we are meeting to build relationships, to explore potential, and to deliver results for both of our people.

So, again, let me thank the Foreign Minister for his hospitality and his friendship, and to commend you, Marty, on the excellent job done in hosting these important gatherings in the last week.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Thank you very much, Hillary. Before opening the floor for questions, may I express a sentiment which I am sure Hillary would want to associate herself to, as well? Once again, to reaffirm and communicate our (inaudible) with regard to the attacks that took place in Norway just recently, the loss of life, of innocent lives lost, and our condemnation for that event, yet, at the same time, our confidence in the strength of the Norwegian nation, of its government, to be able to overcome this particular challenge, and that we, as members of the international community, stand by them in expressing our solidarity and support.

QUESTION: Thank you very much (inaudible). I have a question for you, ma'am, and one question to you, Mr. Marty.

First question, I would like to know what is your opinion on how ASEAN works on problems such as the border disputes (inaudible), issues of human rights (inaudible), and especially South China Seas issue. And do you think that we should always be (inaudible)?

My second question. There has been (inaudible) on the human (inaudible) Indonesia following the statement of Human Rights Watch. How (inaudible) participation of human rights in Indonesia, especially (inaudible).
And to Mr. Marty, (inaudible).

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Ah, right. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Let me begin with responding. I want to commend Indonesian leadership of ASEAN this past year. Because of its active role in promoting a resolution to the border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand. Indonesia played that role very effectively, to the point that both countries have asked Indonesia to continue playing such a role, even after its chairmanship of ASEAN expires.
And I think the international court of justice's decision about the disputed territory between two ASEAN members itself highlighted the importance of ASEAN continuing to seek a permanent resolution.

Secondly, with respect to human rights in Burma, we discussed that in our meetings, in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and in the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue. And I think it is very important that we continue to press the new Government of Burma to take action that will demonstrate a break with the past. And again, here I commend Indonesia's leadership, both as chair of ASEAN, in reaching out to the new government, but also, based on your own experience, I think there is much for Indonesia to share, as to how you make a successful peaceful transition to a democracy as vibrant and successful as the one here in Indonesia.

And with respect to the South China Sea, as you know, that took up a great deal of our time in discussions, both prior to and during the meetings. I have to comment Indonesia's leadership again. Because, as chair of ASEAN, Indonesia led the way to the adoption of the declaration of conduct. I think that it is important for all of us to realize what is at stake here. Because, clearly, the South China Sea is absolutely essential to global trade. At least 50 percent of all global trade goes through the South China Sea every single year. And it is important for us to support freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, so there is no question as to the rights of every nation for its ships, its goods to pass through the South China Sea. But it is especially important for the region.

And the United States takes no position on any claim made by any party to any disputed area. What we want to see is a resolution process that will be aided by the code of conduct that ASEAN is working toward, based on the Declaration of Conduct, and that the principles of international law will govern, so that there can be peaceful resolution of all the claims. In order to achieve that, every claimant must make their claim publicly and specifically known, so that we know where there is any dispute. And secondly, all claims must be related to territorial characteristics.

So, we think that it was an important first step, but only a first step in adopting the Declaration of Conduct. And we commend, again, Indonesia's leadership in achieving that, and urge that ASEAN move quickly -- I would even add urgently -- to achieve a code of conduct that will avoid any problems in the vital sea lanes and territorial waters of the South China Sea.

With respect to -- you had two questions in there -- with respect to human rights, we have a working group in our Commission on democracy on human rights. We had a very positive discussion about those important issues during the reporting from that working group, and we look forward to continuing to support Indonesia in its important leadership on democracy and human rights, not only in the region, but globally. And, therefore, we look forward to continuing to make progress.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: If I may just also add to the point that Secretary Clinton has made on the South China Sea, Indonesia is acutely aware of the need to maintain momentum. Of course, the conclusion of the guidelines just now -- a couple of days ago now -- is a very important development. I would not wish to underestimate its importance. But, at the same time, it reminds us of the further work that needs to be done maintaining momentum, maintaining a sense of urgency. And we have a road map at the back of our minds of what needs to happen between now and then, whenever the "then" is. But you can be assured that we have a clear outline and expectations of what needs to happen. And not least, of course, the identifications of elements for Code of Conduct within the process of its eventual conclusion, as well.

On the specific question asked -- addressed to myself, namely Indonesia and the United States with regard to the East Asia Summit, as you are very much aware, of course, the process, the very process of United States participation and addition to the East Asia Summit was, among others, a product of a process that Indonesia and the United States bilaterally (inaudible) about.

I remember my first conversation with you, Hillary, in Singapore, if I am not mistaken, at the sideline of a conference. This was an issue that you raised then. And, therefore, even from the beginning, the United States and Indonesia have been engaged in a very thorough way to discuss, to compare notes of our strategic vision of what the East Asia Summit is all about. And now that the United States is part of the East Asia Summit, it is our task, together with the other members of the EAS to give flesh to this -- to give value to this forum. And I think that the discussion that we had yesterday was extremely instructive -- a couple of days ago now -- among others, to ensure that the East Asia Summit, besides discussing the five priority issues that we have been discussing, also deepen and broaden its engagement or discussion on so-called broad strategic issues.

The East Asia Summit must provide solutions to many of the region's challenges, and opportunities, as well. And I am glad that, with the United States being part of the equation, being part of the architecture, then the chances of having this summit providing that answer is suitably enhanced. Thank you.

QUESTION: I am going to follow up on a couple of human rights issues. Foreign Minister, do you believe that the change that occurred in Myanmar, Burma, this year is sufficient for Burma to take its place, for instance, as head of ASEAN? I don't believe the United States thinks so. I mean you both can comment on that.

And in advance of the Secretary's visit, a number of media groups, a human rights group, issued statements critical of Indonesia's handling of the situation in Kampar, saying that aid groups and journalists were being barred, and that there were reports that -- of a crackdown on the indigenous people. And I was just wondering if you both can comment on those specifics.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Thank you. In a way, the questions are somewhat related, as relates to human rights and democratization.

One thing that we have learned in the course of our decade-long now -- nearly -- democratization is that it is a process. It is impossible to have a snapshot of one moment in time and sort of decide, "Are we there yet, or are we not there yet?" And this is most definitely the case with respect to Myanmar. Myanmar is obviously a work in process, in terms of democratization. To put it more -- in a more -- I guess -- yes, I don't want to use -- describe it as a work in progress.

But it is very much related to the issue of chairmanship. As you know, at the moment, the decision has not been made by ASEAN. When we last met as foreign ministers, the decision has been left -- not quite done yet. But we have to see and have a sense of -- comfort level whether Myanmar is actually prepared and ready to assume chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014. I am aware -- we are aware -- of the responsibilities and the expectations that is inherent in a particular country chairing ASEAN, especially on the eve of 2015. So we are well aware of that, and we are going to have plenty more discussions among ASEAN member states to ensure that there is a real comfort level about the issue.

On the issue of human rights situation in Indonesia, the kind of concerns that we have expressed, many -- we hear such comments and expectations on a regular basis. But the only thing is nowadays it is also a concern that is shared by all Indonesians alike. So it doesn't take an external party to suggest to us we need to do this and that, because it is being -- efforts are being made to ensure that our own democratic and human rights expectations are fulfilled, as we expect them to be.

But, you know, as Secretary Clinton has said, we have this working group within this forum on human rights and civil society that has been working not only in promoting bilateral cooperation on human rights issue, but also increasingly now, of cooperation of a multilateral character, as well, a lot of experience sharing that we are disseminating to some other countries in transition, including in the Middle East and North Africa, which shows the potential demonstrative effect that countries like Indonesia, working together with United States, can impact -- impart upon our partners, as well. Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we greatly appreciate Indonesia's leadership in promoting progress toward political reconciliation and democracy in Burma. And, as the foreign minister said, Indonesia's own recent history provides an example for transition to civilian rule and building strong democratic institutions.
And we have, in many different settings, expressed our deep concern about the oppressive political environment in Burma. We have called on the newly-elected government to release political prisoners, open a meaningful dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi by utilizing decision-makers who can respond to her legitimate suggestions and concerns, and we will continue to press for the kind of changes that we see benefiting the people of Burma in the future.

With respect to Papua, the United States supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, which includes the Papua and West Papua provinces. We, of course, believe in open dialogue between Papuan representatives and the Indonesian Government to address grievances and support development. But, as the Foreign Minister said, this is a matter for the Indonesian Government, and they are addressing it. And we hope to see full implementation of the special autonomy law for Papua, which is a commitment on the part of the Indonesian Government to address many of the concerns that have been expressed.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madam Secretary and Mr. Foreign Minister. I want to ask about how far this relation has progressed since you (inaudible), especially about the (inaudible) and security sector.

And then, what will U.S. President Barack Obama of United States bring to the East Asia Summit next November? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that there has been a discernable amount of progress in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia under the Obama Administration. President Obama came to office very committed to deepen, broaden, and strengthen the bilateral relationship between our two countries. And, based on the work that I have overseen, and that I have been able to analyze, given the work of the Commission, I am very pleased by the progress that our bilateral relationship is making.

We, on both sides, have more to do. And so, this is a continuing process that we will be focused on. I know President Obama is looking forward both to attending the East Asian Summit and the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and his bilateral meetings with President Yudhoyono and others. But this is a very important relationship, one that the United States highly values, and that we are deeply invested in. And I think, based on the progress we have made in a very short period of time, there is a tremendous potential for future cooperation.

QUESTION: Hi. I am Anthony Kuhn with NPR, National Public Radio of the U.S., and I would like to hear both from Secretary Clinton and Minister Marty on this.
To go back to the South China Sea, Secretary Clinton, you have asked claimants to back up their claims in international law. This is probably the most -- as China would put it -- core interest, or core matter, the thorniest issue you could raise. It has taken the better part of a decade just to come up with a non-binding resolution that says very little about what to do when there are spats. What about the medium term? What about the short term?

What do you propose to address -- to prevent incidents which you say threaten security? Might you -- although you are both not claimants in this -- for example, engage in diplomacy in, say, to claimants, at least try to get to your different domestic departments in line, reading from the same page on this issue? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, Anthony. I think that the progress that we saw this year stands in marked contrast to our meeting last year. The achievement of a declaration, as you point out, had been a long time coming, thanks to the hard work and leadership of the foreign minister and the Indonesian Government as chair of the ASEAN meeting, as well as the ARF. There has been progress on the dialogue between China and ASEAN.

The Declaration is a first step. Nobody claims it is more than that. It is a first step. It needs to be quickly followed up on by the code of conduct. There needs to be a lot of dialogue between ASEAN and China in their already-existing mechanism. And the rest of the world needs to weigh in, because all of us have a stake in ensuring that these disputes don't get out of control. And in fact, the numbers have been increasing. The intimidation actions of (inaudible), of cutting of cables, the kinds of things which will raise the cost of doing business for everyone who travels through the South China Sea, which, as I said earlier, is half of all global commerce.

So, we support a collaborative, diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve all of their disputes. What we do not support, and are strongly against, is the use or threat of force by any nation to advance its claims. Therefore, we think simultaneously there needs to be a very concerted effort to realize a code of conduct, and there needs to be a call by the international community for all parties to clarify their claims, both land and maritime, and to conform them to international law, including as reflected in the UN Convention on Law of the Seas.
This is the way the world is supposed to work. And in the 21st century, this is the way it must work. Because no nation can, on its own, manage everything that needs to happen. And those days are and must be over. And, therefore, we have to have the kind of cooperative, collaborative effort that Indonesia has led.

FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA: Well, thank you very much for that question. Collaborative and cooperative mindset is an effort -- is certainly exactly the kind of spirit and outcome we are promoting as Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, for our region. Of course, the obvious recent manifestation among others has been on South China Sea, as well as on the Thai-Cambodia situation.

In other words, we are keen to avoid for our region the kind of fault lines and schisms and divisions that may not be -- that would not be to the interest of any countries in this part of the world. And the South China Sea, the guideline itself, the Declaration and its guidelines, when you look at it, it may not seem to suggest much. It may not. However, if you look at the broader picture of what it represents, the fact that after about eight years, finally, this year, after much strong effort, and in contrast to -- like Secretary Clinton said, in contrast to last year's ambience and conditions, we were able to get this done. I think that is a good start. And it is an asset for us to develop on.

The key point here is that we must make sure that this is not the end of the line. This is but the beginning. And I can assure you that Indonesia, as chair of ASEAN, we have a road map -- as I said before in my earlier remarks, we have a clear road map of what needs to happen between now and, say, November. That is the next junction, when we will be having the summit of ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, to ensure a constant sense of progress and momentum. Because we do sincerely and genuinely feel letting things not going anywhere, letting things be state of status quo can be possibly destabilizing, and creating uncertainty and opening up the potentials for miscalculation. And this is what we wish to avoid. Transparency, in terms of intent, in terms of claims, is extremely important.

But all this must be done within the diplomatic process. And I don't mind having very difficult debate -- frank and candid, as we say it in diplomatic parlance -- as long as it is all done in the construct of a conference room, rather than out there at sea. And there has certainly been, as Secretary Clinton said, recent incidents at sea. I am afraid it is a general trend, not only in the South China Sea; the other seas of all parts of the world also have been marked by tensions. The militarization of fishing vessels, for example, that -- how fishing vessels have been protected by the navies of different countries and creating incidences at sea, and these are very serious developments.

That is why, among our initiatives just now, was to have a maritime forum for our region, an East Asia or Asia Pacific ASEAN maritime forum, where all the different assets of maritime ocean issues can be discussed in a cohesive way. Indonesia, you recall, is an archipelago. It is a country that is not small, made up of some 17,000 islands. We used to think of the oceans as a factor that divides us. But, thanks to the foresight of our founding fathers, the oceans, the seas between the islands, becomes an issue that binds us in accordance with this archipelagic outlook.
Now, we would like to think that East Asia and the Asia Pacific, a great deal of which is made up of the seas, can also have a similar integrative outlook, to look at the seas as a potential for cooperation, rather than a source for conflict and tensions. That is certainly the kind of outlook we would like to promote. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

Stilwell Road/ Ledo Lam

Stilwell Road/ Ledo Lam

This World War II documentary, narrated by actor (and future U.S. President) Ronald Reagan, focuses on the China-India-Burma front of the war. The Stillwell Road (named after American General Joseph Stillwell, whose idea it was) was an engineering marvel whose purpose was to truck supplies to the Chinese army fighting the Japanese in China. It started in India, cut through the almost impenetrable jungles and mountains of Burma, and ended in China.

Mungkan Majan II na documentary Sumla Hkrung ndai gaw 40 lang ngu na American Gumsan (1981-89) galaw lai wa sai Ronald Reagan(nnga mat sai) Mung Masa bungli n-galaw shi yang shi hku nna tsun htai dan ai Ledo Lam a Labau Sumla hkrung langai rai nga ai. Stilwell Road Lam ndai hpe shawng nnan Ledo Road ngu shamying hpang ai rai nna India Mungdan Ledo Mare kaw na npawt hpang mat wa nhtawm Myen Mung hpe lai di mat wa let Miwa mung du hkra hkrang mat wa ai Lam Kaba(478 miles) rai nga ai. Lam ndai galaw ai shaloi masha n-gun 63,000 rai nna hkrat ai gumhpraw gaw US$ 150.00 million jan rai nga ai. Ndai Stillwell Road(Ledo Lam) hpe mayak mahkak law law a lapran hta byin hkra galaw ai madung lawng lam gaw Miwa hte Myen Mungdan de Mung maden shang wa ai Japan Hpyen hpe gasat nga ai Miwa, English, American hte Jinghpaw Hpyen Dap ni a matu Sanat Laknak hte arung arai ni htaw sa na matu rai nga ai, shingrai Lam kaba ndai a mying hpe mung Lam ndai galaw ai ten ningbaw rai nga ai American Hpyen Du Kaba General Joseph Stilwell a mying hpe la-kap nna Stilwell Road ngu mung shamying ai lam rai nga ai.

January 2, 2006 Ning Nam Ngu Mare Muse Ninghtawn Rung e Mung Maden Myen ni Sat kau ya ai KIA Magam Gun ni hte Mung Masha ni a Records

We Hope the Last Kachin Alive Continues to be Kachin

Burma, China Ignoring Environmental Warnings for Dam

Burma, China Ignoring Environmental Warnings for Dam

Wednesday, 20 July 2011 00:00
Written by Joao Peixe

The hugely controversial Myitsone dam in northern Burma, currently under construction by the China Power Investment Corporation, was the subject of a 2009 internal report by the company, which called for the project to be scrapped.
The Environmental Impact Assessment report has nevertheless been ignored, and work is proceeding on the project, the Democratic Voice of Burma Online reported.

The EIA report stated that, "If the Burmese and Chinese sides were really concerned about environmental issues and aimed at sustainable development of the country, there is no need for such a big dam to be constructed at the confluence of the Irrawaddy River," urging instead for two smaller, but equally efficient, dams to be built above Myitsone.

Upon its completion in 2017, the $4 billion Myitsone dam will become the world's fifteenth biggest hydropower structure.

According to the Burma Rivers Network, which closely monitors the social and environmental impacts of the various energy initiatives on Burma's waterways, around 15,000 people will be displaced around the dam site, while the sizeable changes in the Irrawaddy river's flow will "impact millions of people downstream who depend on the Irrawaddy for agriculture, fishing, and transportation."

China has faced strong international criticism for its business links with Burma, whose ruling junta is subject to a number of international sanctions.

By. Joao Peixe, Deputy Editor OilPrice.com

Self-professed Burmese political assassin in Australia

Burma Conspiracy

Mungkan Mungdan ni ahkyak la na matu hprai nga ai Myen Hpyen Asuya hpe kalang myi bai Hollywood kaw na Media Majan langai hku den jaw dat sai. Hollywood kaw mying kaba chyalu rai nga ai Sharon Stone hte Tomer Sisley yan ndai sumla hkrung hta madung shang lawm ai rai nna mungkan mungdan shagu ngu na daram du na bat hta madun hpang wa na rai nga ai ndai sumla hkrung a mying gaw “Burma Conspiracy” ngu ai rai nna Myen Hpyen Hpung a mung shawa ntsa zingri zingrat ai, roi mara galaw ai lam hpe mungkan ting chye hkra Hka hta Marang bai jat dat ai Sumla Hkrung rai nga ai.

HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW ABOUT MYITSONE DAM

Burma's Vice-President Implicated in Kachin Massacres

Convict Porters - War Crime

Revolution spinning in the wind

Obama, Dalai Lama Hold Talks

Ningmu Laika hte Shatsam N-gun Jaw Laika hkap la nga ai lam

Tsaw ra hkungga ai,
Nu, wa, hpu nau, manaw manang ni, Jinghku jingyu ni… daini na aten gaw Myen Asuya hpyen hpung ni anhte Wunpawng Jinghpaw nga manga hpe amyu shamyit majan kaba galaw na matu bungli hpang wa nga masai.. ndai hpe moi na zawn KIO/KIA Majan ngu nna atang ahpa nsawn la ga..ndai majan sum yang…Jinghpaw Wunpawng Amyu sha ni a shawng lam yawng nsin chyip re de du mat wa na gaw ga lahtum nshut re. Dai majaw .. nang/ngai majan pa de nlu sa ai rai yang…nang du nga ai shara kaw na anhte hpyen hpung a matu Kyu hpyi ya nga ga, Ningmu bawnu atsam hte garum shang lawm ga, ja gumhpraw hte shang lawm ga, yawm dik htum na a tsaw ra myit hpe madun ai hku nna shang lawm lu hkra shakut ga. Nang ngai amyu sha ni kaw na n-gun, ningmu, tsaw ra myit ni gaw kade daram manu dan ai lam.. lawu na Padang Hkrunlam Majan Masing Hpyen Hpu-Awn(commander) langai rai nga ai Du Jum(Cpt.) Myu Jet Awng a laika hpe hti yu yang asan sha chye lu nga saka ai.

Lama na nang hku nna KIOCC Ndau Laika a ntsa e ningmu jaw mayu ai shing nrai Majan Pa shawng lam e Amyu sha hte Mungdan a matu magrau grang grang gasat poi shang nga ai Shawnglam Hpyen La/ Hpyen Num ni hpang de laika ka n-gun jaw mayu ai nga yang ndai Blog htumpa e ka bang nhtawm (submit) ngu ai shara dip shagun dat na hpe lajin dat nngai..dai nre sha email laika hte aten la nna ka shagun na rai yang mung ( oka.jinghpaw21@gmail.com )de ka shagun dat na matu lajin laroi dat nngai law.

Yumaya Hpyen Magamgun Dingsa
(အညတ၇ ကခ်င္ စစ္သည္ေဟာင္း တစ္ဦး)


Hkawp Du Wa hpang de shana dat ai.

15-7-2011 ya shani na KIOCC Ndau Shabra laika hte seng nna Mungkan Mungdan shara shagu hta chyam bra nga ai WP Amyu Sha ni a ningmu hpe OKA kaw na kahkyin la yang kaja na re. Bai nna shawng lam majan pa kaw tinang sinda hpe kaduk shatai nna Amyu hte Mungdan a lawt lu lam amatu shakut shaja nga ai share ninghkring ni hpe n-gun jaw ai laika nimung mai shagun ya ai. Ndai lam ni hpe mung OKA kaw nna lit la woi awn ningshawng tai ya yang kaja na re.

Hkungga let,
Myu Jet Awng

KIO Central Committee Statement, July 15, 2011

Summary of KIO Central Committee Statement (not official translation)

KIO Central Committee Statement, July 15, 2011

The KIO Central Committee met with close to 150 civilian leaders and representatives at Laiza during July 12-13; the purpose was to ask what the Kachin people would want their leaders, the KIA/KIO to do in light of the momentary ceasing of hostilities with the forces of Thein Sein's government. The response, in raw, emotional terms, was to fight on for the rights of the people. The total absence of trustworthiness on the part of the military government is fully documented in the memory of Kachin people ranging over three generations now. Calm then emerged and the following political statements were framed with eventual unanimous consent.

Kachin people have not seen any results from the numerous previous peace talks or dialogs of the past; they want truly meaningful dialog this time. They want the government to make firm commitment, with concrete and transparent evidence of good faith by agreeing to a dialog that guarantees that the interests of both sides are clearly and fairly presented. Kachin people continue to believe, and have expressed through their leaders in the KIO/KIA, that the problems of the Union are political; fair and just political solutions must be found before there can be lasting peace and stability.

The KIO leaders reiterate that they serve the wish of the Kachin people, and should a dialog toward genuine peace and just solutions ensue, the leaders ask all Kachin people to be part of that political process. The KIO will continue to lead as mandated, and the Kachin people must be part of the movement that the KIO leads.

The Kachin people will take the stand, as iterated above, as a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council; they will expect the UNFC to be in any and all dialogs. "We will take our position together with the other partners of the UNFC, as one group."

The KIO expresses sincere gratitude to the all community leaders and representatives for always being there to answer its call for advice and discussion.

Notes and comments

The onset of hostility initiated by the junta government forces in June this year brought about the kind of rage and contempt that was universally felt by Kachins and hard to conceal. This emotional reaction stemmed from the experience of long oppression, especially since the abrogation of the rights of nationalities of the Union of Burma as framed in Panglong Agreement, 1947, and the founding constitution of 1948. The slogan through most of the recent meeting at Laiza was to fight on for justice and rights. When the percentage breakdown came out about how practically all civilian leaders advised continued armed resistance over any empty ceasefire and dialog, many of the men and women in uniform broke down in tears out of pride and happiness.

As the meeting progressed, the direction toward deriving the strongest possible political statement became the central focus. This was a poignant moment when anger was effectively transformed into reason. Two notable features of this KIO statement are, first, the total commitment of Kachin civilian leaders in this process, and the call of the KIO leaders to the Kachin people that for this change to have any meaning their leadership must be supported by an effective movement of all Kachins. Kachins reaffirmed national unity as well as the unity of political purpose.

The second significant feature is the emplacement of the strong momentum of Kachin people and KIO/KIA of the moment into the bulwark upon which the United Nationalities Federal Council had been founded. The KIO was instrumental in the founding of the UNFC, and now they have invested in it the identity and energy of the long Kachin struggle for justice and rights. The political agenda of the UNFC, one offering genuine federal democracy, stands head-and-shoulders above the "democracy" of President Thein Sein's governing organization. The Kachin political transformation will surely affect the entire UNFC.

Prepared for the Overseas Kachin Association News Website by SK.

KIO NDAU SHABRA LAIKA JULY 15, 2011

တင္းမာမႈဒ ီဂရီ တိုးျပလာေနတဲ့ မေနာေျမက ေသနတ္သံမ်ား

မလြတ္လပ္ၾကေသးေသာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၏တိုင္း၇င္းသားမ်ား

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 21, 2010 ၇က္ေန ့တင္ဆက္ျပီးေသာေဆာင္းပါးကိုျပန္လည္တင္ဆက္ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

အညတ၇ ကခ်င္စစ္သည္ေဟာင္း တစ္ဦး
(Yuamaya Hpyen Magamgun Dingsa)

BURMA: Letter to President Obama, July 7, 2011

သံမွဴးၾကီး ဦးေက်ာ္၀င္း အေမရိကန္တြင္ ႏုိင္ငံေရးခိုလံႈခြင့္ ေတာင္းခံမႈ အေပၚ ၀ါရင့္ သံတမန္ေဟာင္း တဦး၏ အျမင္

Diplomat seeks Asylum in US(Video News)

Regional Commanders Reshuffled

By WAI MOE Monday, July 4, 2011

In the first major development within Burma's military since it officially handed over power to a quasi-civilian administration on March 30, the War Office in Naypyidaw has reshuffled the commanders of at least six Regional Military Commands (RMCs) and filled two other important posts.

According to information leaked by military sources on Monday, the War Office, under Commander in Chief of Defense Services Gen Min Aung Hlaing, issued the reshuffle order on Friday, implementing a decision made during a triannual meeting of military commanders held in late May.

The latest reshuffle did not involve any promotions, as most of the regional commanders will simply be changing places, according to a military source.

“Brig-Gen Tin Maung Win, the commander of the Southwest RMC, will take over the Western RMC from Brig-Gen Soe Thein. Brig-Gen Tun Than will move to the Southern RMC headquarters at Taungoo, while Brig-Gen Soe Htut of the Southern RMC has been shifted to Taunggyi, the headquarters of the Eastern RMC, and Brig-Gen San Oo from Taunggyi is now the Rangoon commander,” the source said.

Two other vacant positions were also filled, although no names were available for the new appointees.

One of the positions, chief of the Bureau of Special Operations-6, was formerly held by Lt-Gen Soe Win, who became the deputy commander in chief of the defense services earlier this year. The other, chief of armed forces training, was held by Lt-Gen Hla Htay Win until he was named joint-chief of staff (army, navy, air force)on March 30.

Although Burmese military sources mentioned only half a dozen regional commanders who had changed positions, an official from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) said on condition of anonymity that the KIA's intelligence indicated that 12 of the Burmese army's 14 RMC commanders had been reshuffled.

The only two exceptions, he said, were Brig-Gen Ye Aung of the Central RMC and Brig-Gen Zayar Aung of the Northern RMC, which has been engaged in sporadic clashes with the KIA since mid-June.

Although all the reshuffled commanders were informed about their new appointments two weeks ago, they did not move to their new posts until this past weekend, sources said.

All of the commanders who were affected by the recent reshuffle were promoted from commanders of light infantry divisions and commandants of military schools during a massive military reshuffle in August 2010.

ျမန္မာ ဒု သံမႉး အေမရိကန္မွာ ႏိုင္ငံေရး ခိုလံႈခြင့္ေတာင္း

Diplomat Seeks Asylum in US

2011-07-03

A high-ranking Burmese embassy official says a lack of political progress pushed him to defect.
The number two diplomat at the Burmese Embassy in Washington, D.C. has defected and is now seeking political asylum in the United States.

Deputy Chief of Mission Kyaw Win, 59, told RFA he made the decision to leave the government because he saw little hope for Burma’s future and because he fears “my life and those of my family are in danger.”

Kyaw Win said that after Burma held historic elections last November, he expected the government to begin a transition to democracy. Instead, he said, nothing has changed and “the military continues to hold uncontested power.”

“Senior military officials are consolidating their grip on power and seeking to stamp out the voices of those seeking democracy,” he said, adding that war with the country’s ethnic groups is imminent.

Recent fighting between government troops and the ethnic Kachin army near the border with China has escalated, causing thousands of refugees to flee the conflict.

He also warned of threats made by the Burmese government against Nobel laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which he said “must be taken seriously.”

Suu Kyi, who turned 66 in June, recently announced plans for her first tour of Burma since 2003 when her visit to Depayin in the north was marred by what many believed was an assassination attempt against her by groups linked to the military junta.

Her motorcade was attacked by pro-junta thugs, resulting in the death of at least 70 of her supporters in what is known today as the Depayin massacre.

Burma’s state media warned Suu Kyi in a commentary last week that her tour could trigger riots.

Career diplomat

Kyaw Win is a career diplomat who has worked for the Burmese Foreign Ministry for 31 years.

During that time he served in Madrid, Geneva, New Delhi, Brasilia, and Washington.

But now, he says, the army of Burma’s late national hero and father of Suu Kyi, General Aung San, “has been corrupted” and has become “an oppressor of the people, not a defender of the people.”

The Burmese government has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including murder, torture, rape, forced labor, and the use of child soldiers.

Kyaw Win says he now supports an international inquiry into those violations. He is also calling for “highly targeted financial sanctions against the government and their cronies that serve to keep them in power.”

Deputy Chief of Mission is the highest posting a non-military person can hold in Burmese embassies. Kyaw Win has held the position in Washington since 2008.

But he said that his work reaching out to the diplomatic, governmental, and NGO communities in the U.S. capital may have made him a target of the regime he represents.

“My reports questioning the actions of the military and urging dialogue and reconciliation … resulted in my being deemed dangerous by the government,” he said, adding that he fears persecution should he return to Burma.

His message for Burma’s military is “not to fear democracy, but embrace it as the only way forward.”

Kyaw Win is not the first high-ranking Burmese diplomat to defect from the country.

In March 2005, former Major Aung Lynn Htut resigned as deputy chief of mission at the Burmese embassy in Washington and requested political asylum in the U.S. for himself, his wife, a son, two daughters and a sister.

At the time, he said that he feared for his life because of an ongoing purge of the associates of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who was ousted in 2004 following a power struggle with more hard-line officials in the military junta.

Several other Burmese diplomats defected from the country following a brutal crackdown on student-led protests opposing the rule of military dictator Ne Win in 1988.

Little progress

In November of 2010, the Burmese government held its first elections in 20 years, but blocked Suu Kyi, who had spent 15 of the last 21 years under house arrest, from participating and disbanded her opposition party, the National League for Democracy.

She was released by the ruling generals on Nov. 13 just after elections which were heavily criticized as a sham by the local opposition and Western nations.

The new quasi-civilian government, largely comprised of retired military officers, has not introduced any real reforms since then and is still holding some 2,200 political activists in prisons throughout the country.

Suu Kyi addressed U.S. lawmakers for the first time in June, asking them to help push for the release of Burma’s political prisoners and for a UN probe into human rights abuses in her country.

The United States and other Western governments have made freedom for Burmese political prisoners a key prerequisite for any easing of tough sanctions against Burma.

U.S. President Barack Obama's administration abandoned a previous policy of diplomatically isolating Burma and has attempted to engage the government over the past 18 months, but has achieved little progress.

Reported and translated by Khin Maung Soe for RFA’s Burmese service. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

အပစ္အခတ္၇ပ္စဲေ၇း မွ တိုင္း၇င္းသားမ်ား အတိုက္ခိုက္ခံေန၇ေသာ ဗမာအစိုး၇ တို ့၏ စစ္ဆင္ေ၇းအမ်ိဳးမ်ိဳး၇ပ္စဲေ၇းသို ့

KIA နဲ႔ အစိုးရ ေနာက္တႀကိမ္ အပစ္ရပ္ႏိုင္ဦးမလား

လ ိုင္ဇာၿမိဳ႕က ို တ ိုက ္ေတာ ့မယ ္ ဆ ိုရင္

ETHNIC AREAS UPDATE: BURMA HEADS TOWARD CIVIL WAR

Myanmar carrying out 'ethnic cleansing': missionary agency

Jul 1, 2011

VATICAN CITY - TROOPS in Myanmar are carrying out 'ethnic cleansing' against the mainly Christian Kachin ethnic minority near the Chinese border, the missionary news agency Fides reported on Friday.

Citing a local Catholic priest, Fides said fighting had forced 20,000 people to leave their homes so far and the number was increasing by the day.

Priests and nuns in the area 'are doing everything to help the ethnic Kachin refugees, almost all Christians, victims of a brutal repression carried out by the Burmese military', the priest was quoted as telling the Rome-based agency.

Clashes began when the government struck an agreement with China on the construction of a dam in the northern region, which would force the evacuation and flooding of villages where the Kachin people live, Fides said.

'They are women, children and old people who are at the mercy of the soldiers. These, when they meet the Kachin villages, carry out, for revenge, all sorts of violence, abuse and ransacking,' the priest said. 'They kill old people and children, rape women, burn homes, confiscate properties. They use ruthless methods to ethnic cleansing.'

The priest also said there was a risk of a 'humanitarian emergency' in the area for refugees out in the open as the rainy season approaches. -- AFP