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Thursday, December 16, 2010

Burma Needs Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Class Solidarity













by Dr. Zar Ni


Tuesday, December 14, 2010







The world knows plenty about Aung San Suu Kyi and what she represents. But it knows almost nothing about the generals beyond their international pariah status.


Self-styled Burma experts attest to this general ignorance of the essence of military rule and the psyche of those in power in Naypyidaw.


In private policy circles and public forums, many of these tea-leaf-readers continue to discuss a myriad of the country’s problems, still without putting their finger on the single most fundamental issue which most broadly accounts for the people’s daily misery and country’s bleak future.


Is it “bad governance?” Is it Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s callous leadership with its characteristic total disregard for public welfare? Is it the military’s persecution of ethnic nationalities (or minorities)? Is it widespread human rights violations? Is it the war crimes, which the Tatmataw, Burma's armed forces, are allegedly committing, especially in ethnic conflict zones? Or is it the country’s kleptocratic, repressive, and pathological state? Is it the predatory neighbors?


Of course, one would be tempted to tick the box “all of the above” and argue that specific problems – the regime’s failure, for example, to provide public services in health, education and social security or to set up an adequate and functioning system of agricultural credits for the country’s farmers, who make up the bulk of the population—need to be addressed, while waiting for the revolution to deliver.
However, Burma’s fundamental problem is not just about leadership, policy failure, dysfunctional institutions, rights abuses or fractured opposition movements.


Categorically speaking, Burma is confronted with nothing less than a full-scale pathological process of internal colonization, this time by its own military. This is an evolutionary process which was set in motion within the past 50 years, at least since the coup of 1962 decisively established one-party military rule, where the military and the State became coterminous or two-sides of a coin.
Indeed, Burma’s problems can best be understood as those of a colonial order.


Sixty-two years after independence from Britain, Burma has evolved into a dual-colony in which the population of more than 50 million citizens is being herded into a political space via the Orwellian “7-steps road map for democracy.” The ruling military clique backed by its 400,000-strong military will continue to make all decisions with massive societal and ecological consequences for the whole population; only this time their decisions are going to be made to sound constitutionally mandated, and in accord with the laws of the land.


Further, this small group of men subscribe to an irredeemably myopic and toxic version of ethno-nationalism which refashions Burma along the old feudal lines where the majority “Burmese and Buddhists,” as defined by these men in generals’ uniform, will be more equal in their Union of Republic of Myanmar.


Needless to say, the generals will pay lip service to ethnic unity and create nominal space for the ethnic people while pursuing “divide and rule” as the overarching strategy.


Substantial numbers of electoral seats won by the Shan and Arakanese parties which some analysts have hailed as “symbolic victories” look rather fishy in light of the looming “counterinsurgency” operations against the Karen, the Kachin, the Karenni and others.


It is worth stressing that the ruling generals have rejected the federal spirit of ethnic equality and violently opposed any struggle towards a genuine federated Union. They have declared dead the Panglong Agreement of 1947, the founding document of a modern, post-colonial Burma, wherein ethnic equality was enshrined as an inviolable pillar of multi-ethnic Burma.


In Burma’s new colonial rule under its own military, anything and anyone that doesn’t bend to the generals’ will is to be controlled, subjugated or crushed.


Suu Kyi and ethnic minority leaders, whether armed or not, are heading on an inevitable collision course with Burma’s military junta. For they have made repeated calls for national and ethnic reconciliation as well as genuine public expressions of inter-ethnic solidarity,


The last thing any colonial power would want and would tolerate is social and ethnic solidarity across communities, regions and classes.


For those who have viewed the emerging parliamentary and formal political processes as the only space in which the people’s voices can be heard, policies debated and public welfare advanced, it is time for a serious rethinking and soul-searching. In a polity where those in power in effect accept nothing but total surrender, where politics are regarded as an extension of war and everything is viewed through Zero-Sum lens, choosing sides becomes necessary.


There are no shades of gray in any colonial phenomenon. Battle lines are clearly drawn. The colonized are to be exploited, crushed, subjugated or co-opted.


The generals, of course, don’t see themselves as “native colonialists.” They feel no need for reconciliation along ethnic or political lines with any person, organization or community. In short, they have done nothing wrong, and they can do no wrong. For they perceive themselves as the country’s sole national guardian, untainted by partisan politics.


They are committed to the abstract idea of a multi-ethnic nation while trampling on the very idea in reality. And they embrace an absolutist notion of sovereignty where the military, not the people in whose name it exists, is sovereign. They love the country, but they can’t stand the people, especially the kind who refuse to go along with their design for the rest of the country. Political, defiant ethnic communities and 2,100 political prisoners spring to mind.


Their politics is all about resuming and completing the process of re-consolidation of the power of the ethnic Burmese majority, most specifically the soldiering class, over the rest of the ethnic minorities –a process only interrupted by the old kingdom’s 19th century defeat by Great Britain. Sixty years after independence, the military has built its own version of local colonial rule serving as the constitutionally-mandated ruling class and where the rest of the civilian society, ethnic majority and minorities alike, are second class citizens.


Twenty years ago, when the generals launched a ceasefire strategy with nearly 20 disparate ethnic armed resistance organizations, they weren’t acting out of genuine desire for reconciliation, but following a strategy to preempt the inter-ethnic solidarity between the Suu Kyi-led majority and rebellious minorities. Now that some of the most crucial ceasefires are likely to unravel, the highest strategic priority of the regime has become preventing inter-ethnic unity.


Throughout modern history, no colonialism is ever known to have offered the colonized political processes or institutions which would undo, or even undermine, such broad colonial objectives as economic exploitation of land, labor and natural resource, political domination and subjugation of populations under colonial rule, and control over the cultural and intellectual life of colonies.


Whether one has in mind the formal and classical version, which dissolved, thanks in no small part to colonialists slaughtering one another during the two 20th century world wars, or the subsequent and newer versions characteristic of the Cold War, the essence, objectives and nature of colonial rules remain virtually the same.


Words such as political, ethnic and international solidarity have been used too often and too lightly.
Humanitarian assistance, developmental aid, foreign direct investment, increased trade or commerce may be needed in any systemic efforts to rebuild poverty-stricken Third World nations emerging from decades of war and conflicts. But they are no substitute for forging an inter-ethnic and class solidarity, on which an inter-generational political resistance, armed and non-violent, depending on one’s own location, needs to be built.


The fact is the colonial state in the Union of the Republic of Myanmar stands in between public welfare and international assistance and increased foreign direct investment, which has been in the billions thanks to Burma’s economically predatory regional friends such as China, Thailand, India, Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore.


Precisely because this ethno-nationalist bond between the Burmese junta and the majority Buddhist Burmese has been irreparably broken down, the recent call by Suu Kyi and minority leaders for reconciliation and inter-ethnic solidarity against oppression poses the greatest threat to the ruling junta.


While Burma’s issues are complex, as far as the regime’s strategy is concerned it is a simple, time-tested “divide-and-rule.” The only way the opposition movements in particular and multi-ethnic communities in general can defeat these native colonizers is through inter-ethnic—and inter-class—solidarity.


It’s high time the international community, as well as ordinary citizens of Burma, address this strategic need and respond to the calls from Suu Kyi and the leaders of ethnic nationalities.



Dr Zarni is research fellow on Burma at the London School of Economics and Political Economics.



Sunday, November 14, 2010

Red Guards Say Sorry

November 11, 2010

But China's Communist Party still honors Cultural Revolution instigator Mao Zedong.















AFP

A group of young Chinese Red Guards march in Beijing, August, 1966.

HONG KONG—A group of former "Red Guards," Mao Zedong's army of students who denounced and persecuted teachers, doctors, and other authority figures in the name of revolution, have made a rare public apology to their former teachers.

Now in their sixties, former Red Guards Shen Xiaoke, Hu Bin, and Guo Canhui apologized publicly to former teachers whom they beat and spit on during the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), according to an article in the Guangzhou-based Southern Weekend newspaper.

They apologized for mistreating former Beijing Foreign Language Institute teacher Cheng Bi, 86, retired middle-school teacher Guan Qiulan, 81, and Li Huangguo, a retired teacher from the Beijing Mineral Industry Auxiliary Middle School, 79.

China has yet to authorize any national event in memory of this period in the nation’s history, and many still bear privately the scars of a time when neighbors, colleagues, and families denounced, attacked, and even killed one another in a frenzy of mass political "struggle."

U.S.-based author Zheng Yi, who was in the middle of his studies at Beijing's prestigious Qinghua University during the Cultural Revolution, said that while the apologies come late, they are still meaningful.

"Right from the time that the Cultural Revolution ended, we should have seen such acts," Zheng said. "It has taken until today, and the people doing the apologizing are all in their sixties."

"Of course a late apology is better than no apology," he said.

U.S.-based editor Hu Ping said he was at high school in the southwestern city of Chengdu during the 1960s.

"Of course it's late," Hu said. "A lot of the victims have already died."

"They should have been apologizing much earlier for the wrongs that they did to them."

"Nonetheless, we should recognize this apology as sincere, and we should still encourage it," he said.

Numbers unconfirmed

The Cultural Revolution has been officially labeled a "mistake of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, who launched the initial 1966 campaign against "capitalist roader" officials.

In the ensuing mayhem, qualified professionals like teachers and doctors were locked up in “cow pens,” while schools and universities were closed and health services fell into disarray under the supervision of "revolutionaries."

While the true number of casualties remains unconfirmed to this day, Southern Weekend quoted official statistics as saying that 1,772 people died nationwide in the violence, which was encouraged by then supreme leader Mao Zedong, the "Red Sun" of the era.

Recent research in the southern city of Shantou alone has shown that 100,000 people were accused as criminals, more than 4,500 were injured or disabled, and some 400 people died.

Chen, Hu and Guo had taken part in more violent "struggle sessions" than those involving the teachers named, the paper said, hinting at other victims who had died.

It said the students had written to their former victims to beg their forgiveness.

'A good start'

Retired teacher Cheng Bi replied in a letter: "You have made a good start," the paper said.

"This case was not an isolated one, even though public apologies are still rare before the entire historical truth is made known," the article said.

The article said the letters sprang from shelved plans to hold a moment of silence for the victims of the Cultural Revolution during a 50th anniversary celebration at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute.

Instead, the master of ceremonies merely expressed regret that principal Mo Ping, who died in 1968 after suffering severe beatings at the hands of Red Guards, "and others," could not attend the celebration.

Zheng said that none of the former Red Guards featured in the report were leading figures in the movement, which was unleashed by Mao Zedong as a way of gaining ascendancy once and for all over his political opponents.

He said many of the leaders of the Red Guards were the sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres close to Mao Zedong, and that many of the teachers "struggled" by their students in Beijing were beaten to death.

"These people [who apologized] all followed other people's lead and joined in," Zheng said.

Mao still honored

And he said that none of the apologies would make any difference to the ruling Communist Party while it still espoused the political ideology of "Mao Zedong Thought."

Communist Party leaders in Beijing still permit no national memorial to the Cultural Revolution, although officials in Guangdong's Shantou city built a museum in 2006, honoring those who died in the southern province.

The museum, which is privately financed and advertises only discreetly on the Internet, sits at the top of Tashan, a mountain where many of the Cultural Revolution dead from the nearby city of Shantou were buried.

Zheng said the leaders of the most violent attacks of the period have remained mute so far.

"We haven't heard an apology from a single one of the key assassins, the ones who went around beating people to death, or those who incited such acts of violence and bloodshed: the instigators and leaders," he said.

"Individual apologies by Red Guards aren't going to change the fact that the Chinese Communist Party still daren't face up to history," Zheng said.

Reported by Shi Shan for RFA's Mandarin service. Translated and written in English by Luisetta Mudie.

Sunday, August 15, 2010

WUNPAWNG AMYU SHA NI A MUNG MASA SHAWNGLAM BAWNGBAN HPAJI JAW HPAWNG GALAW

Knet; 2010 ning August 15 ya.

Wunpawng Mungdan Shanglawt Hpung (K.I.O) woi awn let Wunpawng Amyu Sha ni a Mung Masa shawnglam bawngban hpaji jaw hpawng hpe 2010 ning August shata 14 ya shani kawn Laiza Muklum, Ninggawn Daju Hpyen Dap hta galaw nga ai lam chye lu ai.

Ndai bawngban hpaji jaw hpawng galaw ai a yaw shada lam gaw Wunpawng Amyu Sha ni a shawnglam hte seng nna matut galaw sa wa na magam bungli ni a ntsa hta hpaji jaw ya lu na matu rai nga ai.

Zuphpawng hta K.I.O Ginjaw Salang ni hte saw shaga da ai Mare Buga shara shagu de na Mung Shawa gawng malai myit su Du Salang ni, Hpung woi Sara Kaba ni hkrum zup bawngban ai rai nna, zuphpawng hpe August 14 ya shani kawn 16 ya shani du hkra galaw sa wa na re hpe chye lu ai.

Zuphpawng hta hpaji jaw mat wa ai lam ni hpe K.I.O Ginjaw Komiti kaw nna bai myit yu na re lam, August shata htum wa maga de K.I.O Hpung shang masha ni a Party Congress hta bawngban jahkrup mat wa na re lam hpe chye lu ai.

Sunday, July 25, 2010

MUNG MASA HKRANG MASING GALAI AI LAM

MUNG-MASA HKRANG-MASING GALAI AI LAM
(athwin-ku:-pyaung: ye:{အသြင္ကးူေျပာင္းေ၇း}/political system change)

Ka lajang ai: N krip ai Wan-kang

I. Hkrang-masing galai ai lam – lachyum hpa rai ta
1. Mungmasa galaw ai hkrang masing A hpe B shabyin dat ai lam.
2. A hpe B galai shabyin nna yaw shada ai lam awng dang shangun ai lam.

Daini Wunpawng Jinghpaw ni a man e dawdan ra ai lam hta ndai ni hpe mu na ga ai.

Langai, amyu-masa (amyu grin nga lu na matu ra mara ahkaw ahkang lu la na masa lam) hte mung-masa lam hpe n mai ginhka ai lam. Ndai lam lahkawng hpe gumhpawn gayawp nna galaw nga ga ai re lam.

Lahkawng, WP ni a mung-masa wuhpung gaw, KIO-KIA langai sha re ai lam. Dai re majaw, hkrang-masing galai ai ngu yang KIO-KIA a hkrang masing lam rai nga ai lam.

Masum, Myen hpyen atsuya SPDC gaw, KIO-KIA a hkrang masing hpe BGF (Border Guard Force) byin hkra galai mayu ma ai lam.

Mali, WP amyu-sha ni a ra sharawng ai lam gaw, KIO-KIA a hkrang masing hpe tinang amyu a nga-sat nga-sa lam ahkaw ahkang hpe lu ging ai made daram (Panglung Myithkrum Ga-shaka, 1947 the maren) lu la na lam maga de mahtang KIO-KIA a hkrang-masing hpe galai mayu ai lam.

Ningrai nna myit mada mahkyen lam ni dam lada sung ai hku shai hkat nga ai.

II. Hkrang-masing galai lam a man-shingdu malawm magawm ni

Ndai lam ni hpe bai kahtap myit yu ra na rai ga ai.

Langai, SPDC gaw, KIO-KIA hpe hkrang masing galai dat ai majaw tinang hpyen atsuya a uphkang masa a shangwang kata e, BGF hku nna shang lawm na lam hpe ra nga ai. KIO-KIA gaw, Myen hpyen du ni a npu e hpaw tawn ai wuhpung byin wa na hku hkrang masing galai ya mayu nga ai.

Lahkawng, ndai hku KIO-KIA hpe BGF shabyin la ai hkrang masing galai ai lam hpe April shata, 2010 hta, n byin mai ai, WP ni Panglung ahkaw ahkang hpe n tat lu ai, ngu ai kaw du mat nna tawn kau ra mat wa sai.

Dai ni, KIO-KIA hpe WP wuhpung hku matut nga nga tim, BGF ngu masat tawn ai hkrang masing hpe lang mat wa na hku bai sawn yu wa nga ma ai zawn rai wa sai.

SPDC hpyen jaubu ni hte mazum nna ga-hkrum myit hkrum ai KIO-KIA Du Kaba ni pru wa hkra shakut nga ai zawn zawn, mung rai wa nga ai kun?

Masum, BGF a mahkyen gaw, WP amyu sha ni ahkaw ahkang hkam la lu na masing hpe tsep kawp shaw tsan kau na masing re majaw, hkrang masing galai ai lam hta, KIO-KIA gaw, SPDC a mahkyen hte nhtan shai ai hku, shanhte katsi yang anhte kahtet ai hku sha, hkrang masing mai galai na rai nga ai lam dan leng wa sai re.

III. Hkrang-masing galai lam – WP ni a hkrang masing mahkyen lam

Ya ndai lam ni hpe bai myit yu ga.

Langai, WP ni a matu amyu-masa lam hte mung-masa lam gaw langai sha re majaw, KIO-KIA hte seng nna hkrang masing galai na lam gaw, amyu a lam, amyu hku dawdan ra ai lam, rai nga ai. KIO-KIA wuhpung kata e dawdan mai ai lam n rai nga ai.

Lahkawng, WP amyu-masa gaw ahkaw ahkang hkum hkum tsup tsup lu la na lam rai nga ai; kaga lam tsep kawp n lawm nga ai.

Masum, ahkaw ahkang hkum hkum tsup lu la na lam hpe madung n shatai ai hkrang-masing galai na lam hpe gara hku mung n mai hkap la ai lam hkrak sha mu lu ai lam.

Mali, rawt malan KIO-KIA hpung hta, tinang wuhpung hpe sha yu yu nna, amyu-masa hpe n yu shalawm ai hku dawdan chye ai lailen nga lai wa sai rai yang, dai ni dai lailen hpe n galai kau n mai rai sai.

Manga, WP shawa a ntsa e mung, KIO-KIA hpe wuhpung hkrang-masing galai na lam hpe shinggan de nna shadut ai ni nga nga sai re majaw, tinang amyu shawa a nsen gaw, “N mai byin ai, n byin lu ai” ngu ra sai.

Kru, KIO-KIA hpe amyu-masa galaw ai wuhpung hku nna WP shawa hkap la sharawt tawn ai teng yang, dai wuhpung hpe ra mara lam hta madi shadaw na lit hpe amyu-shawa gaw, rap larau dagraw la ra ai lam nga nga ai.

KIO-KIA hpe amyu-masa hkrang masing hpe manat tawn shangun na rai yang, KIO-KIA gaw WP amyu yawng a lagaw lata hkum daw hkum chyen rai ra nga ai.

Sanit, WP shawa KIO-KIA hpe tinang amyu a hkum hkrang n-gun atsam hku n sharawt shagrin la yang, KIO-KIA gaw WP amyu-masa a hkrang masing a shanggan e rai ang mat wa na re law.

IV. Dai ni na manghkang
Ndai lam ni hpe mung myit yu ra ai.
Langai, KIO-KIA mung-masa galaw ai ladat gaw, gap-hkat jahkring ai aten, 1994, nna, bawngban jahkrup ai masa hpe sha hkan shachyut nga ai. Shingdu e masa n ginsup nga ai. Lam madung langai hpe sha hkan nang sa wa nga ai.

Lahkawng, dai ni SPDC a dawhkrawng Kokang hpyen hpung hpe, Miwa ni garum ai the, Jinghpaw Mungdaw, shawng na NDA-K ginra de htawt bang tawn masai.

Anhte the bawngban jahkrup nga ai “hpyen” ni gaw, anhte shingdu e masa n hkring n sa ginsup nga ai.

Masum, anhte a mung-masa ningbaw ningla ni gaw, wora maga na ni a myiman hpe sha yu ai, dai hpe sha mu ai, shingdu e byin wa ai hpe n shingdang lu mat wa sai. Hukawng lahta de ya lawu ga de nna masha 100,000 bai bu htawn bang la na re da. Ndai hku nna 2010 ra-lata dang hkra mahkyen galaw nga ma ai. Anhte a daidaw buga n rai ni?

Mali, htingbu mungdan Miwa Mung, India Mungdan ni dai ni anhte hpe yu kaji mat wa sai. Sinna democracy mungdan kaba ni anhte shamu shamawt na kade wa alat yu tim, anhte a hpa-awn ningshawng ni gaw, “hpyen” ni a myiman hpe sha mada azi taw nga ai zawn n re ni?

Anhte a amyu masa lam hta hkrang masing galai mat wa sahka, ngu ra na kun?



Aten ma mat wa nga sai, Wunpawng Jinghpaw Amyu Sha yawng dum hprang saka, nsen kaba, n-gun kaba hte rawt sa wa saka.

Ka lajang ai: N krip ai wan kang, OKA Nsen

Thursday, April 29, 2010

CHANGING WINDS IN KACHINLAND

Pondering the BGF issue's imminent death
J. M. “Martin” Edmunds
Special to OKA News

It's February 2010, near Laiza, Kachin State – “The Border Guard Force issue will die very soon, the way I see it. The Burman junta will change strategy then, and I hope you KIA fellows can roll with the punches and keep up the opposition” said a civilian Kachin elder who's frequently consulted because he's always been trusted. As he intones, two uniformed men and two other civilians plus myself, sit with him, and listen intently, noting each word. The two in uniform are the top leaders of the KIA. The other civilians are respected leaders in their communities. To this observer a number of things are highly unusual, and overall, this meeting reflects the nature of the Kachin opposition to the SPDC today in a number of ways. I would like to share some of these with you.

These gentlemen are pondering politics beyond the BGF detente between the SPDC generals and the KIO.

A second civilian leader next speaks. “All these months while the BGF issue is being discussed on the surface, the junta is really studying why the Kachin civilians and the KIO, I really mean the KIA, have such strong unity, they are trying to find a vulnerable point that they can attack. This is what we have to worry about more than anything. The BGF talk is just a ploy for now.”

Another chimes in, “Plus, how many deadlines can you give and keep a straight face? This BGF requirement started last year about this time.”

The first civilian leader adds “Our dilemma as I see it, will be that they will say let's keep the ceasefire agreement, and then attack our unity as a people. We must always understand that they fear the civilian population far more than the military. If their soldiers attacked our civilians, the international media will be all over them, that's why. Right now they are trying to think up strategies to destroy our unity within the ceasefire framework. They have always worked on the divide and rule premises.”

At this juncture the senior KIA man says “Look at page 14 of the document that was circulated to everyone. It says here that the junta fears civilian power the most, and for this reason, the junta will seek to control the Burmans first and foremost because they have the largest civilian population that does not want to accept the junta's plans for this country.”

The third civilian leader adds, “ We need to remember that under the ceasefire the junta army can still intimidate our civilian population, but the KIA cannot. We do not treat our fellow Kachins in the manner that the junta army treats the Burman civilians and all others. So Kachins will be at a tremendous disadvantage in the post-BGF game. It is clear that our KIA must pursue a very proactive and energetic relationship with our own people. We must constantly reassure and reaffirm our unity.”

The second KIA officer now says, “This will be the right thing to do, going to the people. We are supposed to be opposing a military regime for the purpose of rebuilding a democratic system. We must go to our people because that's the right way.”

Everyone nods in agreement.

It is clear that these Kachins are already looking beyond the BGF detente, late in February, 2010; it is also clear that looking beyond together are civilian leaders (4) and KIA men (2), neither of whom is among the usually familiar KIO leaders.

Now, late April --Advance now to the end of April, and the course of BGF has indeed ended, by decision of the junta, that it is hopeless. The barrier presented by the KIO has been that Kachin people do not want to accept it. What the Kachin people want is in the Panglong Agreement, 1947, and Constitution which founded the Union of Burma in 1948.

The imperial SPDC's new clothes
The big news today sees junta generals resigning from the military to form political organizations. In Kachin State the junta generals have invited those members of the KIO senior leadership who have been soft on the BGF debate; they are being invited to form a political party with them. In lower Burma some twenty generals have similarly resigned to enter political participation as civilians!

What is not changing
All the generals who are resigning to enter politics hold positions related to civil administration; they do not command troops. The commanding generals of the directional commands (or taing:hmu rank) are not taking this step.

It is clear, as the Kachin leaders already realized, that this is driven by the fear of civilian polity, and it is intended to dilute Kachin and other ethnic groups' political feelings and dissuade us all from a potential eruption, as in 1988 and 1990. In Kachin State it is so clear that their new target at the moment is the political unity of Kachins. Remember, that the junta is well practiced in the strategy of divide and rule...

J. Martin Edmunds is a contributor to OKA News, the official eNews of Overseas Kachin Association

CHANGING WINDS IN KACHINLAND

Pondering the BGF issue's imminent death
J. M. “Martin” Edmunds
Special to OKA News

It's February 2010, near Laiza, Kachin State – “The Border Guard Force issue will die very soon, the way I see it. The Burman junta will change strategy then, and I hope you KIA fellows can roll with the punches and keep up the opposition” said a civilian Kachin elder who's frequently consulted because he's always been trusted. As he intones, two uniformed men and two other civilians plus myself, sit with him, and listen intently, noting each word. The two in uniform are the top leaders of the KIA. The other civilians are respected leaders in their communities. To this observer a number of things are highly unusual, and overall, this meeting reflects the nature of the Kachin opposition to the SPDC today in a number of ways. I would like to share some of these with you.

These gentlemen are pondering politics beyond the BGF detente between the SPDC generals and the KIO.

A second civilian leader next speaks. “All these months while the BGF issue is being discussed on the surface, the junta is really studying why the Kachin civilians and the KIO, I really mean the KIA, have such strong unity, they are trying to find a vulnerable point that they can attack. This is what we have to worry about more than anything. The BGF talk is just a ploy for now.”

Another chimes in, “Plus, how many deadlines can you give and keep a straight face? This BGF requirement started last year about this time.”

The first civilian leader adds “Our dilemma as I see it, will be that they will say let's keep the ceasefire agreement, and then attack our unity as a people. We must always understand that they fear the civilian population far more than the military. If their soldiers attacked our civilians, the international media will be all over them, that's why. Right now they are trying to think up strategies to destroy our unity within the ceasefire framework. They have always worked on the divide and rule premises.”

At this juncture the senior KIA man says “Look at page 14 of the document that was circulated to everyone. It says here that the junta fears civilian power the most, and for this reason, the junta will seek to control the Burmans first and foremost because they have the largest civilian population that does not want to accept the junta's plans for this country.”

The third civilian leader adds, “ We need to remember that under the ceasefire the junta army can still intimidate our civilian population, but the KIA cannot. We do not treat our fellow Kachins in the manner that the junta army treats the Burman civilians and all others. So Kachins will be at a tremendous disadvantage in the post-BGF game. It is clear that our KIA must pursue a very proactive and energetic relationship with our own people. We must constantly reassure and reaffirm our unity.”

The second KIA officer now says, “This will be the right thing to do, going to the people. We are supposed to be opposing a military regime for the purpose of rebuilding a democratic system. We must go to our people because that's the right way.”

Everyone nods in agreement.

It is clear that these Kachins are already looking beyond the BGF detente, late in February, 2010; it is also clear that looking beyond together are civilian leaders (4) and KIA men (2), neither of whom is among the usually familiar KIO leaders.

Now, late April --Advance now to the end of April, and the course of BGF has indeed ended, by decision of the junta, that it is hopeless. The barrier presented by the KIO has been that Kachin people do not want to accept it. What the Kachin people want is in the Panglong Agreement, 1947, and Constitution which founded the Union of Burma in 1948.

The imperial SPDC's new clothes
The big news today sees junta generals resigning from the military to form political organizations. In Kachin State the junta generals have invited those members of the KIO senior leadership who have been soft on the BGF debate; they are being invited to form a political party with them. In lower Burma some twenty generals have similarly resigned to enter political participation as civilians!

What is not changing
All the generals who are resigning to enter politics hold positions related to civil administration; they do not command troops. The commanding generals of the directional commands (or taing:hmu rank) are not taking this step.

It is clear, as the Kachin leaders already realized, that this is driven by the fear of civilian polity, and it is intended to dilute Kachin and other ethnic groups' political feelings and dissuade us all from a potential eruption, as in 1988 and 1990. In Kachin State it is so clear that their new target at the moment is the political unity of Kachins. Remember, that the junta is well practiced in the strategy of divide and rule...

J. Martin Edmunds is a contributor to OKA News, the official eNews of Overseas Kachin Association