by Peter Martin & David Cohen – 6 September 2011 8:58AM
Interview with Tang Qifang, Southeast Asia specialist at the foreign ministry-affiliated China Institute of International Studies by Peter Martin and David Cohen. Peter and David are conducting a series of interviews with Chinese academics and journalists, using reader-submitted questions.
From Alejandro: Do you think China will be forced to send soldiers to potential hotspots to protect their investments in foreign countries, such as hydroelectric dams in Burma? Would they send military forces or would they be willing to lose investments rather than fall into a ‘US war’ trap?
I don’t think so. In 2009 there was a very bad conflict between ethnic groups and the then-military government of Myanmar, right along the border with China. During the period of that conflict, a lot of Chinese people lost their investments, and their shops, their factories, because that area is very near to the China-Myanmar border. There were about 30-40 thousand Chinese immigrants and overseas Chinese in that area, and they had to flee back to China, so that’s a very bad condition for Chinese people and the Chinese government. But although it is very near to the Chinese border, China never thought about sending any troops to help them. We just helped them on the Chinese side, helped our people to come back.
So I think from this example you can see the viewpoint of China: no interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Especially with Burma — you know that when this principle was brought out in 1955, it was during the talk between Chairman Mao and the leader of Burma. So that I think see that we can see that China won’t do that.
From Ocean: What role do ethnic Chinese populations in Southeast Asian countries play in China’s relations with Southeast Asia?
In the past, that used to be a very sensitive topic, to talk about ethnic Chinese, especially in Malaysia, because the Malaysian Communist Party in the 1960s and 70s, and we can see that there were some misunderstandings or some not very pleasant happenings, and these kinds of stories had an impact on the relationship between China and Malaysia and Indonesia at this time. But now that we can see that in the last 20 or 30 years, ethnic Chinese became rich in Southeast Asia.
In 1949, when Communist China was founded, there was a clear policy toward ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: the Chinese government encouraged them to join the nationality of the local country, because China didn’t recognize dual nationality. I think this kind of principle is very good, but later, after the 1970s, overseas Chinese began to find that there are many good opportunities for businesses in China.
Martin/Cohen: You said before that China encouraged Chinese people to leave Myanmar during the 2009 conflict. Could that include ethnic Chinese citizens of Myanmar in a future conflict?
If something like 1998 happened, I think that’s possible. There’s a very big difference between immigrants and overseas Chinese — if they have Chinese nationality, China of course has the responsibility to protect them, but if they choose the nationality of the local country, they are not Chinese people, they are ethnic Chinese, and the Chinese government should respect their personal choice. But if they want to choose Chinese mainland as a place to be protected, of course we should respect their choice. I think if they choose to ask for protection from mainland China, I think mainland China will try its best to help them.
From Alexander: In light of the level and the type of language used in Chinese press statements, words such as ‘indisputable sovereignty’ and ‘core interests’, does China consider its territorial dispute in the South China Sea to be a domestic issue?
To some extent, because all the parties claim it is their sea, China takes it as a domestic issue, but the fact is that now it has become an international conflict between China and the ASEAN countries. So it is not only a domestic issue. Considering the way Deng Xiaoping offered to put aside the sovereignty conflict and to focus on cooperation and development in the South China Sea, I think that’s a sign that China doesn’t only consider it as a domestic issue.
From Linda: how does China assess Indonesia’s current trajectory in the international arena? How would China hope to see Indonesia’s role develop in Southeast Asia and further afield?
Indonesia is the biggest country in Southeast Asia, and it has always wanted to take a key role in the region. But the leadership of the ASEAN countries is not really held by any certain country. Although Indonesia is very big and very important, not only in Southeast Asia, but in the Asia-Pacific region, but so far it hasn’t managed to take as important a role as it wants to. Maybe that’s why Indonesia is very eager to make active communications not only in Southeast Asia but also in other areas of international cooperation, and we can see that especially in climate change, where Indonesia takes a very active role.
From Ho Yi Jian: Could you describe the state of Southeast Asian expertise in China?
In China, frankly speaking, I don’t think there’s enough expertise in Southeast Asia is to support the corporations and the government. There are specialists in Southeast Asian languages, for example, in the foreign languages universities, but most of them only specialize in language. There is also very important expertise in the provinces near to Southeast Asian countries, like Guangxi province, and Yunnan province, and Guizhou province, because they have the advantage of communication. Of course, there are some military institutes, but they are secret. They’re very powerful, but we don’t know what they are doing. Even I don’t know. They do very good research, but we cannot share them.
Just last month I attended an academic conference, and someone said that Southeast Asian countries are not as important to China as in the past, that China is not just a power in East Asia, but also in the Asia Pacific, so it should focus on dealing with other big powers, like the US, like Japan, even countries in Latin America. I will never agree with this kind of analysis — I think your closest neighbors should be your closest friends.
From Nicholas Farrelly of New Mandala: In 2011, longstanding ceasefire agreements are crumbling across Burma. The resumption of hostilities in the Shan and Kachin States has seen particularly heavy fighting already. What is China’s role in these re-ignited border wars? Does the Chinese Government have the capacity to broker permanent peace in those deeply troubled areas? If it does, why has it remained so apparently reluctant to get involved?
This conflict, of course, is not a new one, and has very deep roots in history and tradition. We can see that especially since 2009 the military government has been trying to get more control over these areas. They want to control the local military powers, the local troops, so there has been a very big conflict. Of course, they managed to get rid of the powers of some of them, but other groups like the Kachin are still there.
I am not really an expert on the military, but I think that to some extent China has influence on the military government, especially in the area near the China-Myanmar border, but in other areas, like the area between Myanmar and India, I don’t think China has any space to talk about that.
But because China cares about the security of its immigrants and investment, I think China will try its best to ask the government of Myanmar to keep the peace. But because of the balanced diplomacy of the Myanmar Government, they are also in touch with India and the US, so I don’t think China has a very powerful influence.
From Khmerization: China has invested heavily in the Cambodian economy, but is also heavily involved in the destruction of Cambodian environment through its hydro-electric dam-building and deforestation. Do you think that Chinese investments are good for Cambodia or harmful to Cambodia in the long run? Do you think that, due to China’s economic powerhouse, China can help power Cambodia into economic prosperity? Finally, Chinese leadership have tremendous political leverage over the Cambodian leadership, as strong as the political leverage they had with the Khmer Rouge leadership in the 1970s. With this kind of political influence, is there a risk that Cambodia could plunge into similar situation like during the Khmer Rouge regime?
Since the comprehensive free trade agreement took effect last year, more and more investment has been pouring into Cambodia, especially from the government and agricultural sector and things like that. So some things are happening which are bad for the environment of the Mekong river countries. You mentioned deforestation, which is not only bad for downstream countries, but also for China itself. As far the water problem, China and mother Mekong countries are cooperating and sharing these limited resources, but the problem should be sharing a limited resource, but finding ways to make more water resources.
So what China can do is to protect the environment and the resources of the river, is to keep the forest. But the Chinese Government cannot stop illegal logging inside China, and Chinese resources are not enough, so people are going outside China for them. I think that investment is necessary to support development, but the problem is what kind of development. Development could be just like what China did in the last three decades, depending only on human resources and consuming natural resources. I think we should try to help them avoid this kind of development.
I think an undeveloped country is just one that hasn’t developed yet, so they have more opportunities than developed countries. They have access to more modern technology, so I think countries that want to make investments should think about what kind of welfare it can bring to the local country and the local environment. If development is just like what China did in the last three decades, well…you have the financial wealth, but you completely destroyed the environment. We have to make sure Cambodia doesn’t develop like that.
